THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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Henry Kissinger

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Wilson's Belated Triumph
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The Great War: Mystery or Error?
Michael Howard

Britain and the Intellectuals
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Eric Hobsbawm's Eight Lies
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Essays & Comments:

Kurt Campbell, Charles King, Anatol Lieven, J.M. Roberts, Owen Harries

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—Jeane J. Kirkpatrick



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An Announcement

This issue of *The National Interest* marks the beginning of a new era in the life of the magazine. A new era that will be continuous with the old—that must be emphasized. But, after sixteen years, it is not surprising that there will be changes:

Owen Harries, the founding Editor, is retiring and will be leaving in June to return to Australia, whence he came. *The National Interest* has been "his" magazine to the degree it has been anyone's, and his departure is painful to us all. The pain, however, will be assuaged by his remaining our Editor Emeritus and an active Consulting Editor.

Irving Kristol, who has been Publisher since the founding of the magazine, will step down and become Honorary Chairman of the Advisory Board. The new Publisher, we are pleased to announce, will be James Schlesinger, who needs no introduction to our readers. Conrad M. Black, another past contributor to our pages, will remain Chairman of the Advisory Board and will be joined in that position by Henry Kissinger.

Adam Garfinkle, formerly Executive Editor of the magazine, will now be Editor.

A new nonprofit organization, The National Interest, Inc., will replace National Affairs, Inc. as the institutional publisher. This organization represents a partnership between Hollinger International, Inc. (of which Mr. Black is Chairman) and The Nixon Center in Washington, DC.

All of the "new names" are also "old names," having been associated with *The National Interest* for many years. So the magazine itself will undergo no kind of radical transformation. It will be recognizably what it has been over the past two decades, a magazine we are all proud of.

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Over and Out

Owen Harries

WITH THIS issue of *The National Interest*—the sixty-fourth—I am retiring as its editor. I arrived in Washington, DC in 1983, a displaced Welsh-Australian knowing hardly a soul in the country let alone the city, and having just finished a seven-year spell working for the Australian government. In little over a year, and with only a very modest experience in the editing business to recommend me, I was invited to launch and run an ambitious new foreign policy magazine. As they say, only in America.

The initiators and risk-takers in this venture were Irving Kristol and Michael Joyce, who was then just taking up the position of CEO in the recently formed Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. I am profoundly grateful to both of them for what turned out to be the most enjoyable and rewarding job of my life. Their only concession to caution in placing their bets on someone who was, literally, a rank outsider was to persuade Robert Tucker, a distinguished scholar and commentator in the field of international relations, to become co-editor. He was meant, I believe, to provide what the cricketing English refer to as a "safe pair of hands", should I prove to be too erratic. A co-editor arrangement can be tricky, but this one worked fine during the four years it was in place.

The National Interest was conceived not as a journal but as a magazine, not as an academic publication but as an intellectual one, not as a disinterested voice but as a committed one. Although our main focus of interest was to be foreign policy, we interpreted the subject broadly and were interested in, among other things, the history of ideas, religion, novels and poetry, anthropology, military history and movies. We wanted good clear writing and a minimum of jargon. We dispensed with "peer review" and trusted our own judgment. We tolerated footnotes reluctantly, though we have steadily given ground on this over the years.

In our opening editorial—and indeed in our choice of name—we made it clear that the disposition of the magazine would be a realist one: that is, that it would respect the primacy of self-interest as a motive, and of power as a means, in an international system that lacked a polity. As for our commitment, we were unapologetic cold warriors who firmly believed that America's opponent in that protracted conflict was indeed an evil empire. The year that *The National Interest* was launched was also the year that Mikhail Gorbachev emerged as Soviet leader, but the Cold War was still very much a going concern. The Soviet army was fighting a vicious war in Afghanistan, while the struggle to get Pershing missiles into Germany and the shooting down of the civilian South

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Korean Boeing 747 by the Soviet air force were still fresh in the memory.

Truth to tell, though, while the issues at stake in the Cold War continued to be of the utmost importance, by the mid-1980s they did not lend themselves readily to intellectual discovery and excitement. The script of the conflict had been written, the parts allocated and rehearsed, decades earlier. Until nearly the very end it was a static and monotonous affair, the arguments and counter-arguments mostly known by heart. In these circumstances, what was called for was not so much originality and brilliance as stamina and determination, a willingness to go around the block again and again, combating error and falsehood and insisting on reiterating truths, even if by now some of them verged on clichés. This we did conscientiously and effectively, but it was hard to break new ground in the process.

ONLY when it became clear that the Cold War was ending, I believe, did *The National Interest* really come fully into its own. Suddenly the international scene was full of novelty, drama and unpredictable movement. In these circumstances we were very quick off the mark. In the summer of 1989, several months before the Berlin Wall came down, we published Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History?" It was an overnight sensation—innumerable op-ed analyses, translations into more than twenty languages, requests for copies from Thatcher's No. 10 Downing Street, disparaging references in Gorbachev's speeches—and twelve years on it still remains the most discussed article on the post-Cold War era. Soon afterwards we ran a wide-ranging symposium on what was to be "America's Purpose" in that era, with articles ranging from Charles Krauthammer on "unipolarity" to Jeane Kirkpatrick on becoming a "normal country" again, and from Patrick Buchanan on "America First—and Second, and Third" to Nathan Glazer arguing that it was "a time for modesty." That was soon followed by a special issue on *The Strange Death of Soviet Communism*, with contributors of such caliber as Robert Conquest, Richard Pipes, Martin Malia, Peter Reddaway and Stephen Sestanovich—as well as an autobiographical essay by Saul Bellow.

In the post-Cold War climate, it soon became apparent that what had seemed a pretty solid anti-communist front for the duration of the conflict had really been no more than a coalition of disparate elements, held together only by the presence of a shared and compelling threat. There were realists and idealists; conservatives, neoconservatives and old-style liberals; patriots and globalists. And each of these positions had its moderate and hard versions: realists whose preference was for stability and balance, and realists who believed that the only sensible course was to take full advantage of a favorable power situation; idealists who advocated promoting American values only by example, and idealists who believed in the more robust methods of intervention and indoctrination; patriots who settled for respect and the status of *primus inter pares*, and patriots who believed that it was America's destiny and duty to run the world; those who believed that "globalization" would merely mean the complication and modification of the existing system of states, and those who insisted that it was destined to transform that system utterly.

The complicated debates to which all this has given rise have largely centered on specific issues and episodes—Bosnia, NATO expansion, Kosovo, relations with China, the European Union. In almost all of these, *The National Interest* I have edited has argued the case for a restrained and measured realism, one that takes account

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of the intractability of things, the limits of what most Americans are prepared to support, and what in the longer term other states will tolerate. It has also tried to make the case for giving as much weight to what remains the same as to what is novel and eye-catching, in a world where much is changing rapidly. And, while yielding to no one in its admiration for the United States, it has been concerned to caution against formulating policy on the basis that America is largely exempt from the forces and rules that determine the fate of other countries. America is indeed exceptional. But that does not necessarily mean that well-tested political truths do not apply in its case, or that liberties may be taken with them, even in the name of Liberty, without the risk of dire consequences.

These views have led to spirited debates and some sharp but civil differences of opinion with many friends and colleagues. This is as it should be and as we had promised it would be. In our very first issue in 1985 we said that a principal aim of the magazine would be to stimulate and focus lively discussion among the variety of conservative, neoconservative and neoliberal voices—and to prove that we meant what we said, in that same first issue we published a stimulating article by our esteemed publisher dismissing the very concept of "national interest" as "dead beyond resurrection." We have not looked back since. And we may be sure that in whatever other ways *The National Interest* may change from here on, it will remain committed to that aim. □

Back to the Drawing Board

The Clausewitzian analysis is breaking down. It is true that war is an extension of policy—but only when waged by stable states. War is escaping from state control, into the hands of bandits and anarchists. The great work of disarming tribes, sects, warlords and criminals—a principal achievement of monarchs in the 17th century and empires in the 19th—threatens to need doing all over again. Not many military establishments possess the skills, equipment and cultural ruthlessness necessary for the task.

—John Keegan, *Spectator* (London), March 24, 2001

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

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America at the Apex

Empire or Leader?

Henry Kissinger

AT THE DAWN of the new millennium, the United States is enjoying a pre-eminence unrivaled by even the greatest empires of the past. From weaponry to entrepreneurship, from science to technology, from higher education to popular culture, America exercises an unparalleled ascendancy around the globe. During the last decade of the twentieth century, America's preponderant position rendered it the indispensable component of international stability. It mediated disputes in key trouble spots to the point that, in the Middle East, it had become an integral part of the peace process. So committed was the United States to this role that it almost ritually put itself forward as mediator, occasionally even when it was not invited by all the parties involved—as in the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan in July 1999. The United States considered itself both the source and the guarantor of democratic institutions around the globe, increasingly setting itself up as the judge of the fairness of foreign elections and applying economic sanctions or other pressures if its criteria were not met.

Henry Kissinger is chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc. © 2001 by Henry Kissinger. From his forthcoming book *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?* to be published in June 2001 by Simon & Schuster. Printed by permission.

As a result, American troops are scattered around the world, from the plains of Northern Europe to the lines of confrontation in East Asia. These way stations of America's involvement verge, in the name of peacekeeping, on turning into permanent military commitments. In the Balkans, the United States is performing essentially the same functions as did the Austrian and Ottoman empires at the turn of the last century, of keeping the peace by establishing protectorates interposed between warring ethnic groups. It dominates the international financial system by providing the single largest pool of investment capital, the most attractive haven for investors, and the largest market for foreign exports. American popular culture sets standards of taste around the world even as it provides the occasional flash point for national resentments.

The legacy of the 1990s has produced a paradox. On the one hand, the United States is sufficiently powerful to be able to insist on its view and to carry the day often enough to evoke charges of American hegemony. At the same time, American prescriptions for the rest of the world often reflect either domestic pressures or a reiteration of maxims drawn from the experience of the Cold War. The result is that the country's pre-eminence is coupled with the serious potential of becoming irrelevant to many of the currents affecting and ultimately transform-

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ing the global order. The international scene exhibits a strange mixture of respect for—and submission to—America's power, accompanied by occasional exasperation with its prescriptions and confusion as to its long-term purposes.

Ironically, America's pre-eminence is often treated with indifference by its own people. Judging from media coverage and congressional sentiments—two important barometers—Americans' interest in foreign policy is at an all-time low.[1] Hence prudence impels aspiring politicians to avoid discussions of foreign policy and to define leadership as a reflection of current popular sentiments rather than as a challenge to raise America's sights. The last presidential election was the third in a row in which foreign policy was not seriously discussed by the candidates. Especially in the 1990s, American pre-eminence evolved less from a strategic design than a series of *ad hoc* decisions designed to satisfy domestic constituencies while, in the economic field, it was driven by technology and the resulting unprecedented gains in American productivity. All this has given rise to the temptation of acting as if the United States needed no long-range foreign policy at all and could confine itself to a case-by-case response to challenges as they arise.

At the apogee of its power, the United States finds itself in an ironic position. In the face of perhaps the most profound and widespread upheavals the world has ever seen, it has failed to develop concepts relevant to the emerging realities. Victory in the Cold War tempts smugness; satisfaction with the status quo causes policy to be viewed as a projection of the familiar into the future; astonishing economic performance lures policymakers to confuse strategy with economics and makes them less sensitive to the political, cultural, and spiritual impact of the vast transformations brought about by American technology.

Coinciding with the end of the Cold War, the combination of self-satisfaction and prosperity has engendered a sense of American destiny that expresses itself in a dual myth: On the left, many see the United States as the ultimate arbitrator of domestic evolutions all over the world. They act as if America has the appropriate democratic solution for every other society regardless of cultural and historical differences. For this school of thought, foreign policy equates with social policy. It deprecates the significance of victory in the Cold War because, in its view, history and the inevitable trend toward democracy would have by themselves brought about the disintegration of the Communist system.

On the right, some imagine that the Soviet Union's collapse came about more or less automatically as the result of a new American assertiveness expressed in the change in rhetoric ("the Evil Empire") rather than from bipartisan exertions spanning nine administrations over almost half a century. And they believe, based on this interpretation of history, that the solution to the world's ills is American hegemony—the imposition of American solutions on the world's trouble spots by the unabashed affirmation of its pre-eminence.

Either interpretation makes it difficult to elaborate a long-range approach to a world in transition. Such controversy on foreign policy as takes place is divided between an attitude of missionary rectitude on one side and a sense that the accumulation of power is self-implementing on the other. The debate focuses on an abstract issue: whether values or interest, idealism or realism, should guide

[1]The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations polls purport to show continuing interest in international engagement. But other indices, such as media coverage and congressional interest, suggest otherwise.

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American foreign policy. The real challenge is to merge the two; no serious American maker of foreign policy can be oblivious to the traditions of exceptionalism by which American democracy has defined itself. But neither can the policymaker ignore the circumstances in which they have to be implemented.

The Changing International Environment

FOR AMERICANS, understanding the contemporary situation must begin with the recognition that its disturbances are not temporary interruptions of a beneficent status quo. They signal instead an inevitable transformation of the international order resulting from changes in the internal structure of many of its key participants, and from the democratization of politics, the globalization of economies, and the instantaneousness of communications. A state is by definition the expression of some concept of justice that legitimizes its internal arrangements and of a projection of power that determines its ability to fulfill its minimum functions—that is, to protect its population from foreign dangers and domestic upheaval. When all these elements are in flux simultaneously—including the concept of what is foreign—a period of turbulence is inevitable.

The very term "international relations" is, in fact, of relatively recent vintage, since it implies that the nation-state must inevitably be the basis of its organization. However, this is a concept that originated in Europe only in the late eighteenth century and was spread around the world largely by European colonialism. In medieval Europe, obligations were personal and traditional, based neither on common language nor on a single culture; they did not interpose the bureaucratic machinery of a state between the subject and the ruler. Restraints on government derived from custom, not constitutions, and from the universal Catholic Church, which preserved its own autonomy, thereby laying the basis—quite unintentionally—for the pluralism and the democratic restraints on state power that evolved centuries later.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this structure collapsed under the dual impact of the Reformation, which destroyed religious unity, and of printing, which made the growing religious diversity widely accessible. The resulting upheaval culminated in the Thirty Years' War, which, in the name of ideological—at that time, religious—orthodoxy, killed 30 percent of the population of Central Europe.

Out of this carnage emerged the modern state system as defined by the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, the basic principles of which have shaped international relations to this day. The treaty's foundation was the doctrine of sovereignty, which declared a state's domestic conduct and institutions to be beyond the reach of other states.

These principles were an expression of the conviction that domestic rulers were less likely to be arbitrary than crusading foreign armies bent on conversion. At the same time, the balance of power concept sought to establish restraints by an equilibrium that prevented any one nation from being dominant and confined wars to relatively limited areas. For over two hundred years—until the outbreak of World War I—the state system emerging from the Thirty Years' War achieved its objectives (with the exception of the ideological conflict of the Napoleonic period, when the principle of nonintervention was, in effect, abandoned for two decades). Each of these concepts is under attack today, to a point where it is forgotten that their purpose was to limit, not expand, the arbitrary use of power.

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Today the Westphalian order is in systemic crisis. Its principles are being challenged, though an agreed alternative has yet to emerge. Noninterference in the domestic affairs of other states has been abandoned in favor of a concept of universal humanitarian intervention or universal jurisdiction, not only by the United States but by many West European countries. At the United Nations Millennium Summit in New York in September 2000, it was endorsed as well by a large number of other states. In the 1990s, the United States undertook four humanitarian military operations—in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo; other countries took the lead in two, in East Timor (led by Australia) and Sierra Leone (led by the United Kingdom). All of these interventions except Kosovo had United Nations sanction.

Simultaneously, the heretofore dominant concept of the nation-state is itself undergoing metamorphosis. True to the dominant philosophy, every state calls itself a nation but not all are such in terms of the nineteenth-century concept of a nation as a linguistic and cultural unit. Of the "great powers" at the turn of the new millennium, only the democracies of Europe and Japan fulfill that definition. China and Russia combine a national and cultural core with multiethnic attributes. The United States has increasingly equated its national identity with multi-ethnicity. In the rest of the world, states with mixed ethnic composition are the rule, and the cohesion of many of them is threatened by subject ethnic groups seeking autonomy or independence on the basis of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century doctrines of nationalism and self-determination. Even in Europe, falling birthrates and growing immigration are introducing the challenge of multi-ethnicity.

Historic nation-states, aware that their size is insufficient to play a major global role, are seeking to group themselves into larger units. The European Union represents the most sweeping expression of this policy thus far. But similar transnational groupings are emerging in the Western Hemisphere in such institutions as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Mercosur in South America, and in Asia in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The idea of a rudimentary free trade area has made its appearance in Asia under joint Chinese and Japanese sponsorship.

Each of these new units, in defining its identity, is driven, sometimes subconsciously, often deliberately, to do so in distinction to the dominant powers in its region. For ASEAN, the foils are China and Japan (and, in time, probably India); for the European Union and Mercosur, the foil is the United States, creating new rivalries even as they overcome traditional ones.

In the past, transformations of far lesser magnitude have led to major wars; indeed, wars have occurred with considerable frequency in the present international system as well. But they have never involved the current great powers in military conflict with each other. For the nuclear age has changed both the significance and the role of power, at least as far as the relationship of the major countries to one another is concerned. Until the beginning of the nuclear age, wars were most often sparked by disputes over territory or access to resources; conquest was undertaken to augment a state's power and influence. In the modern age, territory has lost much of its significance as an element of national strength; technological progress can enhance a country's power far more than any conceivable territorial expansion. Singapore, with literally no resources other than the intelligence of its people and leaders, has a much higher per capita income than

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much larger and more favorably endowed countries. And it uses this wealth in part to build up—at least locally—impressive military forces to discourage the designs of covetous neighbors. Israel is in a similar position.

Nuclear weapons have rendered war between countries possessing them less likely—though this statement is unlikely to remain valid if nuclear weapons continue to proliferate into countries with a different attitude toward human life or unfamiliar with their catastrophic impact. Until the advent of the nuclear age, countries went to war because the consequences of defeat and even of compromise were deemed worse than those of war; this kind of reasoning led Europe to consume its substance in the First World War. But, among nuclear powers, this equation holds true in only the most desperate circumstances. In the minds of most leaders of major nuclear powers, the devastation of nuclear war is likely to appear more calamitous than the consequences of compromise, and perhaps even of defeat. The paradox of the nuclear age is that the growth in nuclear capability—and hence the acquisition of vast total power—is inevitably matched by a corresponding decline in the willingness to use it.

All other forms of power have been revolutionized as well. Until the end of the Second World War, power was relatively homogeneous; its various elements—economic, military, or political—complemented one another. A society could not be militarily strong without commanding a similar position in other fields. In the second half of the twentieth century, however, the various strands seemingly began to diverge. Suddenly a country could become an economic power without possessing a significant military capacity (Saudi Arabia, for example) or develop vast military power despite an obviously stagnant economy (witness the late Soviet Union).

In the twenty-first century, these strands are likely to merge again. The fate of the Soviet Union demonstrated that one-sided emphasis on military power is impossible to sustain—especially in an age of economic and technological revolution linked by instant communications that bring the vast gaps in the standards of living into living rooms worldwide. In addition, in a single generation, science has made leaps that exceed the accumulated knowledge of all previous human history. The computer, the Internet, and the growing field of biotechnology have invested technology with a scope unimaginable by any past generation. An advanced system of technological education has become a prerequisite for a country's long-term power. It supplies the sinews of a society's strength and vitality; without it, all other types of power will wither.

Globalization has diffused economic and technological power around the world. Instantaneous communications make the decisions in one region hostage to those in other parts of the globe. Globalization has produced unprecedented prosperity, albeit not evenly. It remains to be seen whether it accelerates downturns as efficiently as it did global prosperity, creating the possibility for a global disaster. And globalization—inevitable as it is—also has the potential of giving rise to a gnawing sense of impotence as decisions affecting the lives of millions slip out of local political control. The sophistication of economics and technology is in danger of outrunning the capacities of contemporary politics.

America's Challenge

THE UNITED States finds itself in a world for which little in its historical experience has prepared it. Secure between two great oceans, it rejected the concept of the balance of power, convinced that

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it was either able to stand apart from the quarrels of other nations or that it could bring about universal peace by insisting on the implementation of its own values of democracy and self-determination.

As well as that, the United States is confronted by a world of unparalleled complexity, in which at least four international systems are existing side by side:

• In relations between the United States and Western Europe and within the Western Hemisphere, America's historic ideals have considerable applicability. Here the idealist version of peace based on democracy and economic progress demonstrates its relevance. States are democratic; economies are market-oriented; wars are inconceivable except at the periphery, where they may be triggered by ethnic conflicts. Disputes are not settled by war or the threat of war. Military preparations are a response to threats from outside the area; they are not aimed by the nations of the Atlantic region or the Western Hemisphere at one another.

• The great powers of Asia—larger in size and far more populous than the nations of nineteenth-century Europe—treat one another as strategic rivals. India, China, Japan, Russia—with Korea and the states of Southeast Asia not lagging far behind—consider that some of the others, and certainly a combination of them, are indeed capable of threatening their national security. Wars among these powers are not imminent, but they are not inconceivable either. Asian military expenditures are rising, and they are designed principally as protection against other Asian nations (though some of China's military effort includes as well the contingency of a war with the United States over Taiwan). As in nineteenth-century Europe, a long period of peace is possible—even likely—but a balance of power will necessarily play a key role in preserving it.

• The Middle East conflicts are most analogous to those of seventeenth-century Europe. Their roots are not economic, as in the Atlantic region and the Western Hemisphere, or strategic, as in Asia, but ideological and religious. The maxims of the Westphalian peace diplomacy do not apply. Compromise is elusive when the issue is not a specific grievance but the legitimacy—indeed, the existence—of the other side. Therefore, paradoxically, attempts to bring about a definitive resolution of such conflicts have a high potential for backfiring, as President Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak discovered in the aftermath of the Camp David summit in the summer of 2000. For an attempt to "compromise" on the question of what each party considers to be its holy place was bound to bring home to them the irreconcilable aspect of their positions.

• The continent for which there is no precedent in European history is Africa. Though its forty-six nations call themselves democracies, they do not conduct their policies on the basis of a unifying ideological principle. Nor are African politics dominated by an embracing concept of balance of power. The continent is too vast, the reach of most of its countries too short, to be able to speak of an African balance of power. And, with the end of the Cold War, the great power rivalry over Africa has largely disappeared as well. Moreover, Africa's legacy of colonial rule endows it with explosive potential, ethnic conflict, serious underdevelopment, and dehumanizing health problems. Borders drawn to facilitate colonial rule divided tribes and ethnic groups and assembled different religions and tribes in administrative subdivisions that later emerged as independent states. Hence Africa has produced savage civil wars that spread into international conflicts, as well as epidemics that rend the human conscience. In this continent, there is a challenge to the democracies to compensate

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for their histories in finding a way to help Africa to participate in global growth. And the world community has an obligation to end, or at least to mitigate, the political and ethnic conflicts.

The very range and variety of international systems renders much of the traditional American debate about the nature of international politics somewhat irrelevant. Whether it is values or power, ideology or *raison d'état* that are the key determinants of foreign policy, in fact depends on the historical stage in which an international system finds itself. For American foreign policy, ever in quest of the magic, all-purpose formula, the resulting need for ideological subtlety and long-range strategy presents a special and as yet unsolved challenge.

Unfortunately, domestic politics is driving American foreign policy in the opposite direction. Congress not only legislates the tactics of foreign policy but also seeks to impose a code of conduct on other nations by a plethora of sanctions. Scores of nations now find themselves under such sanctions. Successive administrations have acquiesced, in part as a compromise to gain approval for other programs, in part because, absent an immediate outside danger, domestic politics has become more important to political survival than the handling of foreign policy. What is presented by foreign critics as America's overweening quest for domination is very frequently a response to domestic pressure groups, which are in a position to put the spotlight on key issues by promising support or threatening retribution at election time and which support each other's causes to establish their own claims for the future.

Whatever the merit of the individual legislative actions, their cumulative effect drives American foreign policy toward unilateral and occasionally bullying conduct. For unlike diplomatic communications, which are generally an invitation to dialogue, legislation translates into a take-it-or-leave-it prescription, the operational equivalent of an ultimatum.

Simultaneously, ubiquitous and clamorous media are transforming foreign policy into a subdivision of public entertainment. The intense competition for ratings produces an obsession with the crisis of the moment, generally presented as a morality play between good and evil having a specific outcome and rarely in terms of the long-range challenges of history. As soon as the flurry of excitement has subsided, the media move on to new sensations. At their peak, the Gulf and Kosovo crises or the Camp David summit were covered twenty-four hours a day by print and television media. Since then, except during occasional flare-ups, they have received very little day-to-day attention, even though the underlying trends continue, some of them becoming more unmanageable the longer they remain unresolved.

But the deepest reason for America's difficulty in the 1990s with developing a coherent strategy for a world in which its role is so central was that three different generations with very different approaches to foreign policy were disputing America's role. The contending forces were: veterans of the Cold War strategy of the 1950s and 1960s seeking to adapt their experience to the circumstances of the new millennium; stalwarts of the Vietnam protest movement seeking to apply its lessons to the emerging world order; and a new generation shaped by experiences which make it hard for them to grasp the perceptions of either the Cold War generation or those of the Vietnam protesters.

The Cold War strategists sought to manage the conflict of the nuclear superpowers by the policy of containment of the Soviet Union. Though far from oblivious to the nonmilitary issues (after all, the Marshall Plan was as important as

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NATO to the overall design), the Cold War generation insisted that there was an irreducible element of power involved in international politics and that it was measured by the ability to prevent Soviet military and political expansion.

The generation of Cold War strategists reduced and, for a while, nearly eliminated the historic tension in American thinking between idealism and power. In the world dominated by the two superpowers, requirements of ideology and equilibrium tended to merge. Foreign policy became a zero-sum game in which the gains of one side translated into losses for the other.

Beyond containment, the major thrust of American Cold War diplomatic foreign policy was to return the defeated enemies, Germany and Japan, to the emerging international system as full-fledged members. This task, unprecedented in respect to nations on which unconditional surrender had been imposed less than five years earlier, made sense to a generation of American leaders whose formative experience had been overcoming the Great Depression of the 1930s. The generation that organized resistance to the Soviet Union had experienced Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, which had restored political stability by closing the gap between American expectations and economic reality. The same generation had prevailed in World War II, fought in the name of democracy.

It was Vietnam that broke the fusion of ideology and strategy that characterized the thinking of what is now termed "the greatest generation."[2] Though the principles of American exceptionalism continue to be affirmed by all participants in the domestic discussions of foreign policy, their application to concrete cases became subject to a profound and continuing dispute.

Shaken by disillusionment with the Vietnam experience, many erstwhile intellectual supporters of Cold War policies either retreated from the field of strategy or, in effect, rejected the essence of postwar American foreign policy. The administration of President Bill Clinton—the first staffed by many individuals who came out of the Vietnam protest—treated the Cold War as a misunderstanding made intractable by American intransigence. They recoiled from the concept of national interest and distrusted the use of power unless it could be presented as being in the service of some "unselfish" cause—that is, reflecting no specific American national interest. On numerous occasions and on several continents, President Clinton fell to apologizing for actions of his predecessors that, in his view, stemmed from what he derogatorily described as their Cold War attitudes. But the Cold War was not a policy mistake—though some mistakes were, of course, made in the pursuit of it; profound issues of survival and national purpose were involved. Ironically, that claim to unselfishness was interpreted as a special kind of unpredictability, even unreliability, by nations that have historically treated diplomacy as a reconciliation of interests.

Obviously the United States cannot—and should not—return to the policies of the Cold War or of eighteenth-century diplomacy. The contemporary world is far more complex and in need of a much more differentiated approach. But neither can it afford the self-indulgence or self-righteousness of the protest period. These schools of thought, in any event, mark the end of an era whose disputes seem to the generation born after 1960 as abstruse and academic.

That generation has not yet raised leaders capable of evoking a commitment to a consistent and long-range foreign policy. Indeed, some of them question

[2]Tom Brokaw, *The Greatest Generation* (New York: Random House, 1998).

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whether we need any foreign policy at all. In the globalized economic world, the post-Cold War generation looks to Wall Street or Silicon Valley in the same way their parents did to public service in Washington. This reflects the priority being attached to economic over political activity, partly caused by a growing reluctance to enter a calling blighted by relentless publicity that all too often ends in destroying careers and reputations.

The post-Cold War generation is concerned very little with the debates over the war in Indochina, being largely unfamiliar with its details and finding its liturgy nearly incomprehensible. Nor does it feel guilty about professing a doctrine of self-interest which it pursues strenuously in its own economic activities (though it sometimes enlists appeals to national unselfishness as a sop to the conscience). As the product of an educational system that puts little emphasis on history, it often lacks perspective about foreign affairs. This generation is subject to being seduced by the idea of riskless global relations as compensation for the intense competitiveness of its private lives. In this environment, the belief comes very naturally that the pursuit of economic self-interest will ultimately and almost automatically produce global political reconciliation and democracy.

Such attitudes are possible only because the danger of general war has largely disappeared. In such a world, the post-Cold War generation of American leaders (whether graduated from the protest movements or the business schools) finds it possible to imagine that foreign policy is either economic policy or consists of instructing the rest of the world in American virtues. Not surprisingly, American diplomacy since the end of the Cold War has turned more and more into a series of proposals for adherence to an American agenda.

But economic globalism is not a substitute for world order, though it can be an important component of it. The very success of the globalized economy will generate dislocations and tensions, both within and between societies, which will exert pressures on the world's political leaderships. Meanwhile, the nation-state, which remains the unit of political accountability, is being reconstituted in many regions of the world on the basis of two seemingly contradictory trends: either by breaking down into ethnic components or by dissolving itself into larger regional groupings.

So long as the post-Cold War generation of national leaders is embarrassed to elaborate an unapologetic concept of enlightened national interest, it will achieve progressive paralysis, not moral elevation. Certainly, to be truly American, any concept of national interest must flow from the country's democratic tradition and concern with the vitality of democracy around the world. But the United States must also translate its values into answers to some hard questions: What, for our survival, must we seek to prevent no matter how painful the means? What, to be true to ourselves, must we try to accomplish no matter how small the attainable international consensus, and, if necessary, entirely on our own? What wrongs is it essential that we right? What goals are simply beyond our capacity? □

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
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Natural Rights and Human History

Francis Fukuyama

> Terms like sanctity remind me of animal rights. Who gave a dog a right? This word right gets very dangerous. We have women's rights, children's rights; it goes on forever. And then there's the right of a salamander and a frog's rights. It's carried to the absurd.
>
> I'd like to give up saying rights or sanctity. Instead, say that humans have needs, and we should try, as a social species, to respond to human needs—like food or education or health—and that's the way we should work. To try and give it more meaning than it deserves in some quasi-mystical way is for Steven Spielberg or somebody like that. It's just plain aura, up in the sky—I mean, it's crap.[1]
>
> —James Watson

IF JAMES Watson, Nobel laureate, co-discoverer of the structure of DNA, and one of the towering figures of twentieth-century science, should become a bit impatient with the injection of the word "rights" into the discourse of his particular domain of genetics and molecular biology, we might well excuse him. Watson is famous both for his temper and for his often unguarded and politically incorrect remarks; he is, after all, a hardheaded scientist and not a scribbler on political and social matters. Moreover, he is correct in his central observation about contemporary rights discourse: it is a lot of crap. His remark is reminiscent of the utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who famously commented that the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen's assertion that rights were natural and imprescriptible was "nonsense upon stilts."

The problem, however, does not end there, because we cannot in the end dispense with serious discussion of rights and talk only of needs and interests. Rights are the basis of our liberal democratic political order and are key to contemporary thinking about moral and ethical issues. And any serious discussion of human rights must ultimately be based on some understanding of human ends or purposes, which in turn must almost always be based on a concept of human nature.

It is here that Watson's field, biology, becomes relevant, because the life sciences have been making important dis-

As of July 1, 2001, Francis Fukuyama will be Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He is writing a book on the political consequences of biotechnology, from which parts of this article are drawn.

[1] Quoted in Gregory Stock and John Campbell, *Engineering the Human Germline: An Exploration of the Science and Ethics of Altering the Genes We Pass on to Our Children* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 85.

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coveries about human nature in recent years. So, much as natural scientists would like to maintain a wall of separation between the natural "is" that they study and the moral and political "ought" engendered by discourse on rights, this is ultimately a dodge. The more that science tells us about human nature, the more implications there are for human rights, and hence for the design of institutions and public policies that protect them. These findings suggest that contemporary capitalist liberal democratic institutions have been successful because they are grounded in assumptions about human nature that are far more realistic than those of their competitors.

Rights Talk

OVER THE PAST generation, the rights industry has grown faster than an Internet IPO in the late 1990s. In addition to the aforementioned animal, women's and children's rights, there are gay rights, the rights of the disabled and handicapped, indigenous people's rights, the right to life, the right to die, the rights of the accused, victims' rights, as well as the famous right to periodic vacations that is laid out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The U.S. Bill of Rights is reasonably clear in enumerating a certain set of basic rights to be enjoyed by all American citizens, but in 1973 the U.S. Supreme Court in *Roe v. Wade* manufactured a new right out of whole cloth, based on Justice Douglas' finding in the earlier Griswold decision of an "emanation" from the "penumbra" of the similarly shadowy right to privacy. Constitutional scholar Ronald Dworkin comes up with an even more novel argument: Since having an abortion involves a major life decision on a par with making a religious commitment, the right to abortion turns out all along to have been protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of religious liberty.[2]

Rights on an international level are in no better shape. As Mary Ann Glendon has described in her book, *A World Made New*,[3] the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was hammered out in 1947 as the result of a heroic diplomatic effort that sought to bridge ultimately irreconcilable Western and Soviet views in the shadow of a deepening Cold War. Later international human rights documents added new layers of economic and social rights demanded by socialists and social democrats to the fundamental liberal rights favored by Americans. If you want to amuse yourself, pick up a copy of the Brazilian constitution, ratified in 1988, and read through its enumeration of individual rights: the section is as long as the telephone book of a small city, and contains not just the right to the pursuit of happiness, but to happiness itself.

Given this monumental confusion, why do we not follow James Watson's advice, abandon talk of rights altogether, and simply speak of human "needs" or "interests"? Americans more than most peoples have tended to conflate rights and interests. By transforming every individual desire into a right unconstrained by community interests, one increases the inflexibility of political discourse. The debates in the United States over pornography and gun control would appear much less Manichaean if we spoke of the interests of pornographers rather than their fundamental First Amendment right to free speech, or the needs of assault

[2]This argument is made in Dworkin, *Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

[3]Glendon, *A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (New York: Random House, 2001).

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weapon owners rather than their sacred Second Amendment right to bear arms.

Arguably, the same inflexibility appears when rights are invoked at an international level. A country that makes human rights a significant element of its foreign policy tends toward ineffectual moralizing at best, and unconstrained violence in pursuit of moral aims at worst. Countries that think of themselves as having only national interests, on the other hand, can pursue a policy of realpolitik that, it is said, is safer both for the country in question and for the international system as a whole. As Henry Kissinger might have explained in *A World Restored*, the reckless Alexander I was a proponent of rights, while the prudent Metternich, architect of the Congress of Vienna, proceeded in terms of interests.

The Necessity of Rights

SO WHY not abandon what Glendon labels "rights talk" altogether? The reason we cannot do this, either as a theoretical or practical matter, is that the language of rights has become, in the modern world, the only shared and widely intelligible vocabulary we have for talking about ultimate human goods or ends, and, in particular, those collective goods or ends that are the stuff of politics. Classical political philosophers like Plato and Aristotle did not use the language of rights—they spoke of the human good, and of human happiness and the virtues and duties that were required to achieve it. The modern use of the term "rights" is more impoverished, because it does not encompass the range of higher human ends envisioned by the classics. But it is more democratic, universal and easily grasped. The great struggles over rights since the American and French revolutions are testimony to the political salience of this concept. The word "right" implies moral judgment (as in, "What is the right thing to do?") and is our principal gateway into a discussion of the nature of justice and of those ends we regard as essential to our humanity.

Watson is in effect advocating a utilitarian approach with his advice simply to try to satisfy human needs and interests without reference to rights. But it runs into the typical problem of utilitarianism: the question of priorities and justice when those needs and interests conflict. You are a powerful and important community leader in need of a new liver because of a drinking problem; I am an indigent, terminally ill patient in a public hospital, on life support but with a healthy liver. Any simple utilitarian calculation that seeks to maximize the satisfaction of human needs would dictate that I be involuntarily removed from life support so as to harvest my liver for the sake of the important leader and the people who depend on him. The fact that no liberal society permits this to happen reflects a view that innocent people have a *right* not to be involuntarily deprived of life, no matter how many important needs may be satisfied as a result.

Rights trump interests because they are invested with greater moral significance. Interests are fungible and can be traded off against one another in a marketplace; rights, while seldom absolute, are less flexible because it is hard to assign them an economic value. I may have an interest in a pleasant two-week vacation, but that cannot compete with another person's right not to be held as a chattel slave and work someone else's fields. The slave's right to freedom is not just a strong interest on the slave's part; a disinterested third party might say that the condition of servitude is unjust because it is an affront to the slave's dignity as a human being. The slave's freedom is somehow more basic and fundamental to his status as a human being than my interest in a pleas-

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ant vacation is to mine, even if I assert my interest more passionately than the slave does his.

Political systems enshrine certain kinds of rights over others, and thereby reflect the moral basis of their underlying societies. The United States was founded on the principle stated in the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal", and that "they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights." That principle, as Abraham Lincoln explained, was violated by the institution of slavery. The Emancipation Proclamation and passage of the Fourteenth Amendment corrected this grave inconsistency and laid the basis for subsequent American democracy.

So if rights prioritize human ends or goods and set some above others as the foundation of justice, where do they come from? The reason that there is a constant inflation in the scope of rights is precisely because everyone wants to raise the relative priority of certain interests over others. In the cacophony of rights talk, how do we decide what is genuinely a right and what is not?

THERE ARE in principle three possible sources of rights: divine rights, natural rights, and what one might call the contemporary positivistic view of rights as located in social law and custom. Rights, in other words, can emanate from God, Nature and Man himself.

Rights derived from revealed religion are not today the acknowledged basis of political rights in any liberal democracy. John Locke begins his *Second Treatise on Government* with an attack on Filmer and the doctrine of divine right; the very essence of modern liberalism was to eliminate religion as the explicit basis of political order. This was based on a practical observation that religiously-based polities were constantly at war with one another because there was not sufficient consensus on religious first principles. The background for Hobbes' description of the state of nature as a war of "every man against every man" was the sectarian violence of his time.

None of this, of course, prevents private individuals in liberal societies from believing that Man is a creature created in God's image, and that basic human rights therefore come from God. Scientists like Watson or Richard Dawkins become extremely impatient when people with religious convictions talk about the "sanctity of life", but they need to learn to be more tolerant; such views are very deeply held, and are not going to go away as a result of greater education, rationality and the like. Such views become problematic only when rights presumed to derive from God are asserted as political rights, as in the abortion controversy. For they then run into the same problem recognized by Locke: It is extremely difficult to achieve social consensus on issues involving religion.

The second possible source of rights is nature, or, more precisely, human nature. Despite Jefferson's invocation of the Creator in the Declaration, he, like Locke and Hobbes, believed that rights needed to be grounded in a theory of human nature. A political principle like equality had to be based on empirical observation of what human beings were like "by nature"; since, as he said in a letter to Roger C. Weightman on June 24, 1826, it was not the case that some men were born with saddles on their backs, slavery was in principle contrary to nature and therefore unjust.[4]

It is this tradition of natural right that Robin Fox attacks in his recent article in

[4]Quoted in Adrienne Koch and Willam Peden, eds., *The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: Modern Library, 1944), pp. 729–30.

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this magazine.[5] Fox points out that the concept of human nature has undergone a major revival in recent years as a result of new research in the life sciences, and that it can now be given a "real content." The problem, he argues, is that much of that content is not very pleasant to behold, and would serve poorly as a basis for political rights. Evolutionary biology, for example, has given us the theory of kin selection or inclusive fitness, which asserts that human beings seek to maximize their reproductive fitness by favoring genetic relatives in proportion to their shared genes. This leads, in Fox's view, to implications like a natural or human right to revenge, or a right of a murder victim's family member to impregnate the perpetrator's females, since these are all behaviors that occur naturally in both human and animal societies.

Fox's argument, as stated in this piece, is reminiscent of what has been labeled the "naturalistic fallacy"[6], a tradition that stretches from David Hume to twentieth-century analytical philosophers like G.E. Moore, R.M. Hare and others. Particularly strong in the Anglo-Saxon world, the naturalistic fallacy argues that nature cannot provide a philosophically justifiable basis for rights, morality or ethics.

Since the philosophical school dominant in contemporary academia believes that any attempt to base rights on nature has long since been debunked, it is understandable that natural scientists are quick to invoke the "naturalistic fallacy" as a shield to protect their work from unpalatable political implications. Many of the findings of contemporary biology in areas like cognitive neuroscience, genetics and evolutionary theory would seem to have controversial political implications in such areas as the heritability of intelligence, criminal behavior, homosexuality or natural differences between the sexes. Many of these findings would seem to support conservative views, since they suggest that there are natural limits to social constructionism and therefore to human freedom. Evolutionary biologists in particular have run afoul of feminists, since they have argued that many sex differences are based on biology rather than socialization. Since most natural scientists are either apolitical or else *bien pensant* liberals, it is easy for them to evoke the naturalistic fallacy and argue, as Paul Ehrlich recently did in his book *Human Natures*,[7] that human nature gives us absolutely no guidance as to what human values should be.

IT IS MY VIEW that the common understanding of the naturalistic fallacy is itself fallacious, and that there is a desperate need for philosophy to return to the pre-Kantian tradition of grounding rights and morality in nature. But before I can state this argument more fully and explain why the post-Kantian dismissal of natural rights is misguided, we need to look at the third source of rights, which might be labeled "positivistic." The weaknesses of the third, positivistic approach to rights are indeed what necessitate the effort to resurrect the concept of natural rights.

The most readily available way of determining the source of rights is to look around and see what the society itself

[5]Fox, "Human Nature and Human Rights", *The National Interest* (Winter 2000/01).

[6]Fox has noted to the author that in other of his writings, particularly *Conjectures and Confrontations: Science, Evolution, Social Concern* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), he has explicitly argued against the naturalistic fallacy. I am seeking to respond to the argument he put forward in this journal; readers should consult other of his works for a fuller account of his views.

[7]Ehrlich, *Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and the Human Prospect* (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2000).

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declares to be a right, through its basic laws and declarations. In his response to Fox in the Spring issue of this magazine, William F. Schulz, executive director of Amnesty International, argues that contemporary human rights advocates have long since dropped any notion that human rights can or should be based on nature or natural law. Instead, according to him, "'human rights' refer to 'humans' rights', 'the rights of humans', something that human beings possess or can claim, but not necessarily something derived from the nature of the claimant." Human rights are, in other words, whatever human beings determine they are.

As a political strategy for negotiating documents like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there is no doubt that Schulz is correct in saying that rights are whatever you can get people to agree they are, and that there will never be consensus on a set of natural rights. There can be procedural refinements to make sure a positive right actually reflects the will of the society that declares it, such as rules that require ratification of bills of rights by supermajorities (as in the case of the U.S. Constitution). The First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and religion may or may not be ordained by nature, but they are ratified as part of a constitutional process. But this approach means that rights are essentially procedural: if you can get a supermajority (or whatever) to agree that all people have a right to walk around in public in their underwear, then that becomes a fundamental human right along with freedom of association and freedom of speech.

So what is wrong with a purely positivistic approach to rights? The problem, as any human rights advocate will know in practice if not in theory, is that there are no positive rights that are also universal. When Western human rights groups criticize the Chinese government for jailing political dissidents, the Chinese government responds that for its society, collective and social rights outweigh individual rights. The emphasis of Western organizations on individual political rights is not an expression of a universal aspiration, but rather reflects the Western (or perhaps Christian) cultural biases of the human rights groups themselves. The Western human rights advocate might respond that the Chinese government has not followed the correct procedure, insofar as it has not consulted its own people in a democratic manner. But if there are no universal standards for political behavior, who is to say what the right procedure is?

And what does an advocate of a positivistic approach like Schulz have to say in response to another, culturally different society that follows the right procedures and yet promotes abhorrent practices like suttee or slavery or female circumcision? The answer is that no response is possible, since you have declared from the outset that there are no transcendent standards for determining right and wrong beyond whatever any particular culture declares to be a right.

Why the Naturalistic Fallacy Is Fallacious

THE PROBLEM of cultural relativism brings us back to reconsider whether we might have been premature in discarding an approach to human rights based on human nature, since the existence of a single human nature shared by all the peoples of the world can provide, at least in theory, a common ground on which we can base universal human rights. Belief in the naturalistic fallacy runs so deep in contemporary Western thought, however, that resurrection of a natural rights argument remains a formidable task.

The idea that rights cannot be grounded in nature rests on two separate,

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though often interrelated, arguments. The first is attributed to David Hume, one of the fathers of British empiricism, who is widely believed to have proven once and for all that it is impossible to derive an "ought" from an "is."[8] That is, a statement of moral obligation cannot be derived from an empirical observation about nature or the natural world. When natural scientists assert that their work has no political or policy implications, they usually have in mind the Humean "is-ought" dichotomy; because human beings are genetically inclined to behave in certain species-typical ways does not imply that they *should* behave in that manner. Moral obligation comes from some other shadowy, ill-defined realm distinct from the natural world.

The second strand of the naturalistic fallacy would argue that, even if we could derive an "ought" from an "is", the "is" is ugly, amoral or indeed immoral. Nietzsche put the idea much more forcefully than any bone-dry British analytical philosopher ever could in *Beyond Good and Evil*:

> 'According to nature' you want to live? O you noble Stoics, what deceptive words these are! Imagine a being like nature, wasteful beyond measure, indifferent beyond measure, without purposes and consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and desolate and uncertain at the same time; imagine indifference itself as a power—how could you live according to this indifference?[9]

Robin Fox presents us with an up-to-date version of this line of thought based on contemporary sociobiology: nature commands that we get our genes into the next generation by killing off rival males and impregnating their mates.

To rebuild an argument in favor of natural right, we need to take on each of these arguments in turn, beginning with the "is-ought" distinction. More than forty years ago, Alasdair MacIntyre pointed out that Hume himself neither believed in nor abided by the rule commonly attributed to him that one could not derive an "ought" from an "is."[10] At most, what the famous passage from the *Treatise* said was that one could not deduce in a logically *a priori* way moral rules from empirical fact. *But like every serious philosopher in the Western tradition* before him since Aristotle, Hume believed that the "ought" and the "is" were bridged by concepts like "wanting, needing, desiring, pleasure, happiness, health"—that is, by the goals and ends that human beings set for themselves. He gives the following example of how one is derived from the other: "If I stick a knife in Smith, they will send me to jail; but I do not want to go to jail; so I ought not (had better not) stick a knife in him."

There are, of course, a huge variety of human wants, needs and desires that can

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[8]Hume's exact statement is: "In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought*, or an *ought not*. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought or ought not expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it." Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*, Book III, Part I, Section I (London: Penguin Books, 1985).

[9]Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), Section 9, p. 15.

[10]MacIntyre, "Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought'", *Philosophical Review* (October 1959).

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produce an equal diversity of "oughts"; it is at this point that human nature enters the picture. For virtually every pre-Kantian philosopher had an implicit or explicit theory of human nature that set certain wants or needs above others as being more fundamental to our humanness than others. I may want my two-week vacation, but your desire to escape slavery is based on a more universal and more deeply felt longing for freedom, and therefore trumps my want. Hobbes' assertion of a basic right to life (which is the precursor to the right to life enshrined in the Declaration of Independence) is based on an explicit theory of human nature that posits that the fear of violent death is the strongest of human passions, and therefore produces a right more basic than, say, the assertion of religious orthodoxy.

THE RADICAL break in the Western tradition comes not with Hume but with Kant, who with the categorical imperative sought to detach morality in its entirety from any concept of nature.[11] It was Kant who argued that true moral choice implied freedom of the will, which meant in turn freedom from any form of natural causality: moral agents routinely defy the laws of physics by choosing not what their material bodies tell them they want, but what reason dictates to be right. Kant expressed in philosophical terms a view that was embedded in Protestantism: that human nature was sinful, and that moral behavior required rising above or suppressing our natural desires.

Much of subsequent Western philosophy has followed the Kantian route toward so-called "deontological" theories of right, i.e., theories that try to derive a system of ethics that is not dependent on any substantive assertions about human nature or human ends. Many deontological theories elevate moral autonomy to be the chief if not the only human good, a view that has become embedded in a good deal of contemporary U.S. constitutional law.

I believe that this broad turn away from human nature-based theories of right is flawed for a number of reasons that, due to space limitations, cannot be fully explicated in this article. Perhaps the most revealing weakness is the fact that virtually all philosophers who attempt to lay out a deontological theory of rights end up reinserting various assumptions about human nature into their theories. The only difference is that they do it covertly and dishonestly, rather than explicitly, as in the earlier tradition from Aristotle to Hume.

An example of this is John Rawls, whose theory of justice explicitly sidesteps any discussion of human nature and seeks to establish a set of minimal moral rules that would apply to any group of rational agents based on the so-called "original position." As critics of Rawls have pointed out, the original position itself and the political implications Rawls draws from it in fact contain numerous assertions about human nature, in particular his assumption that human beings are risk-averse. William Galston has pointed out similar flaws in the thinking of post-Rawlsian legal theorists like Ronald Dworkin and Bruce Ackerman, who try to define the rules of a liberal society while eschewing any reference to priorities among human ends or, in more contemporary language, between possible lifestyles.[12]

What about the other leg of the naturalistic fallacy argument, which says that even if rights were derivable from nature, that nature is violent, aggressive, cruel or indifferent? Human nature at a minimum points in contradictory directions, toward

[11] Hume has been wrongly interpreted as a kind of proto-Kantian, but in fact he falls squarely in the older tradition of deriving rights from human nature.

[12] See Galston, "Liberal Virtues", *American Political Science Review* (December 1988).

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competition and cooperation, toward individualism and sociability; how can any particular "natural" behavior be the basis of natural rights?

The answer, I believe, is that while there is no *simple* translation of human nature into human rights, the passage from one to the other is ultimately mediated by the rational discussion of human ends, that is, by philosophy. That discussion does not lead to *a priori* or mathematically provable truths; indeed, it may not even yield substantial consensus among the discussants. It does, however, allow us to establish a hierarchy of rights, and it allows us to rule out certain solutions to the problem of rights that have been politically powerful in the course of human history.

Take for example the human propensity for violence and aggression. Few people would deny that this is somehow grounded in human nature; there are virtually no societies free of murder or that have not experienced armed violence in some form. But what we notice in the first instance is that random violence against other members of the community is prohibited in every known human cultural group. This is no less true among man's primate cousins: a troop of chimpanzees will occasionally experience violent aggression from a younger male that, like the Columbine High School shooters, is lonely, peripheral or otherwise seeking to make a point.[13] But the older members of the community will always take measures to control and neutralize that individual because community order cannot tolerate such violence.

Primate violence, including human violence, is legitimated primarily at higher social levels, that is, on the part of in-groups that compete with out-groups. Warriors are treated with respect and honor in a way that school shooters are not. Hobbes' war of "every man against every man" is in fact a war of every group against every group. In-group social order is driven by the need for competition against out-groups, both over evolutionary time (there is a great deal of evidence that human cognitive capabilities were shaped by these group-oriented competitive needs[14]) and in the course of human history.[15] There is a sad continuity from non-human primates to hunter-gatherer societies to contemporary ethnic and sectarian violence as (primarily) male-bonded groups compete against one another for dominance.[16]

This might be taken to be confirmation of the naturalistic fallacy, and thus the end of the story, but for the fact that human nature encompasses a great deal more than male-bonded violence. It also encompasses the desire for what Adam Smith called "gain", the accumulation of property and goods useful to life, as well as reason, the capacity for foresight and the rational ordering of priorities over the long term. When two human groups butt up against one another, they face a choice between engaging in a violent, zero-sum struggle for dominance, or else in a peaceful, positive-sum relationship of trade and exchange. Over time, the logic of this choice (what Robert Wright labels "non-zero-sumness"[17]) has driven the boundaries of human in-groups to ever

[13]For numerous examples of this, see Frans De Waal, *Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

[14]See my book, *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order* (New York: Free Press, 1999).

[15]"Defensive modernization" describes a process whereby the requirements of external military competition drive internal sociopolitical organization and innovation. There are many examples of this, from reforms in post-Meiji Restoration Japan to the Internet.

[16]See my "Women and the Evolution of World Politics", *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 1998).

[17]Wright, *NonZero: The Logic of Human Destiny* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2000).

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larger communities of trust: from tiny kin groups to tribes or lineages, to states, nations, broad ethnolinguistic communities and eventually to what Samuel Huntington labels cultures, that is, communities of shared values encompassing many nation-states and hundreds of millions if not billions of people.

There remains a significant amount of violence at the boundaries of these ever larger groups, made more deadly by the simultaneous advance of military technology. But there is a logic to human history that is ultimately driven by the priorities that exist among natural human desires, propensities and behaviors. Human violence over the past 100,000 years or so has become increasingly controlled and pushed to the outer boundaries of these ever larger groups. Globalization—a world order in which mankind's largest in-groups no longer violently compete with one another for dominance but trade peaceably—can be seen as the logical culmination of a long-term series of decisions in favor of positive-sum competition.

Violence, in other words, may be natural to human beings, but so is the propensity to control and channel violence. These conflicting natural tendencies do not have equal status or priority; human beings reasoning about their situation can come to understand the need to create rules and institutions that constrain violence in favor of other natural ends, like the desire for property or gain, that are more fundamental.

Human nature is best at providing us with guidance as to what political orders will not work. Robin Fox makes fun of the idea that the contemporary evolutionary theory of kin selection or inclusive fitness could constitute the basis for rights. But a better understanding of this theory would have led us to predict the bankruptcy and ultimate failure of communism, due to its failure to respect natural inclinations to favor kin and private property.

Karl Marx argued that man is a species-being, that is, that human beings have altruistic feelings toward the human species as a whole. The policies and institutions of real-world communist states—like the abolition of private property, the subordination of the family to the party-state, and commitment to universal worker solidarity—were all predicated on this belief. (Visitors to Moscow in the days of the USSR may remember the statue there to Pavel Morozov, a little monster celebrated by Stalin for turning his parents in to the secret police.)

There was a time when evolutionary theorists like V.C. Wynne-Edwards postulated the existence of species-level altruism, but modern kin selection theory denies the existence of strong group-selection pressures.[18] It postulates instead that altruism arises primarily out of the need of *individuals* to get their genes passed on to successive generations. Human beings will by this account be altruistic primarily to family members and other kin; a political system that forces them to spend their Saturdays away from their families working on behalf of the "heroic Vietnamese people" will meet very deep resistance.

Human Nature and Politics

THE PRECEDING example demonstrates the ways in which human nature and politics are intertwined: kin selection indicates that a political system that respects

[18]The intellectual landscape on the issue of group selection has changed somewhat recently with the work of biologists, for example, David Sloan Wilson, who have made the case for multi-level (that is, both individual and group) selection. See Wilson and Elliott Sober, *Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

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the right of people to follow their own individual self-interests and attend to family and close friends before they attend to strangers halfway around the world will be more stable, workable and satisfying than one that does not. Human nature does not dictate a single, precise list of rights; it is both complex and flexible as it interacts with various technological environments. But it is not infinitely malleable, and our underlying shared humanity allows us to rule out certain forms of political order like tyranny as unjust. Those rights that speak to the most deeply felt and universal human drives, ambitions and behaviors will be a more solid foundation for political order than those that do not. This helps explain why there are a lot of capitalist liberal democracies around the world at the beginning of the twenty-first century, but very few socialist dictatorships.

Does this then mean that capitalist liberal democracy of the sort practiced in the United States is an ideal political system because it is optimally consistent with our underlying natures? And if so, does this further imply that we need to predicate our foreign policy on the extension of American-style rights to all peoples around the world? Here the answers become necessarily more nuanced and complex.

Robin Fox is on much firmer ground when he argues that there are many aspects of contemporary American society that are in some sense profoundly unnatural, such as our hyperindividualism, the impersonality of most of our social connections, and our imposition of anti-nepotistic rules that force us to hire qualified strangers before family members. There are many traditional, non- or pre-liberal societies that better respect group identity, face-to-face community and kinship than the United States. Rigid insistence on our part that all societies around the world respect human rights as we understand and institutionalize them risks being simultaneously arrogant, naive and politically imprudent.

But the kinds of political and economic institutions we now have are the by-product of the interaction of our underlying human desires and aspirations with the possibilities afforded us by science, technology and the economic horizon that the latter creates. Individualism and rules against nepotism are dictated by the requirements of a modern capitalist economy, whose economic benefits satisfy latent longings of our underlying natures. Most Americans are willing to give up a more natural kind of face-to-face community, where we are surrounded primarily by kin and close friends, for the more diverse, wealthy, entertaining, technological and necessarily impersonal world that constitutes modern urban life.

But the important point is, *so is virtually everyone else in the world*, because ultimately they are human beings with very similar sorts of underlying preferences. There are, of course, plenty of people who continue to live in a variety of traditional societies and seem to be quite contented doing so. But that is often the case because they cannot figure out how to transform their society into a more modern one, or else because they simply have not heard what modern societies are like. The moment they find out, they usually decide they like what they see, which explains why there is a massive flow of migrants or would-be migrants from less developed to developed countries, and virtually no one making the journey in the opposite direction.

Human rights as understood in contemporary liberal democracies, then, comes as part of a larger package. These rights express the moral aspirations and priorities of modern societies, that is, of societies based on the systematic employment of science and technology for the satisfaction of human needs. To seek to

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export only the human rights part of that package to societies that are either traditional, non-democratic or otherwise based on contrary political principles can often be counterproductive and, if the country in question is powerful, dangerous as well. Human rights can be said to be universal only in a developmental sense: they become explicit aspirations primarily of societies that are both economically and politically developed. They are, in other words, a by-product of History in the Hegelian-Marxist sense.

On the other hand, virtually everyone around the globe seeks development, and it is perfectly reasonable for the United States and other Western countries to embed a universalist human rights policy in a broader strategy designed to help them get there. American-style human rights may be foreign to traditional Chinese culture, but they are not necessarily foreign to educated and technologically-inclined Chinese who hope to integrate their country more fully into the global economy. Communist China cannot be forced to respect human rights, but it is not unreasonable to help guide an economically modernizing and politically liberalizing China toward institutions that will protect and extend human rights over time.

Anyone seeking to prove today that the signers of the Declaration of Independence were right in believing that human rights are based on human nature faces an uphill battle. But advocates of universal human rights need to reflect carefully on the importance of human nature to their cause. For if human beings are not in the end fundamentally similar under the skin, despite obvious differences in race, ethnicity, culture, wealth and education, then on what grounds can we demand that all governments treat their citizens with equal consideration? So too for the beleaguered notion that we have reached the end of History: an end to the historical process makes sense only if human nature provides a constant standard by which we can measure the suitability of our political institutions under a given technological horizon. Constant, that is, until such time as biotechnology gives us the ability to create new beings born, in effect, with saddles on their backs, and a new human nature comes to dictate a new set of posthuman rights. □

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Bad Statesman, Good Prophet

Woodrow Wilson and the Post-Cold War Order

Michael Mandelbaum

WHEN the Cold War ended, professional observers of international politics began an informal contest to describe the new post-Cold War world. This was known as the "Kennan competition", for the goal was to do for the new era what the American diplomat George Kennan had done for the post-World War II period in his influential 1947 article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." In that essay he identified the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union as the centerpiece of international affairs and coined the term "containment" to describe American policy toward its chief adversary.

In the course of the first post-Cold War decade an impressive array of books and articles about the new world order appeared—one of the most influential of them, Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History?", in the pages of this magazine—but none gained acceptance as definitive. The answer to the question of how to characterize the world after the Cold War, however, was hiding in plain sight. The key lies in the ideas of the most controversial and least successful of all American foreign policymakers, the twenty-eighth president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson.

Both the controversy and the failure center on Wilson's plan, unveiled at the Paris Peace Conference following World War I, for an international organization to keep the peace. The League of Nations was established but the United States did not join, and the organization did not prevent the outbreak of World War II two decades later. One reason for the American rejection of the League was the president's incompetence in lobbying the U.S. Senate in favor of American membership. Both at home and abroad, Wilson was a poor statesman.

Eight decades later, however, he has proven to have been a remarkably good prophet. His vision of a world transformed, of a new postwar order that would prevent a recurrence of the ordeal of 1914–18, went beyond the establishment of a League of Nations. The Wilsonian vision had three other components, each of which, he believed, would contribute to a more peaceful world: restraints on armaments, democratic government, and the unimpeded flow of commerce across national borders. These other pillars of his program—this

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"Wilsonian triad"—form the setting of the world after the Cold War.

In his statement setting forth what the United States hoped to accomplish by intervening in World War I—the "Fourteen Points" speech of January 8, 1918—in his subsequent elaborations on those points, in his other major addresses on the war, and in his diplomacy at Paris, Woodrow Wilson presented his vision of the postwar international order. His was a program of international reform in which disarmament, democracy and free trade were central.

He called, on January 8, for the reduction of all national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety. He was convinced that the expansion of Europe's armed forces and the accumulation of weaponry by the continent's great powers before 1914 had contributed to the outbreak of the conflict. Arms, he believed, were themselves a cause of war.

Popular government was an equally important part of Wilson's vision. The United States had entered the war, according to the contemporaneous slogan, to make the world safe for democracy. Democracy was a necessary condition of peace, its absence a cause of war. Democracy entailed self-government, and the single greatest obstacle to European self-government in the second decade of the twentieth century was imperial rule. Wilson's Fourteen Points speech thus called for the end of empires. This required the application to imperial territory of the principle of national self-determination, a principle that Wilson considered necessary for the kind of democracy in which he believed.

In the same speech, as he had before and would again afterward, Wilson also called for the removal of barriers to international trade and the establishment of equal trading conditions for all countries everywhere. Free trade was, with disarmament and democracy, a pillar of a peaceful world. At Paris, Wilson sought to dismantle the barriers to the free flow of commerce across international borders.

Wilson's ideas seem familiar to us today. They reappeared in the statements of American aims in the next war by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. They entrenched themselves thereafter in the political rhetoric of the Western democracies. They are staples of speeches by Western—especially American—political leaders on world politics and foreign policy. Indeed, the Wilsonian ideas are so familiar that they have become the political equivalent of Muzak, scarcely registering on an audience whenever they are proclaimed. They are what all Western political leaders say they want, what—they insist—the policies they are prescribing aim to achieve. Wilson's three precepts are considered the standard means to the universally desired and self-evidently worthy ends of peace, liberty and prosperity.

The Passing of the Old Order

BUT THIS was not always so. In the decades after Wilson unveiled his vision of international order, the means he had advocated were bitterly contested. And for most of recorded history the ends he proposed, far from being universally accepted, were all but unthinkable. A century before Wilson's moment, and for all the centuries before that, the world in which every human being lived was what, after it had disappeared, came to be called "traditional." Life was lived locally. Economic activity was almost entirely agricultural. Political authority was hereditary and arbitrary. Change in the daily routine of court, town and village, when it occurred, was experienced as disruption, not progress. The principal causes of change were dynastic succession, religious schism and the weather. The three international

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goals that Wilson proclaimed and that came in the twentieth century to seem unarguably desirable would have struck almost anyone living in the first half of the eighteenth century or earlier as distinctly odd.

Peace would have seemed an odd goal because war was considered a natural feature of relations between and among sovereign states. War was not always desirable, of course, and a body of doctrine had accumulated over the centuries to regulate its conduct, but the abolition of war was almost nowhere regarded as a serious human hope or purpose. As the English jurist Sir Henry Maine observed in the second half of the nineteenth century, "War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention."[1]

If peace was a fantasy in the traditional world, liberty for all was widely considered a menace. Democracy was tantamount to mob rule, as well as a departure from, indeed an inversion of, the divinely decreed, normal order of things. The educated few familiar with the history of the ancient world had learned from it that the rule of the *demos* (the people) led to disaster.

Prosperity was the third component of the Wilsonian triad. Individual wealth was an age-old feature of social and political life; exchange was a normal part of economic activity; and the discovery of new deposits of minerals, the opening of new trade routes, incremental improvements in the techniques of growing crops and making handcrafts, and above all the vagaries of the climate had caused the level of economic activity and the supplies of food and material possessions to rise and fall from time immemorial. But the broad-based, self-sustaining economic growth of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was beyond imagining.

The world of tradition was swept away by the Industrial and French Revolutions. The first led to the greatest change in human existence since the domestication of agriculture in the Neolithic age, between 8000 and 3000 B.C. Beginning in Great Britain, it involved the substitution of inanimate for animate sources of power, the concomitant substitution of machines for human labor, and the use of new and more abundant (and ultimately man-made) materials. The second, which substituted the popular will for dynastic inheritance as the basis for political legitimacy, was the most important political event in Europe since the fall of the Roman Empire. Together, the two revolutions formed the context for all that followed. They changed the way public affairs were conducted and individual life lived. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that they changed the world—decisively, irreversibly and rapidly. So powerful was their impact that at Paris in 1919 assumptions about what the world was and what it could be that had been axiomatic as recently as the eighteenth century had been so decisively repudiated that no serious person could hold them.

The horrors of World War I had turned the abolition of the ancient practice of armed conflict into a practical necessity. The course of the nineteenth century, continuing the work of the French Revolution, had progressively weakened the grip of dynastic rule in Europe, and World War I put an end to it.[2] And the extraordinary surge of economic activity, involving new sources of power that made possible new products

[1]Quoted in the frontispiece of Michael Howard, *The Invention of Peace* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).

[2]While it was impossible to preserve or restore dynastic rule in Europe (the remaining monarchs there lacked effective political power), imperial rule lived on in the French and British possessions outside Europe.

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and new ways of producing them, had disrupted the settled agricultural life of much of the planet. In the nineteenth century, and to the present day, the Industrial Revolution, with its unimagined material wealth and its unprecedented squalor, has proven to be as close to an irresistible force as human history has known.

Wilson accepted the goals of the modern world but his vision of them was distinctive in two enduringly important ways: first, he offered a particular set of means for achieving peace, popular rule and prosperity. Second, he asserted that the goals of liberty and prosperity were also conducive to peace. The first of the three great aims of the modern world, the one that the recent experience of terrible battles like the Somme and Passchendaele had made it seem imperative to achieve, was also, in the Wilsonian vision of the post-World War I order, a by-product of the other two.

The Origins of a Vision

ALTHOUGH it bears his name, Wilsonianism did not originate with Woodrow Wilson. While his vision represented a program of international reform when he urged it on the world, it was not new. It was the product of a particular intellectual and political climate of a particular time and place that itself was the result of a particular historical experience. It arose in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Great Britain and its political offshoot, the United States.

The influential nineteenth-century English political thinker Jeremy Bentham had proposed the abolition of armaments as an avenue to peace, and the cause was taken up by the English peace societies that were founded in the first half of that century.[3] American revolutionaries at the end of the eighteenth century, especially the more radical among them such as Thomas Paine, believed that the overthrow of the hereditary monarchies of Europe would, among other benefits, relieve the world of the selfish, unnecessary wars that these monarchs were in the unbreakable habit of waging.[4] As for commerce, the cause of free trade was a major issue in the nineteenth-century politics of Great Britain, and some of its most enthusiastic proponents—the member of parliament and textile manufacturer Richard Cobden prominent among them—asserted that, beyond making countries richer, free trade would also make them more peaceful in their relations with one another. The United States was not as firmly committed to free trade as was Great Britain, but the benefits of commerce and the desirability of promoting it were themes in American political life from the founding of the Republic.

The putative relationship between democracy and free trade on the one hand and peace on the other was not, on the whole, central to the political life of either

[3] On the nineteenth-century origins of Wilsonianism, especially in Great Britain, see, *inter alia*, Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1978), chaps. 2–3; F.H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1967), chaps. 5–7; and A.J.P. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers: Dissent Over Foreign Policy, 1792-1939* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1985; first published, 1957), chaps. 1–2.

[4] "Monarchical sovereignty, the enemy of mankind and the source of misery, is abolished, and sovereignty is restored to its natural and original place, the nation. Were this the case throughout Europe the cause of war would be taken away." Thomas Paine, "The Rights of Man", *Common Sense and Other Writings* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), p. 109.

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the United States or the United Kingdom before World War I. But that was because a great European and world war was not then an overriding concern in either country. By the end of 1918 it *was* the central issue, and one in urgent need of solution. Wilson bundled these Anglo-American ideas together and presented them as the solution the world was seeking. The ideas were in the air in the United States and Britain: Wilson was an American and an Anglophile, and as both a practicing politician and former university professor of politics and government he was aware of the pertinent intellectual currents in both parts of the Anglo-American political world. Woodrow Wilson was the Henry Ford of international liberalism, taking what had already been invented and offering it to the world in a widely available format.

The ideas he brought to Paris were current in the world in which he lived because they were consistent with the broad principles of Anglo-American political culture. The Wilsonian triad was liberal in the original and fundamental nineteenth-century sense of the term. In different ways, each of its component parts—democracy, free trade and controls on armaments—involved restraints on the exercise of power by governments.[5]

This principle has some claim to being the essence of political liberalism, which erects fences around certain spheres of social life into which the government is forbidden to intrude, thereby creating space for individual liberty. Similarly, restrictions on arms limit one of the basic tools of statecraft and so impose restraints on what sovereign states can do to one another. A market economy, which its earliest and most influential chronicler, Adam Smith, called "a system of natural liberty",[6] is liberal in that one of its central institutions is private property, which is controlled by individual owners rather than the government. Economic decisions—what to produce, where and when to produce it, and to whom and for how much to sell it—are made by individuals according to the criterion of profitability rather than by officials according to their own agendas. To be sure, government plays a role, sometimes a large role, in a market economy: it produces some things; it sets some prices; it imposes taxes on privately owned property. But what it does is limited. As with democracy and restraints on armaments, market economics establishes zones that are off-limits to the exercise of governmental power.

If the other three parts of Wilson's vision had been established, the shortcomings of the fourth, his beloved League of Nations, might not have mattered. But in his day the Wilsonian triad was not established, not even in the Anglo-American world from which it came. Great Britain did not favor self-government for its own imperial possessions, nor was it enthusiastic about limits on its navy. The United States was not wholeheartedly devoted to free trade. The immediate and, for most of the twentieth century, most formidable obstacle to establishing the triad in practice, however, was what for most of the century was the major consequence of World War I. Out of the rubble of war emerged new rivals to liberalism, movements that accepted two of the goals of modernity—popular sovereignty and economic growth—but prescribed radi-

[5]Restraint here does not necessarily imply the establishment of a separate body to do the restraining. There is no higher power than the sovereign state, a fact particularly important for matters of international security. Restraint is self-restraint.

[6]Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (New York: Modern Library, 1994), p. 745.

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cally illiberal means for achieving them. The contest for global primacy between the two forms of modernity was to dominate the twentieth century. Both communism and fascism had their proximate roots in World War I. The founder of the first was a Russian revolutionary who spent the war in exile in Switzerland until returning to Russia to seize power in St. Petersburg in 1917; the founder of the second was an Austrian-born veteran of the trenches on the western front, who ruled Germany from 1933 until his suicide in 1945.

The contest between international liberalism and the movements that Lenin and Hitler founded was waged to determine whether the popular will was properly expressed through the institutions and procedures of Western, originally Anglo-American, liberal democracy, or through self-selected elite political parties presiding over forms of state domination so extreme that they came, collectively, to be called totalitarian. It was also a contest over whether the wealth that the Industrial Revolution had made possible could be better achieved through the institutions and practices of the free market of the Anglo-American world or through much greater (in the case of fascism) or total (in the communist case) control by the government of the basic economic tasks of investment, production and distribution.

As for international security, the illiberal approach made war—in the case of fascism, war between states; in the case of communism, so-called "class war"—central, desirable, indeed necessary. In the face of such an attitude the hand of the liberal nation-states was forced. They might well believe war to be unnatural and undesirable, but they could hardly afford to act as if it were impossible. Until late in the twentieth century genuine peace, let alone controls on armaments, was not a realistic prospect. It was something that would no doubt be beneficial if it ever came to pass, but that showed no sign of ever doing so—until, that is, the sudden end of the Cold War.

From Dream to (Qualified) Reality

DÉJÀ VU, according to Freud, occurs when someone experiences in real life something that he or she had previously dreamed. By this definition, the post-Cold War world was a textbook case. For as the twentieth century ended, what had been for Woodrow Wilson a vision of world order—what can be seen in hindsight as the Wilsonian dream—had, to all appearances, come true. A world dominated by the East-West conflict had given way to a world in which the principles of the winning side in that conflict were unchallenged. Those principles were liberal ones.

The control of armaments is a nineteenth-century idea but a twentieth-century invention. In Wilson's day no regulations governed the possession of weapons. In the wake of the Cold War there were many such regulations. Most of them concerned a particular region and a particular type of armament. The region was Europe. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, the European continent was as intensively regulated for military forces as the center of a major American city is for architecture. The European arms control regime, largely negotiated in the latter years of the Cold War and in the immediate post-Cold War period, was a set of military zoning ordinances: strict, elaborate and designed to produce a stable balance of forces, even as zoning laws are intended to produce an ensemble of height and space that is both esthetically appealing and commercially viable. The most heavily regulated arms were those known as "weapons of mass destruction." This cat-

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egory included nuclear weapons, but also, by convention, chemical and biological armaments.

As for democracy, it was rare in Wilson's era. World War I was won by a coalition of genuine democracies: the United States, Great Britain, France and the British dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. But the roster of Allied powers in that war virtually exhausted the list of the world's functioning democracies, where governments were freely elected and the laws that elected governments enacted were scrupulously followed. The goal for which the United States had fought the first great conflict of the twentieth century had, by the end of the third of these conflicts, evidently been achieved: much of the world was democratic. In its 1999 report, Freedom House, an American organization that follows and seeks to promote the progress of political liberty in the world, classified 85 of the world's 192 countries as "free" and 60 more as "partly free." This was a far higher score, even adjusting for the vastly expanded number of independent countries, than the planet would have earned in Wilson's day. It is a higher score than the Freedom House ratings of twenty or even ten years earlier.[7]

The third Wilsonian precept, unimpeded international commerce, was also a notable feature of the post-Cold War world. Between 1950 and 1996, the world's exports increased by volume sixteen times over (while total economic output increased by a factor of six). In most countries, and for the world as a whole, merchandise exports as a percentage of the gross domestic product was considerably higher in the wake of the Cold War than it had been on the eve of World War I.[8] All this happened despite the fact that many countries that had gained independence after World War II began their careers as sovereign states determined to adopt the policy of "import substitution", designed to restrict dependence on products made elsewhere. But by the first post-Cold War decade many of the barriers they had initially erected had been lowered or abolished. The World Trade Organization, established in 1997 to further the principles of free trade, had 132 members, with 30 additional countries seeking to join. And the flow of capital across borders had increased even more dramatically than trade.[9]

At the same time, more and more countries adopted liberal principles for organizing economic activity within their borders as well as across them. The role of government in economic management shrank, while that of market principles in decisions about production and distribution expanded. Liberal economic ideas penetrated even those parts of the world that had been, at the height of the Cold War, most hostile to them. By 1997 Wang Zhongyu, minister of the State Economic and Trade Commission (his title itself a badge of official economic illiberalism) of the People's Republic of China—a country in which, until quite recently, an individual suspected of following the "capitalist road" would have been imprisoned or shot—was declaring, "We must have a system where the strong survive and the weak fail. That is the lesson of the market

[7] *Freedom in the World, 1999-2000* (New York: Freedom House, 2000), p. 602.

[8] Some examples: in 1913 the percentage for the United States had been 3.7, in 1992 it was 8.2. For France, 8.2 and 22.9; for Germany, 15.6 and 32.6; for Japan 2.4 and 12.4; for Korea 1.0 and 17.8; for the world as a whole, 8.7 and 13.5. "Wealth of nations", *Financial Times*, May 19, 1998. See also "Survey", *The Economist*, September 20, 1997, p. 24.

[9] Robert Gilpin, *The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 21-4.

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economy."[10] A term that became common in the wake of the Cold War bore witness to the strength of liberal economic ideas and practices: globalization. While it had a variety of implications, the word had a single meaning—the spread of free markets everywhere.

Another sign of the victory of economic liberalism was the status and power of the two principal international financial institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Both had their headquarters in the capital of the country that had been most vocal, for most of the twentieth century, in its proclamations of support for free markets: the United States. Both were committed to propagating these principles and both—the Fund more so than the Bank—possessed a crucial instrument for doing so: money.

The IMF was the Vatican of free-market economics, but more powerful than the bishop of Rome. Stalin's sneering rhetorical question about the power of the Church—"How many divisions has the Pope?"—was wholly inappropriate for the late twentieth-century citadel of liberal economic orthodoxy. For without so much as a Swiss palace guard it had, in the wake of the Cold War, acquired the power to induce governments to adopt sweeping changes in policy, with serious economic effects, that were often, in the short run, deeply disadvantageous to their own people. The IMF was a bank. In exchange for loans to governments it typically insisted on adherence to a strict free-market regimen. That regimen could be harsh, the economic equivalent of a Spartan diet, leading to economic austerity that was sometimes intense and prolonged. The IMF was not always and everywhere popular; in some countries it was extremely unpopular. But in the wake of the Cold War it was omnipresent. Its organizational tentacles seemed to be irresistible to any country in economic distress or simply not as wealthy as the rich industrial democracies. In the year 2000 a total of 83 countries were involved in IMF lending programs of one kind or another, including virtually all of the countries that emerged from communist rule in Europe. It became a mark of seriousness, almost a condition of sovereignty, to have such a program.[11]

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[10]Seth Faison, "Messy Free Market Plunge Rattling China's Business", *New York Times*, October 5, 1997.

[11]*Annual Report 2000* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2000), pp. 123-4. Here is an example of the IMF's centrality drawn from a widely read daily chronicle of international economic matters in the post-Cold War world, the *Financial Times*. The London-based newspaper has functioned as the unofficial house organ of globalization: "The Congo Brazzaville government, which took power last year after a civil war, said yesterday that it would hold elections within three years and possibly within months. Rodolphe Adada, foreign minister, said the government hoped this month to receive International Monetary Fund approval for a national development programme." *Financial Times*, July 1, 1998.

Globalization's weekly chronicle is another London-based publication, the *Economist*. Here is a typical item from its pages: "Madagascar is open for business. Five years ago, arrival at Antananarivo's airport was a bureaucratic assault course that could last three hours. It now takes 30 minutes. Visas are no longer required, exchange controls have been abandoned, travel restrictions lifted. What is going on?

"Answer: the 'Bretton Woods' institutions and Didier Ratsiraka. On February 9th, he took over as president of this island-country off East Africa after defeating Albert Zafy with just over half the votes. . . . So far, the former dictator has made all the right moves. Visiting the World Bank last week, he secured hefty lending commitments through to 1999." *Economist*, March 22, 1997.

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No Other Menu

WHILE the liberal internationalism that Woodrow Wilson had brought to Paris was, in the wake of the Cold War, more popular and more widely practiced than ever before, its tenets were not universally established. Restrictions on weaponry could not in fact be said to be firmly established anywhere. The geographic reach of many of the statutory limits on arms extended only to Europe—an important part of the world, to be sure, but far from the whole of it. And even there, these limits were fragile, the treaties mandating them depending on voluntary compliance. The rules governing weapons of mass destruction were global in scope, but they did not command universal compliance and were not matched by comparably broad protocols that applied to other kinds of weapons. Indeed, the very idea that restrictions on arms could make an important, let alone an indispensable, contribution to peace was still not universally accepted.

Liberal politics and liberal economics were far better established than arms control, not only in practice but also in theory. Behind popular, constitutional politics stood a rich tradition of scholarship and debate reaching back at least as far as Hobbes and Locke in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The comparable tradition for market economics was not quite as venerable, but its roots could be traced to the eighteenth century and to another formidable thinker, Adam Smith. No such admired tradition stood behind the idea that reducing weaponry was a key to international peace.

Indeed, while more deeply and widely established, the form of government Wilson had thought integral to peace was not universal, either. In the first post-Cold War decade, democracy became a cause to which a good deal of lip service was paid simply as a matter of convenience by rulers who remained authoritarian and corrupt. Many countries had governments that looked, but did not function, like the British parliamentary model or the American federal system. In the eighteenth century Grigori Potemkin, a minister of the Russian empress, Catherine the Great, lined a route on which she was traveling with impressive-looking but flimsy, hastily built structures in order to persuade her that large settlements had been built there. They are known to history as "Potemkin villages." In the same spirit, many of the post-Cold War "Potemkin democracies" were intended, among other objectives, to deceive the powerful of the international system, who could be counted on to confer economic favors on regimes they could find some reason to believe were democratic. On a map of the world on which degrees of democracy were indicated by varying shades of red, large stretches of the planet—Africa, the Arab Middle East and much of the former Soviet Union—could qualify only for the palest of pinks. The government of the most populous country in the world, the People's Republic of China, still made the suppression of political liberty a matter of firm principle and, within its declining means, of daily practice.

Free trade, and the market economics that underlie it, was more widely accepted and practiced than either of the other two parts of the Wilsonian triad. Rare was the political leader who dared expressly to oppose either. While resolutely opposed to liberal politics, the Chinese government emphatically favored, at least rhetorically, liberal economics. Still, obstacles to commerce—while they were fewer and more modest, and although erecting and maintaining them were less intellectually and politically respectable than in Wilson's day—were still to be found throughout the international system. At the end of the first post-Cold

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War decade the world had not become a single, vast, seamless republic of merchants in which getting and spending, making and distributing, buying and selling all proceeded untroubled by any consideration save profitability.

Nor, finally, was the world fully liberal in the way that had mattered most to Wilson: it was anything but wholly peaceful. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the threat of a major conflict like those that had dominated the twentieth century had receded sharply; but lesser wars were numerous.

In the wake of the Cold War, liberal internationalism was not, therefore, universal. It was, instead, hegemonic. The term "hegemony" comes originally from ancient Greece. There it referred to the fact of preponderance and the exercise of leadership or predominant influence by one Greek city-state, usually within the context of a confederacy of several of them. The hegemon towered over the others. Similarly, international liberalism was a towering presence in the post-Cold War world. It provided the most widely adopted and enthusiastically practiced set of political and economic principles and institutions. It was practiced and promoted by the most powerful members of the international system. It was the world's orthodoxy. For the first time in the two centuries of the modern era, it had no serious, fully articulated rival as a set of principles for organizing the world's military relations, politics and economics. When Wilson had unveiled his ideas at Paris they had been utopian. Eight decades later they had become pedestrian.

To be sure, in the last decade of the old millennium not all sovereign states accepted each of the three features of international liberalism; there were many rejections, tacit and explicit. And even where liberal principles were accepted, governments were not always able to practice them. But there were no alternative principles. The international system was like a fixed price menu from which a diner could accept or reject different items. He or she could choose to skip the *hors d'oeuvre*, or the main course, or the dessert—or to go hungry altogether. In the first post-Cold War decade, Burma, Cuba, Iraq and North Korea did reject international liberalism in its entirety and did go hungry—literally as well as metaphorically. But there was no other menu, no other series of equally appetizing political and economic choices from which to order. International liberalism had no shortage of critics who were prepared to point out its shortcomings and suggest improvements, but there were no restaurants offering a different product.

For all their failures to meet liberal standards, the Potemkin democracies and *faux*-market economies, with their rigged stock markets and government monopolies, were eloquent testimony to the liberal hegemony. They were engaged in a hypocritical enterprise; but hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue, and at the dawn of the twenty-first century liberalism was conceded, for the first time, to be the essence of virtue.

A decade after it began, therefore, the central theme of the post-Cold War era is discernible: the plot of international history in the wake of the great East-West conflict is the defense, maintenance and extension of the three parts of the Wilsonian triad. Nor is this simply a detached, lofty perspective on the post-Cold War world far removed from the hurly-burly at ground level. This has been the theme of post-Cold War history in the era's first decade, as those who have been making that history have understood and experienced it.

The more powerful states in the international system have deliberately sought to propagate liberalism. They have propagated it even when they have not consciously been seeking to do so; they

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have been magnets as well as missionaries. Lesser states, especially those not fully liberal, have been attracted, repelled, exhilarated and offended—but at all events powerfully affected—by liberalism. It is the compass point by which they now take their own bearings. They understand their own politics, economics and foreign policies as responses to the liberal hegemony even if they seek to evade it.

Asked where in Paris he would most like to live, a French architect is said to have picked the Eiffel Tower, on the grounds that this was the only place in the city from which he would not have to look at it. For the moment, at least, the international liberalism that Woodrow Wilson unveiled at Paris after World War I is the Eiffel Tower of the post-Cold War world. □

Monuments and Modernism

The truth is that the temperament of modernism was *anti*monumental. Modern architecture, in particular, rose on a doctrine of functionalism and structural honesty, and its idealism was subsumed in crusades for tangible goals like mass housing and urban renewal. When it looked upon society, it tended to see ills that needed to be remedied more than achievements that cried out to be commemorated.

For this reason, the winning of World War II, the biggest national undertaking since the Civil War (and one which, in contrast to that earlier conflict, enjoyed an unprecedented degree of national consensus) was marked by no great national building. . . .

If modernism had discredited the form of the traditional monument, the Vietnam war helped discredit the content. The war confirmed for many that there was little about America—or "Amerika"—that was worth celebrating. To every imaginable claim of virtue, a seemingly irrefutable qualifier could be raised. Yes, we had liberty—but we had also had slavery. Yes, we had equality—but we had also had Jim Crow. And yes, there was Normandy and the liberation of Europe—but there had also been Hiroshima. The increasing prevalence of this habit of mind—by now, several generations have been brought up to think this way instinctively—made the very idea of a celebratory national consensus seem laughable, let alone the idea of building monuments to express it.

—Michael J. Lewis, "Mumbling Monuments", *Commentary*, February 2001

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Who's Afraid of Mr. Big?

Josef Joffe

THE PUZZLE persists: Why is the world not "ganging up" against the "last remaining superpower"? Why has history not claimed its due a dozen years after the end of the Cold War, the twentieth century's last and longest dominant conflict? For history (and theory) asserts that the international system abhors imbalances, that great power will spawn counter-power. At this point, the United States is the mightiest nation on earth. Its reach spans the globe. Its economy dwarfs the next-largest, Japan, by a factor of two and a half; its defense outlays exceed those of the next five-biggest spenders combined. Nor is it just a matter of "hard power." America's "soft power", to invoke Joseph S. Nye's term, looms even larger than its economic and military assets. U.S. culture, low-brow or high, radiates outward with an intensity last seen in the days of the Roman Empire—but with a novel twist. Rome's and Soviet Russia's cultural sway stopped exactly at their military borders. America's soft power, though, rules over an empire on which the sun never sets.

Yet history (still) refuses to kick in against Number 1. The Soviet Union's demise in 1989–91 has not produced the expected outcome. There is no "reversal of alliances" as after World War II, when the United States inducted defeated Germany and Japan into its anti-Soviet coalition. Nor has America's Cold War coalition crumpled, as history would have suggested. The alliance against Revolutionary France was essentially dead by 1822, seven years after Waterloo. The anti-German alliance of World War I began to unravel in Rapallo in 1922, three years after Versailles. But twelve years after the Soviet capitulation in the Cold War, there is not even a trace of real, that is, military, balancing against the United States. No armed coalitions, formal or informal, are being organized by former friends or foes.

So much for the puzzle. One way of cracking it is to frame the issue in different terms. Just because there is no explicit counter-aggregation of *military* power does not mean that there is no balancing at all. Hence we might distinguish between three different types of balancing: psycho-cultural, politico-diplomatic and military-strategic—a distinction to which classical balance of power theory has paid no attention. No, there is (as yet) no strategic balancing against Number 1, but on the two other levels a different picture emerges. To elucidate its nature, this article will focus on the Atlantic relationship within the global post-bipolar context. The gist of the story is this: psycho-cultural balancing—high; politico-diplomatic—medium; mili-

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tary-strategic—low. Why is this so, and what are the implications for America's grand strategy?

Balancing Against the Barbarians: The Contest of Cultures

A RECENT *Newsweek* essay was titled "Europe: The Un-America." The author, Michael Elliott, makes short shrift of a common transatlantic civilization. To set the stage, he quotes columnist Polly Toynbee from the British *Guardian*:

> The two [American party] conventions [in 2000] displayed all that is most repugnant and alien in a political system corrupted beyond recognition. . . . God's chosen people, uniquely blessed, nurture a self-image almost as deranged in its profound self-delusion as the old Soviet Union.[1]

The thrust of such a critique is directed not at what America does, but at what America *is*. As depicted mainly, but no longer exclusively, in the liberal media (officials are far more circumspect), the United States is what Europe is not, nor wants to be. Hence, Europe as the "Un-America." The indictment, to caricature it with maximal authorial license, is threefold:

America is morally retrograde. It executes its own people, which Europe does not, and it likes to bomb others, which Europe does only when dragged along by the United States. It is the land of intolerant, fundamentalist religion, while Europe is charting a path toward enlightened secularism. The United States is a nation that will not submit to the dictates of global goodness; hence it will not respect climate conventions, nor will it ratify the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the land mine ban. Internationally, it is "Dirty Harry" and "Globocop" rolled into one—an irresponsible and arrogant citizen of the global community.

America is socially retrograde. It is the land of "predatory capitalism" (in the words of former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt) that denies critical social services, like health insurance, to those who need it most. Instead of bettering the lot of the poor and unskilled, it shunts millions of them, mainly dark-skinned minorities, off into prison. Europe, on the other hand, metes out rehabilitation, not retribution. America accepts, nay, admires gross income inequalities, whereas Europe cherishes redistribution in the name of social justice. The United States lets its state school system rot, not to speak of the public infrastructure.

America is culturally retrograde. It gorges itself on fatty fast food, wallows in tawdry mass entertainment, starves the arts and prays only to one God, which is Mammon. Instead of subsidizing the good and the high-minded, as do the Europeans, the United States ruthlessly sacrifices the best of culture to pap and pop. Its great universities (for the rich and well connected only) conceal vast illiteracy and ignorance of the world. In matters sexual, America is both prurient and prudish, a far cry from the wiser ways of Europe.

America, in short, gets it both coming and going. It is puritanical and self-indulgent, philistine and elitist, sanctimonious and crassly materialist. It is a society where Europe's finest values—solidarity and community, taste and manners—are ground down by rampant individualism. It is the "Un-Europe."

This is, to repeat, a polemical exaggeration, bereft of all cross- and counter-currents. But whatever the caricature's fidelity, there is a deeper problem with

[1]Elliott, "Europe: The Un-America", *Newsweek*, Special Davos Edition, December 2000-February 2001, p. 22.

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such an indictment. Europe—indeed, most of the world—also wants what America is. Nobody has ever used a gun to drive Frenchmen into one of their 780 McDonalds. No force need be applied to make Europeans buy clothes or watch films "Made in USA." Germans take to "Denglish" as if it were their native tongue. So might the French to "Franglais" if their authorities did not impose fines on local DJs when they do not call a "hit parade" a "*parade de frappe*", as it were.

In fact, European governments must resort to the force of law to *stop* their citizens from imbibing all things American. This is where "cultural balancing" takes on an operative coloration. In 1993 the French coaxed the European Union to insert into its commercial treaties a "cultural exception" clause exempting cultural products, high or low, from normal free-trade rules. Other European nations impose informal quotas. The purpose is a balance of power policy of sorts. It is to contain American cultural clout—to erect trade walls instead of real turrets and battlements. The enemy is not America the Conqueror—not the "Imperial Republic"—but America the Beguiling.

But why the bad-mouthing of America if it is so alluring? This is where a related type of balancing comes in; let us call it "psychological." Shall we ask Professor Freud to explain? He would mumble about "reaction formation" and "projection", about feelings of deficiency and dependence breeding assertions of moral-cultural superiority. Trying to be up to date, he might launch into a discourse on "HHMMS", the "Harvard and Hollywood, McDonald's and Microsoft Syndrome." The problem, he would conclude, is that America is both menace and seducer, both monster and model.

Harvard stands for America's towering intellectual dominance where the Sorbonne and the University of Göttingen once ruled the roost. Now Europe's best and brightest would rather go to Stanford and the California Institute of Technology than to one of those faceless mass universities that have replaced the Continent's ancient centers of excellence. Books, even the high-brow kind, travel overwhelmingly west to east across the Atlantic.

Hollywood signifies America's supremacy in pop culture—not only in the film and TV market, but also in music, "airport literature" and off-the-rack fashion. Europe reads John Grisham and wears DKNY.[2] Even the French would rather watch *Gladiator* or *ER* than their own more sophisticated, but apparently more boring, fare. Indeed, Europeans tend to prefer Tinseltown to one another's movies.

McDonald's symbolizes America's irreversible occupation of Europe's palaces of *basse cuisine*. Ironically, Europeans have also begun to eat bagels, which were originally boiled and baked in the southwest of Germany, whence they wandered to Jewish Eastern Europe and then to the Lower East Side. To top these horrors, Starbucks has begun to invade Europe, once the proud stronghold of the espresso and the demitasse.

Microsoft is a shorthand for America's steamroller economy. Even as the U.S. economy began to look at a not-so-soft landing in 2001, while Europe was still on an upswing, the EU remained stuck with close to double-digit unemployment. The stuff that drove, and will continue to drive, the New Economy hails from Seattle or Silicon Valley. Worse, since it is America that keeps inventing the "new new thing", it gets to name it. Reports the publisher of a standard German dictio-

[2]In this arena, though, the Europeans are fighting back successfully, considering the inroads H & M (Sweden) and Zara (Spain) have made into the U.S. teen market, while Ikea (Sweden) is approaching pop icon status in the furniture trade.

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nary: "We just had to add 5,000 new words, and most of them are American derivatives."

In short, history's first global civilization is "Made in USA", and it needs no gun to travel. Yet seduction is worse than imposition. It makes you feel weak, and so you hate the soft-pawed corrupter as well as yourself. Worse still, seduction is subversion. America is not just Number 1 in terms of strategic, economic and cultural power. It is also modernity's global ramrod, and to compete, Europe has to emulate the barbarians at least part of the way. It has to rethink short work weeks and long vacations, unassailable job security and munificent welfare benefits. The French may insist on their *exception culturelle*, but it was the Socialist Jospin government that cut taxes and (some) labor market regulations. It was the Social Democratic Schröder government that began the partial privatization of social security while abolishing taxes on the sale of corporate cross-holdings, which will not only do wonders for competition and transparency in the land of "Rhenish Capitalism", but also overturn cozy business ways dating back to the nineteenth century. When Europeans talk about "best practices", they look to American accounting standards; when they seek to reform corporate governance, they consult the American model.

Like any revolution, this one threatens old power, status and entitlement structures. Unwritten social contracts that have upheld distinctly Continental notions of distributive justice are under attack from abroad, and "abroad" signifies mainly "America", hence the conflation of "globalization" with "Americanization." To catch up, Europe has to become at least partly what America already is; no wonder that it dislikes the idea as well as its purveyor. The natural "reaction-formation", as Professor Freud would pontificate, is to assert Europe's moral-cultural superiority, holding it up against the depraved ways of its eighteenth-century offspring—or to project its angst about modernity's cruel progress on the vast canvas that is the United States. This is, of course, an old story in the annals of Euro-American relations, but the drama has gained more oomph and speed in an age of instant mass communication.

Hence Europe as the "Un-America", hence the psycho-cultural balancing against an America that is what Europe fears to become but cannot totally resist. What is "un-European?" Here is a nice list as provided by French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine in his book, *Les Cartes de la France à l'heure de la mondialisation*: "ultraliberal market economy, rejection of the state, nonrepublican individualism, unthinking strengthening of the universal and 'indispensable' role of the USA, common law, *anglophone*, Protestant rather than Catholic concepts."[3]

Balancing Against Ubiquity: The Political Contest

THE EFFORT to balance America's "soft power" is caught between seduction and "reaction-formation." To caricature the ambivalence: Frenchmen will cheer those who trash a McDonald's and then repair to one of the 779 still standing for a shake and a Big Mac. Germans will rail against Hollywood's cultural imperialism while watching *Eurocops*, a local series that mimics the U.S. model down to the last zoom and jingle. Given this comic equivocation, one should not expect too many operational consequences. Save for the French-inspired "cultural exception" clause, there is no hard and fast counter-action. The struggle is high on vocality, but low on penalties. Temptress America seems des-

[3]Quoted in Tony Judt, "The French Difference", *New York Review of Books*, April 12, 2001, p. 19.

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tined to prevail—though not forever. If the Europeans take up the challenge, a familiar dialectic is bound to carry the day in the market of culture: first imitation, then appropriation, and finally equalization and sectoral domination.

In the political and economic arena, the duel has more palpable repercussions, ranging from the unconscious to the blatant. The problem, whether articulated or not, is obvious. First, how to constrain an economy that seems to defy the usual strictures of the international market (for why else would the dollar rise in tandem with exploding trade deficits?). Second, how to contain, or at least compete with, an America that dominates the diplomatic field from Pyongyang to Jerusalem, from the World Trade Organization to the International Monetary Fund, from the heavens above (where it might sacrifice the Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty to national missile defense[NMD]) to the grounds below (where it refuses adherence to the land mine ban).

In this realm, the demise of bipolarity did have consequences. Shorn of their former strategic dependence on the world's one and only superpower, the Europeans are defying the United States in a lasting manner. The "Chicken War" of the early 1960s was quickly resolved—with the help of a Soviet Union that had conveniently unleashed the crises over Berlin and Cuba. Yet the "Banana War" continued for eight years before the Europeans countenanced a compromise in 2001 (that will not be fully operational before 2006). The ban on "hormone beef" and genetically modified foodstuffs continues with no end in sight.

With Cold War discipline gone, the Europeans can afford to balance against Mr. Big in ways that help their own farmers while hurting those of the United States (which is also no stranger to the "consumer protection" game). On weightier matters than soybeans and steaks, Europe's common currency makes a better case in point. Nary a politician or pundit has failed to stress the *political* rewards of monetary union. Above and beyond facilitating intra-European trade and investment, the euro would serve as a bulwark and counterweight against the Almighty Dollar. Indeed, the language was straight out of the balance of power vocabulary. Turning into a co-equal reserve currency and unit of account, the euro would impose discipline on America's profligate ways by curbing its power to issue debt in its own currency, *vulgo*: flood the world with checks that will not be cashed. And so the euro would bring about a bipolar or, along with the yen, tripolar system in the financial arena.

Politico-diplomatic balancing kicked in against the United States long ago. Since the Gulf War, the EU has fitfully tried to insert itself into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in order to break the U.S. monopoly on mediation. As the United States tries to hang on to the "dual containment" of Iran and Iraq, the EU has insisted on a "cultural dialogue" with Tehran. To curtail U.S. influence in the region, the French have opened separate diplomatic channels to Baghdad and Tehran, escalating the competition against the United States in 2001, when they openly condemned the February 16 Anglo-American bombing of Iraq.

With his counterpart Vladimir Putin at his side, French President Jacques Chirac has openly castigated American missile defense plans while in Moscow. Diplomatic balancing can also involve doing nothing at critical junctures in world politics. When the Bush administration was caught in a terse standoff with China over its crippled spy plane held on Hainan Island this April, the European allies reacted with deafening silence. Such thrusts and parries belong in the category of "subcritical balancing", for they fall far short of the real thing, i.e., formal counter-aggre-

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gations of power. So do the routine invocations of "strategic partnership" between Moscow and Beijing that entail neither partnership nor strategic consequences.

More interesting (and novel) is the indirect, nay, unconscious "ganging up" against Number 1. The common denominator of such actions is the attempt to constrain American power within universal or at least regional control regimes. Take the European, Russian and Chinese opposition to NMD. The message is: "You must adhere to time-honored arms control regimes as embodied in the ABM Treaty." Yet the purpose, perfectly logical from a non-American perspective, is to suppress a quantum leap in what is seen as already excessive American power. Assume though, by a flight of fancy, that NMD really works. In that case, it will not only devalue the strategic arsenals of the lesser players; worse, it will add to America's "proactive" power by enhancing its "escalation dominance." Concretely, if America could really shield itself against missiles, it could inhibit Chinese sallies against Taiwan or intervene against any "rogue state" with little risk to itself. That would grant a nice margin of usable power to the United States, a prospect that does not reassure the rest of the world.

Take the Land Mine Convention or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to which the United States refuses to adhere amid a chorus of international chagrin. Again, the lesser players correctly see America's waywardness in balance of power terms. Anti-personnel mines deliver a nice shield for power projection abroad, while continued nuclear testing helps to build more sophisticated, say, sub-kiloton warheads that might just be more usable. That, too, concerns those who worry about unbridled American power, and rightly so.

Or take America's refusal to submit to climate conventions. Though the Europeans frame the issue in terms of global good citizenship, the underlying point is again untrammeled American power. As the Europeans suspect, the United States will strengthen its economic position relative to the EU if it continues to take liberally from the global commons by refusing to limit its CO_2 output. So even the politics of goodness imply balancing against Number 1. Negotiations about the implementation of the Kyoto climate protocol held in The Hague in November 2000 ended amid bitter recriminations against the United States. Notes the *Economist*: "Some European ministers made it clear that they wanted Americans to feel some economic pain more than they wanted a workable agreement."[4]

America's refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) also involves an unarticulated balancing game. For both sides, the issue is American power. Clearly, the United States does not want international bodies to scrutinize its interventions abroad by way of prosecuting malfeasants in its military *ex post facto*. Clearly, the Europeans see the ICC as yet another regime that will punish or deter the use of force not sanctioned by international bodies such as the UN. Though the ICC is directed against the Slobos and Saddams of this world, it might also constrain those, like the United States, who have been known to take the law into their own hands.

The general point is this: Hegemonic powers are loath to submit to international regimes they do not dominate. Lesser powers like such regimes precisely because they strengthen the many against the one. Naturally, the United States cherished the UN all the way into the early 1960s when the votes could be guaranteed; naturally, Washington turned against the General Assembly in the 1970s when it began to

[4]"Oh no, Kyoto", *Economist*, April 7, 2001, p. 81.

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churn out anti-American votes in the manner of an assembly line. In a world that does not (yet) gang up formally against the "last remaining superpower", international regimes have become the functional, though unarticulated, equivalent of classical balance of power politics.[5] Number 1 knows it, and so do numbers 2, 3, 4, et al. But since this game is played by allies as well as undeclared adversaries, it is high on implicit intent and low on explicit affirmation.

Balancing Against Hegemony: The Strategic Contest

LET US RETURN to the original puzzle: Why is there no *real* ganging up against the United States? Why does NATO endure, why is there no "GTO", a "Global Treaty Organization" directed against the one and only global power?

The simplest answer is because it is not necessary. The United States is a hegemon different from all its predecessors. America annoys and antagonizes, but it does not conquer. Indeed, the last time the United States actually grabbed territory was a hundred years ago, when it relieved Spain of Cuba and the Philippines. This is a critical departure from the traditional ways of the high and mighty. For the balance of power machinery to crank up, it makes a difference whether the rest of the world faces a huge, but usually placid elephant or a carnivorous tyrannosaurus rex. In the days of the Habsburgs, Bourbons and Hohenzollerns, counter-alliances formed so rapidly because expansion and war was the full-time job of kings and potentates, not to speak of Hitler and Stalin.

This is not the place to review the burgeoning literature that seeks to explain why postindustrial democracies like the United States no longer go to war for land and glory.[6] Suffice it to say: he who does not conquer does not provoke literal counter-alliances and war. America's "hard power" inspires discomfort, not existential angst, *pace* Messrs. Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic and Osama bin Laden. Still, such an assessment cannot completely assure the others. For great power creates balancing incentives willy-nilly; an elephant, no matter how benign, is no pussycat.

Since America's existential sting is well concealed or well contained, strategic balancing against this hegemon falls short of the classic pattern; it is internal, illicit or implicit. Internal balancing is what the Russians and Chinese do when they try to preserve (Moscow) or expand (Beijing) their military panoplies. Illicit balancing goes by the name of international terror. It is deployed against the United States more or less privately, as by Saudi freelance bombardier bin Laden, or more or less officially, as by those Arab countries suspected of being sources of "state-sponsored terrorism." Implicit balancing is what the EU does when it fields a rapid reaction force under the umbrella of its "European security and defense policy" (ESDP).

The label "implicit" is deliberately chosen. For its purpose is not to countervail the United States in the ways of a classic alliance. The size of the rapid reaction force is as modest as its objective. The latter was laid down in the "Petersberg Tasks": policing rather than warfighting, peace maintenance rather than peace enforcement. These tasks dovetail nicely with the force's compact size of 60,000 (akin to the numbers deployed in Kosovo after the bombing in 1999).

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[5]On this point, see also David B. Rivkin, Jr., and Lee A. Casey, "The Rocky Shoals of International Law", *The National Interest* (Winter 2000/01).

[6]For brevity's sake, the reader's attention is directed to the last fifteen years of the quarterly *International Security*.

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More ambitious objectives would have to contend with declining post-Cold War defense budgets, which, in the case of Europe's biggest country, Germany, have fallen to 1.5 percent of GDP (the United States extracts twice as much from a $10 trillion economy). To field an autonomous fighting force, which would have to detain a goodly measure of escalation dominance, the EU would not only have to raise the numbers to, say, 200,000. It would also have to acquire an additional triple capability: long-range (satellite-based) intelligence and assessment, long-range projection assets, long-range stand-off munitions. The latter is particularly critical, given the democracies' well-known aversion to suffering casualties.

But assume Europe puts its money where its mouth is. This will leave the EU with another big question it has scrupulously avoided: Would it *want* to intervene alone—without a reinsurance policy underwritten by the U.S. cavalry, so to speak? In a setting that actually entailed peace *enforcement*, i.e., real warfighting, sensible policymakers would want to make sure that there is a Plan B with an American component. The U.S. cavalry would have to come in either for the rescue or for the evacuation. But if the United States is to be in on the crash, it would naturally want to be in on the take-off. And so autonomy, in any real sense, seems a long way off.

Nonetheless, the European rhetoric on the rapid reaction force is shrouded in equivocation. Atlanticist stalwarts like Britain and, to some extent, Germany talk about a force within NATO. Usual suspects like France depict the force as a first step toward "further progress" on the road to a full-fledged EU army, as did defense minister Alain Richard. One French official, speaking anonymously, has put it with Gallic acerbity: "The train [of an independent European defense policy] is already moving. NATO is not on board. It is not the engine. It is not even in the tender or even in the passenger compartment."[7] This is how Washington views the force. Hence, the three D's issued as early as 1998: The ESDP must not *diminish* or *duplicate* NATO, nor *discriminate* against non-EU NATO members.

Whatever the European rhetoric, the ESDP is a balancing mechanism *in nuce*. The thrust is implicit rather than explicit. Its purpose is not to oppose the United States outright, but to enhance Europe's relative power *vis-à-vis* the United States with an asset that might increase European autonomy or diminish U.S. preponderance. As such the rapid reaction force is a perfect example of "neo-ganging up." It unfolds *within*, not between, alliances. It is not a duel here and now, but a down payment on the future.

The Alliance and America: Implications for Grand Strategy

HISTORY says that alliances are the victims of victory. A French official, of all people, has added an interesting twist to this tale: "We may have to reverse Palmerston's dictum that nations have neither permanent allies nor permanent enemies, but only permanent interests. Today, nations have changing interests, but permanent allies."[8] The point is contrarian, but correct. Unyielding interests can no longer be so easily defined in an Atlantic world bereft of existential threats and geospatial competition. What is the "national" interest in highly privatized democracies where politics no longer stops at the water's edge?

[7]For Richard, see Robert Locke, *Sunday Times* (London), December 10, 2000. For the anonymous French official, see Anton La Guardia, *Daily Telegraph* (London), December 16, 2000.

[8]Therese Delpech (of the French Atomic Energy Commission) at a conference on NMD at Stanford University, March 2000.

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Once defined by a sheltered establishment, the interests of liberal democracies now tend to reflect the ever-changing kaleidoscope of domestic claims.

Yet there is a set of core values that stretches from Berlin to Berkeley. These are milieu rather than possession goals. Call them democracy, welfare, prosperity, peace, the "pursuit of happiness", rule-encased conflict management. By definition, milieu goals require collective action, hence stable coalitions of the like-minded. Even the mightiest nation in all of history needs partners when it comes to keeping nuclear stuff out of Saddam's hands or stabilizing the Balkans against either the Serbs or the Kosovar Albanians, and so, of course, do the Europeans. This may be one crucial reason why the Alliance has not gone out of business—why the contest over a new distribution of power has remained safely confined within the common Atlantic fold.

Nonetheless, the power gap between the United States and Europe is growing. This places a particular burden on the "last remaining superpower." Why, again, has the rest of the West not ganged up on Number 1 for real? One explanation is the "self-containment" of the United States; the elephant lumbers, but usually does not throw its weight around. In the Eight Years' War over bananas, it awaited two favorable rulings by the WTO before imposing trade sanctions on the EU. Even in the crunch, as in the bombing run against Saddam in 2001, the United States tried to act at least *à deux* (with Britain).

The second answer has to do with the provision of "public goods." In the past, at least, the United States has acted as foremost producer of global/regional public goods. The essence of public goods is that anybody can profit from them once they exist. That gives the lesser players a powerful incentive to maintain the existing order and to accord at least grudging acceptance to the main provider of such benefits. Conversely, it diminishes their incentives to gang up on him. Who else would otherwise uphold international security or financial stability?

While numbers 2, 3, 4, et al. surely resent America's clout, they have also found it useful to have the United States in the game. Europe and Japan regularly suffer from America's commercial *hauteur*, but they also know that the United States is the ultimate guarantor of the global freer-trade system. Britain and France almost came to blows with the United States in the early phase of the Bosnian war, but were only too happy in 1995 to let American cruise missiles help drive the Serbs to the negotiating table. Ditto four years later in the Kosovo war. The Arabs hardly love the United States but they did cooperate when Bush the Elder mobilized an international posse against Saddam Hussein because they were unable to uphold the regional balance by themselves.

When lesser powers cannot deter China in the Taiwan Strait, or persuade North Korea to denuclearize, it is nice to have one special actor in the system who has the will and the wherewithal to do what others wish but cannot achieve on their own. Indeed, such an actor is indispensable. In the language of "public goods" theory: there must always be somebody who will recruit individual producers, organize the start-up, and generally assume a disproportionate burden. That is as true in international affairs as it is in grassroots politics.

Previous hegemons sought to conquer; the United States has built institutions, which is another word for "public goods"—that is the difference. The genius of American diplomacy in the twentieth century was building institutions—from the UN to the IMF, from NATO and its enlargement to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the WTO. These provided the rest with two valuable goods. They cocooned and multilateralized American power, and they

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advanced American interests by serving those of others.

The problem with this flattering assessment is that most of the world's great institutions were built during the Cold War—when it was clearly in the interest of the United States to shoulder the burden and sign the checks. Now, it is no longer so clear that the United States puts more resources into international institutions than it seeks to extract from them. America's old penchant for free trade has been diluted by "managed", that is, regulated trade. Nor is this just the failure of the Bush *fils* administration. The Helms-Burton sanctions bill (penalizing non-American investments in Cuba and Iran) became law in the Clinton administration. The refusal to pay UN dues was also a Clinton-era phenomenon (though it was rescinded at its very end).

Things have not improved yet in the Bush era. The first moves of the new administration were marked by obliviousness bordering on orneriness—by blatant "unilateralism" in diplospeak. Here are some examples. If need be, "Star Wars, Mark II" will be pursued at the costs of ancient arms control regimes. Cold-shouldering climate conventions? It was done without even a perfunctory nod to the spin doctors, although Washington could have marshaled plenty of good arguments against the rigidly unrealistic goals of the Kyoto Protocol. Just as abruptly, the administration walked away from three mediation efforts so dear to the heart of its predecessor: in Korea, Northern Ireland and the Middle East. In all of these cases, unilateralist injury was compounded by an appearance of sheer indifference.

Clumsiness in the intercourse with allies and rivals has beset every new postwar administration; a steep learning curve has always followed. Yet the issue is not an additional dollop of *politesse*, but a matter of principle. To the extent that the United States turns unilateralism into a habit or cuts its contribution to the production of public goods, others will feel the sting of American power more strongly. And the incentive to discipline Mr. Big will grow.

The choice is all too clear. Primacy does not come cheap, and the price is measured in the currency of obligation. Leaders succeed not only because of their superior power, but also because they have a fine sense for the quirks and qualities of others—because they act in the interest of all. Their labor is the source of their authority. And so a truly great power must not just prevent but pre-empt hostile coalitions—by providing essential services. Those who respect the needs of others engage in supply-side diplomacy: They create a demand for their services, and that translates into political profits, also known as "leadership."

Power, in short, exacts responsibility, hence a vision that transcends narrow self-interest (which usually breaks down into a series of even narrower domestic claims). As long as the United States continues to provide international public goods while resisting the lure of unilateralism, envy and resentment will not escalate into fear and loathing. Balancing against the United States is still implicit or illicit. Here are the proper maxims for a Number 1 that wants to ward off the real thing: Pursue your interests by serving the interests of others.[9] Transform dependents into stakeholders. Turn America the Ubiquitous into America the Indispensable. □

[9]For an elaboration, see my "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy After Bipolarity", *International Security* (Spring 1995).

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The Lesser Evil

The Best Way Out of the Balkans

Richard K. Betts

PEACE IN Bosnia and Kosovo, such as it is, has rested these past several years on an uneasy conspiracy to prop up, but never openly discuss, a set of irreconcilable contradictions. Inhabitants and intervenors have conspired to live with political practices that contradict constitutional principles, and to prolong foreign occupation while genuflecting to the aims of democracy and self-determination. The American foreign policy elite on both sides of the political spectrum has been complicit. Clintonites promoted the conspiracy in order to do something like the right thing without overstepping the seeming bounds of domestic support. The new Bush team disapproves of entanglement in peacekeeping, but it wants to maintain American primacy on the world stage—a contradiction of its own that blocks a graceful exit. And now, Albanian guerrillas subverting southern Serbia and northern Macedonia, and Croat rioters in Bosnia, are disturbing the calm that had preserved inertial peacekeeping as the path of least resistance.

In 1995 President Clinton justified sending American troops to Bosnia with the assurance that they would be out within a year. He mistook an exit date for an exit strategy. As a result, for six years in Bosnia and two years in Kosovo, the United States has continued to collaborate with other occupying powers without an exit strategy, far beyond the passing of the exit date. Unlike the occupations of Germany and Japan after 1945, NATO and the UN have settled into operations in the Balkans that are best understood as institutionalized temporizing. There have been noteworthy efforts at economic reconstruction, but attempts at political reconstruction have been limited and confused.

In fact, the confused political status of these areas has been a vital necessity. It lets occupiers and inhabitants pursue separate agendas. The Western presence has been sustainable because it rests on unresolved contradictions between the *de jure* and *de facto* settlements of the two wars: Bosnia is in principle a single state but in practice a partitioned one, while Kosovo in principle remains a province of Yugoslavia but in practice is not. These contradictions allow the inhabitants of Bosnia and Kosovo to avoid organizing their societies in the ways that the occupiers want, while allowing the occupiers to pretend that they are supervising a transition to the type of social organization of which the West approves.

Resolving these contradictions has proved too daunting, so temporizing is

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the result. Rather than face an unpalatable choice between the much stronger efforts that cultivating political stability would require and a withdrawal that might reignite war, the United States, NATO and the UN drifted toward open-ended occupation. This has been the path of least resistance, however, only because the costs have been modest—little treasure and no blood. Without U.S. casualties, and with surpluses suppressing urges to wield sharp budgetary pencils, the American public has no reason yet to rue the occupations. The odds that these fortuitous, permissive conditions will continue indefinitely are low.

Around Kosovo, Albanian action to support their kin in Serbia and Macedonia has already undermined postwar stability. In Bosnia, Croats have already challenged the status quo. Economic decline could easily produce greater popular unrest and protests against the outside powers, thus catapulting the region back onto the front pages of American newspapers and highlighting the risk of further trouble. It would raise the dormant question of whether Americans wish to run that risk.

Despite such dangers, some believe that there is no need to rush to a resolution and that, indeed, getting out would be a bad thing. In this view, it is good that unchallenged global dominance enables the United States to contemplate an indefinite mission. Now, in the absence of any serious opposition, is the time to use American power to shape world order. Why not start in the Balkans?

During the Cold War, the United States was often accused of neo-imperialism. At the time, this was a bad rap. U.S. interventions often found the client's tail wagging the patron's dog, as Washington became mired in support of problematic Third World governments, while not having any direct or real governing authority over them. Today, however, we are engaged in *real* neo-imperialism, although a quite peculiar multilateral and humanitarian form of it. Under the aegis of international organizations, the United States is collaborating with other governments in the direct control of Bosnia and Kosovo, a return of the Western powers to the tutelary administration of backward nations—rather like a League of Nations mandate. There is certainly no economic benefit to the imperial metropoles. Rather, the Western presence represents a new *mission civilisatrice* for a new imperium. In effect, beneficent recolonization is the regional security strategy that the "international community" offers up at the turn of the twenty-first century. But is this a solution that we should embrace, or a wrong turn from which we should escape?

For its part, and despite rhetorical backing and filling, the Clinton administration embraced the idea. Indeed, it was the implicit rationale for maintaining American primacy that animated the belief shared by Holbrooke, Berger and Albright in the United States as "the indispensable nation." The new Bush administration rejects the enthusiasm for intervention in principle, yet it endorses the importance of American primacy just as forcefully as its predecessor. This makes it awkward to shed current responsibilities. (And although intervention in Bosnia was a Clinton project, the U.S. commitment to protect Kosovo goes back to the administration of Bush the Elder.) Beneficent recolonization can serve primacy if the United States and its rich allies are willing to invest heavily and sacrifice significantly to make it work; otherwise, half-hearted recolonization exposes a hollowness at the core of primacy. The dirty little secret of American foreign policy is that exercising primacy is popular across the domestic political spectrum, but only as long as it is cheap. When national assertion—whether for altruistic or narcissistic purposes—hits a costly

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snag, people notice that it is not all that much fun, and begin to see more merit in less meddling.

To get out of the Balkans, the United States should aim at achieving six main objectives:

Establish self-government to end the occupation. The United States should not be an imperial power and should not accept an indefinite responsibility to administer foreign countries.

Stabilize external security and peace for local states. The prime motive to intervene in the Balkans was to end the violence there. Withdrawal that allowed war to erupt again would therefore represent failure.

Minimize damage to relations with other great powers. The main reasons for intervention were humanitarian, but good deeds should not incur significant costs in those aspects of international politics that count most.

Withdraw U.S. forces. Aside from the moral interest in ending occupation, we have a material interest in reducing the strains on U.S. military forces—particularly on the personnel rotation system and training in the army—that are imposed by prolonged peacekeeping expeditions.

Honor moral obligations. As long as the cost is low, at least, there is no reason not to keep faith with those for whom we intervened.

Honor legal obligations. Other considerations being equal, it is in the interest of the United States to observe the terms of international agreements that it has signed if it wishes such agreements to be useful instruments in the future. But other considerations in the Balkans are not equal. To realist critics, "legalism and moralism" are often lumped together as impediments to the wise pursuit of material interests. In Kosovo, however, legal obligations to Belgrade conflict starkly with moral obligations to the Albanian population. This is a vexation for realists, a dilemma for idealists.

Some would add preservation of NATO's "credibility" and America's "leadership" to this list of objectives. Indeed, some cite these as the most important ones. Mortgaging the mission to these buzzwords, however, is to put the cart before the horse. It reflects a penchant for self-entrapment that is not unique to involvement in the Balkans, but is a problem of U.S. foreign policy in general. We should, by now, recognize that credibility is not served by re-inforcing failure. Just because the costs were measured on an entirely different scale does not mean that Vietnam's lessons on this score are irrelevant. Credibility should serve the pursuit of substantive objectives, but it should not dictate what those objectives are. Leadership means convincing others to want what we want, not changing what we want in order to keep followers faithful. If we could succeed in meeting the six objectives listed above, leadership would be evident and credibility would follow.

The problems with this list of objectives, however, are, first, that each one is hard to achieve in itself, and, second, that it is impossible to achieve some of them without undercutting others. One or more of them will have to be sacrificed. How, then, to proceed?

Sovereignty and Stability

THE HINGE of a potential solution in the Balkans is forging a connection between sovereign self-government and interstate stability (meshing the first, second and fourth of the objectives listed above). Establishment of self-government has already occurred to a degree, but it is a sharply limited kind reminiscent of colonies in the more enlightened of the old European empires. Self-government in Bosnia and Kosovo so far remains sub-

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ject to the higher authority of the occupying forces. NATO officials skew elections, disqualify candidates, close down radio and television stations, and so on. The benefit in this is that it prevents self-government from re-energizing local conflict; the cost is that it defers resolution of the essential issue. *Genuine* self-government requires decolonization—termination of the controlling role of the occupying powers.

Self-government and stability are at odds because it was conflict over the conditions of self-government—the lack of congruence between cultural and political communities—that caused the explosions in the first place. The essential issues are the number, form and boundaries of independent governments—that is, which units constitute the "selves" of self-government—when sovereignty ceases to be limited by occupation. Would the solution be autonomy for ethnically defined territorial areas within a Bosnia and a Yugoslavia that are organized as loose confederations (the current situation in Bosnia, the official aim of the outside powers for Kosovo)? Or self-government for a genuinely unified Bosnia and a Yugoslavia that includes the province of Kosovo, both as multi-ethnic states? Or self-government of smaller, ethnically defined states in formal partitions of the larger units that are currently the juridically legitimate ones?

At present, peace in both Bosnia and Kosovo depends on a blatant contradiction between principle and practice. As long as outside powers continue to run the region, these contradictions can be finessed and may even be useful. If full self-government is ever to develop, however, they have to be resolved. In Bosnia it will be hard to honor legal obligations while meeting the other criteria for success, unless the Dayton agreement is revised. In Kosovo it will be impossible to honor legal obligations to Belgrade without betraying the Albanian population for whom the war was allegedly fought in the first place.

Bosnia remains at peace only because the unified political structure established by the Dayton Accord does not function. Officially the single state is composed of two "entities"—the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska—but each has veto rights over actions of the central government. (There are actually three entities, as the Federation has broken down into Croat and Muslim areas that cooperate only minimally, with the Croat side increasingly asserting its separateness.) What is the real function of the unified state, if any, when the fundamental divisions behind the war remain in place during the peace? As Ivo Daalder observes, "By incorporating rather than resolving the fundamental disagreement among the parties about Bosnia's future, Dayton assured that its implementation would become little more than the continuation of conflict by other means."[1] What makes this situation preferable to formal partition, other than a belief that a hypocritical liberal fiction is better than a legitimized reactionary reality?

Kosovo remains at peace because its internationally recognized status as a component of the Yugoslav state—the price of getting Belgrade to end the 1999 war—is a fiction. The crucial concession that Belgrade got was the elimination of the Rambouillet ultimatum's provision for eventual disposition of sovereignty over Kosovo according to the will of the province's people—a prescription for eventual independence. Annex II of Security Council Resolution 1244, adopted June 10, 1999, affirms the aim of "substantial self-government for Kosovo", but recognizes "the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal

[1]Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 180.

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Republic of Yugoslavia" and stipulates "the demilitarization of UCK."[2] This is an inherent contradiction even greater than that in the Dayton Accord. Only in a wishful scenario of assured self-restraint by Belgrade could Kosovo's juridical status as part of Yugoslavia be made real without betraying the Albanians of Kosovo. Only with a potent army of its own would Kosovo have any reason for confidence that its autonomy would be safe.

Now, in contrast to the scheme embodied in the Rambouillet ultimatum, occupying powers cannot grant Kosovo independence without violating the terms of the agreement that ended the 1999 war. Nor can NATO violate that provision of the agreement without expelling the UN from jurisdiction, since the Security Council has a central legal role in the occupation. And, as Barry Posen has explained, unless Russia and China agree otherwise, the Security Council cannot relinquish responsibility: "Paragraph 19 of the Security Council resolution of June 10, 1999, declares that 'the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter until the Security Council decides otherwise.' Thus, if either the Chinese or Russians choose not to decide otherwise, insofar as both have veto power, Security Council control over Kosovo will last forever."[3]

The overlapping UN and NATO roles in the Balkans reflect the complex novelty of multilateral humanitarian intervention. Two observers argue that "Trusteeship is a new weapon in the armoury of international intervention, and Bosnia is its first arena."[4] This is only partially correct. After all, one of the original institutions of the United Nations was its Trusteeship Council, toothless for most of its existence, and inactive since 1994, just as the point was reached when such an organ might be useful. Moreover, Bosnia is not trusteeship's "first arena" even in the post-Cold War era; that distinction belongs to the United Nations Transitional Administration for Cambodia (UNTAC) in the early 1990s. In Cambodia, the UN did manage to facilitate a truce among three sets of contenders, preside over a temporary receivership of the country, and organize elections and a new political start. The terms of the UN-supervised settlement, however, were imperfectly honored during the UNTAC mission and crumbled rapidly after its termination. Worse, Cambodia did not make the transition to peaceful democratic competition envisioned by the UNTAC plan. Rather, the victory of the strongest of the three main political groups over the others carried the day. Cambodia is not a disastrous precedent for the Balkans, but it is not a good one either.

Models to Emulate—or Avoid

IF TRUSTEESHIP is not a trustworthy solution for problems such as those of the Balkans, what are the remaining options?

Optimism is a bad bet, but not a ridiculous one. Over the past dozen years some bitter, epochal conflicts turned in far more positive directions than most experts would have predicted: the end of the Cold War, the peaceful democratization of South Africa, the ebbing of civil wars in Central America. But where do we look for a basis on which to predict how sectarian and ethnic conflict in the Balkans will be settled? Liberal optimists tend to rely on logic: domestic peace and international aid, both secured by peace-

[2]UCK is the Albanian acronym for the Kosovo Liberation Army.

[3]Posen, "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy", *International Security* (Spring 2000), p. 79.

[4]Gerald Knaus and Marcus Cox, "Whither Bosnia?", *NATO Review* (Winter 2000-2001), p. 11.

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keeping missions, should foster civil cooperation and tolerance because they make better sense than destructive parochialism. Conservative pessimists tend to look more for precedents. What similar cases have yielded the desired result?

If the aim is to make viable multinational states out of riven polities in the region, few encouraging examples spring to mind. Switzerland and the United States may be cited as models, but their achievements are surely too distant in time and circumstances to be convincing analogues. Neither has suffered a war among its constituent groups that still lives in personal memories. Satisfactory political integration in the American South took more than a hundred years after the Civil War, and social integration remains elusive to this day. The settlement in Zimbabwe has crumbled as the Mugabe government expropriates land from white farmers. South Africa so far offers the best example of hope, but even if reconciliation there proves durable, it is arguably less similar to the Balkans than the many examples of failure.

Those who would bank on joining contending ethnic groups into functioning polities bear the burden of providing relevant examples of successful integration. Other ethnically divided states and regions of the twentieth century generally give rise to skepticism about secular integration after bitter civil wars. This is especially true if the states emerging from the resolution are to be democratic and genuinely self-governing. A multisectarian Lebanon is stable now compared to its previous decades of civil strife, but that is largely because Syria keeps the country under its thumb—just as NATO does in the Balkans. Yugoslavia before the 1990s was united and stable in no small part because it was not democratic, and because secular communism suppressed regional particularisms.

Some relevant lessons might be sought among cases of wars ended by partition along ethnic lines, for example, in Palestine, Kashmir and Cyprus. The mention of these unhappy, controversial and unsettled places would undoubtedly prompt many to reject formal partition as a model for Bosnia or Yugoslavia and Kosovo. A closer look, however, leads to a more equivocal conclusion.

The partition of Palestine in 1947 was immediately revised by the 1948 war. It was altered again by the Six-Day War, the Camp David accords, and the Oslo Agreement—and it still remains in question. Does this suggest that Bosnia would do better to avoid partition and insist on an integrated multinational state? Could anything have been much worse than the past half century of tension and periodic war in the Middle East? Well, yes. An internationally enforced creation of an integrated Arab-Jewish state in the 1940s (no harder to imagine at the time than the integration of Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo today) probably would not have been less violent or more viable than what developed.

Kashmir, too, has remained a dangerous cauldron of conflict. In this case either a more careful plan for the partition of India in 1947 that allocated the area to Pakistan (on grounds of ethnic affiliation), or a more decisive war that left it fully within India (as Israel's gains in the 1948 war overcame the nonviable non-contiguity of the partition plan's territorial divisions in Palestine), might have yielded more stability. An independent Kashmir or an accepted division of the area between India and Pakistan are additional hypothetical alternatives, though not real ones. The analogous choices in Kosovo would be union with Albania, reincorporation into Yugoslavia, or independence. (The first or third of these could include partition of Kosovo itself, with a slice in the north going back to

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Serbian Yugoslavia.) There is no good analogy in Bosnia, since the Muslims—who have no supporting external state comparable to Croatia or Serbia—create an unbalanced tripolar situation more complicated than Kashmir or Kosovo.

If one takes the UN role in Cyprus seriously, that case presents the model of indefinite peacekeeping; UN forces have been in the country for nearly forty years. During that time the mission has been eased by its irrelevance to the main security issues on Cyprus—it has not had the powerful controlling role of the West in the Balkans, and did not stop either the Greek coup on the island or the Turkish invasion of 1974. More relevant is the unilateral Turkish partition imposed in 1974. Unacceptable as that partition may be on legal grounds (it remains unrecognized by virtually the entire world outside Turkey), it has ensured peace on the island for more than a quarter century. If justice is to take precedence over peace, what is the solution for Cyprus—to return to the unitary state that preceded the Greek coup? If so, what mechanism would protect the Turkish minority more satisfactorily than has Ankara's intervention? If peace is to take precedence over justice, there is a strong case for international recognition of the partition and the legitimacy of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. If justice and peace are to rank equally, a solution is nowhere in sight—after nearly four decades of impotent UN presence.

PERHAPS the best illustration by analogy of choices for Kosovo comes from the untidy periphery of contemporary China. Is Kosovo's future best exemplified by Tibet, Hong Kong or Taiwan? Since 1950 Tibet has suffered the fate which NATO was concerned to save Kosovo from when it went to war in 1999. Hong Kong represents the hope of the temporizers in the Balkans—in that case an escape from the choice between betraying the Kosovar Albanians and violating the agreement that ended the war with Belgrade; in the Hong Kong case the promise of indefinite actual autonomy under nominal Chinese sovereignty. Taiwan represents *de facto* autonomy without *de jure* independence; but autonomy guarded by force rather than, as in Hong Kong, by Beijing's sufferance. The analogy would be a Kosovo recognized internationally as a province of Yugoslavia, but armed and able to prevent Belgrade from imposing its writ. Unlike Taiwan, however, Kosovo lacks the geographic conditions (a hundred miles of water) to make self-defense without foreign forces feasible.

With the choice cast in these terms, most outsiders would be drawn to the Hong Kong model. But would Belgrade remain as restrained as Beijing has with respect to Hong Kong? Hong Kong's special status is of great economic importance to China while Kosovo has no such importance for Serbia. Further, China has incentives for good behavior as long as it seeks a peaceful re-incorporation of Taiwan. Could we count on Serbia to abstain from encroachment unless the West extends a security guarantee to Kosovo—in effect negating Yugoslav sovereignty?

Legal issues aside, is formal partition the lesser evil? Clearly, the history of partitions in the twentieth century is mostly a sorry one.[5] Several wars followed the 1947 partitions in Palestine and on the Indian subcontinent, Northern Ireland remains violently unsettled eighty years after its separation, and so forth. The relevant question, however, is the counterfactual: Would history in these sorry cases have been better or worse if the states had *not* been

[5]See Radha Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition", *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1997).

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partitioned? The argument for partition is not that it is good or desirable. It is that it may be less horrendous than keeping the warring communities in the same state, or that it is preferable to the indefinite foreign occupation of an artificial and uneasy confederation.[6]

U.S. National Security

MORAL INTERESTS were the prime reason for NATO and UN intervention in the Balkans—the humanitarian imperative to suppress atrocities (although why this imperative should be irresistible in Europe, but not in Rwanda, Sudan or other places plagued by even worse atrocities, has never been made clear). Some observers believed that intervention in the Balkans was warranted as well by material interests, traditional security concerns about the international balance of power and the need to keep local chaos from expanding into conflict among major states. This argument, however, has it backwards. Intervention worsened conflict among great powers instead of dampening it. It would be nice if moral and material interests re-inforced each other, but in reality they have been in tension. Moral interests have prevailed in NATO capitals mainly because material interests have not been seriously threatened.

If the objective had been to prevent escalation of the local conflict to confrontation with a major adversary, there was never reason to assume that Western intervention would accomplish this, or would do so more effectively than diplomatic collusion to insulate the conflict by foreswearing intervention by *any* of the great powers. It is disingenuous to argue that intervention by the West need not aggravate already disagreeable strategic relations between NATO and Russia.

Luckily, worsened relations with Russia are not a crucial problem in today's world, and some may consider them a price worth paying for the moral benefit of keeping the locals from butchering each other. Russia is weak and has few plausible options for responding to its alienation in a way that can threaten NATO. The West does not have to worry about maintaining a balance of power, reassuring Russia about its security, or pandering to Moscow's wounded *amour propre*. In short, NATO may take advantage of its hegemonic position and leave the Russians to lump it if they don't like it. Indeed, as it was, Moscow had no choice but to accept the Dayton Accord and participate in both occupation missions. Although the Kosovo war infuriated the Russians, there was little they could do about it.

It is useful to recall, however, that the Russian *coup de main* in seizing the Pristina airport at the end of the war, and the short-circuiting by the British of General Clark's plan to have NATO forces challenge them, raised the specter of potential unintended military confrontation. Beyond that, the most important question is whether NATO should count on indefinite Russian weakness, or attempt to stabilize relations on a more equitable and cooperative basis before an aggrieved and resurgent Russia regains options of its own.

The Kosovo war brought a large and unanticipated cost to America's relations with another potential great power adversary: China. The accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy (which the Chinese will never accept as accidental) had a gratuitously damaging impact not only on diplomatic relations, but on Chinese pub-

[6]See Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars", *International Security* (Spring 1996); and Kaufmann, "When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century", *International Security* (Fall 1998).

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lic opinion. Moreover, the entire rationale for Western intervention in Kosovo represents a threat in principle to Chinese sovereignty. The rationale could just as easily be applied to justify humanitarian intervention on behalf of the ethnically oppressed populations of Tibet and Xinjiang, or Taiwan's claim to autonomy (in the same way as it impugns Russia's sovereign right to pacify Chechnya).

The burden on Sino-American relations notwithstanding, the American public has supported U.S. operations in the Balkans so far because the costs have been low. But they would also have supported them if the apparent benefits were high—especially in shoring up genuine security interests—even if it had been a more costly enterprise. As John Mueller has argued in these pages, the notion that voters will not tolerate any venture that brings Americans home in body bags is a myth.[7] What voters reject are military operations that appear inconclusive, unsuccessful and bloody, for purposes of dubious importance. Thus, if the perceived benefits of policing the Balkans are low, but the costs rise abruptly, public tolerance will wane. Throwaway rhetoric notwithstanding, no administration has seriously tried to convince the public that humanitarian intervention—if it happens to get messy—is an interest that is truly important to Americans. Leaving support for intervention hostage to endless good luck on the cost side of the equation is therefore a fragile basis for long-term involvement. That is why we need to think seriously about finding a way out.

Ways Out

RECOGNIZING a reality that admits of no good strategy, two analysts of the situation are reduced to recommending that we avoid the question: "Kosovo may now have shattered the exit strategy concept. . . . Not only is it impossible to say when NATO troops will leave Kosovo, it is also impossible to specify under what circumstances they will do so. . . . One cannot say; it would be unwise at this point even to try."[8] Such a plaintive note is a sign of false maturity. We *do* have to try, unless we want to occupy the region for decades.

There is no way out of the Balkans for the United States that does not entail high cost in either effort or honor. There is no evidence of support for a much stronger effort, so the price will probably have to be paid in honor. In that light, there are three general options: worst, bad and not quite so bad.

Inertia: open-ended occupation. This has seemed the path of least resistance, but it puts us at the mercy of events. It is foolish to assume that either the locals or American voters will want us in place forever, or that the costs on the ground will remain low. The Albanian insurgencies in southern Serbia and northern Macedonia suggest the dangers that can arise to complicate the peace that peacekeeping affords.

If there is a rationale for this option other than mindless inertia, it is a long-term tutelage designed to transform the local societies and allow eventual disengagement and durable peace. If a long period of neo-imperial tutelage has high odds of civilizing the locals and making the next generation willing practitioners of secular liberalism, it might be worthwhile to gamble on it, to view institutionalized temporizing as gradual behavior modification. To give such a gamble a chance, however, suggests a bigger effort rather than a dwindling one: a much more

[7]Mueller, "The Common Sense", *The National Interest* (Spring 1997).

[8]Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 216.

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muscular tutelage, forcing the locals to be free as we forced the Germans and the Japanese after 1945. That means forcing them to be free on our terms of liberal, secular, democracy; cracking the heads of the few but crucial nationalist fanatics in all areas; intervening inventively in civics education; imposing the equivalent of denazification ruthlessly on all the local communities, rather than leaving them to shelter indicted war criminals; decisively crushing subversive activism by the Albanians for whom NATO fought in 1999; and changing the political culture to root protections for minorities in custom rather than foreign fiat.

This would be a tall order even under better circumstances. Contrary to the implicit logic of enthusiasts for limited intervention, there is no evidence that a liberal, tolerant, de-ethnicized political order is the natural default option once a peaceful truce is attained, no evidence that it is what societies will necessarily fall into if given the chance by temporary international policing and reconstruction. This conclusion does not rely on the common exaggeration of the historic depth of animosity among ethnic groups in the Balkans; indeed, the assumption that intense centuries-old group hatreds there are irrepressible is in some respects a myth.[9] For whatever tragic reasons of criminal manipulation or fear, however, members of these groups have killed each other in large enough numbers in recent times to prevent easy re-establishment of civic trust. To create secular liberalism in the Balkans amounts to remaking the societies—nation-building and state-building—the ambitious, hubris-laden mission that Vietnam made anathema to the American military.

While doing this is not impossible, even long and strenuous effort cannot guarantee success. Unlike the case in the Balkans, neither Germany nor Japan—the two success stories usually evoked in this context—was an ethnically divided society. Nor does duration of occupation correspond to the durability of reform. A dozen years of Reconstruction in the American South did not consolidate emancipation or prevent the replacement of slavery by virtual serfdom. Nearly twenty years of American occupation in the interwar period left Haiti neither more just nor more durably stable than it had been at the outset—and rather the same may be said for more recent efforts in that country.

More to the point, there is no reason to believe that the responsible powers will permit the more ambitious form and degree of nation-building. Will the UN, with Russia and China involved, work effectively to impose the Western vision of democratic liberalism in the Balkans, or allow NATO to do it while it watches? Will American or European governments really make an all-out effort even if the Security Council sanctions it? No. The force of inertia is toward the thinning out of occupation efforts, not their intensification. Even before the surge of violence around Kosovo's borders, the path of least resistance seemed to be a permanent presence only because it was an attenuating one. Given the long odds, it makes no sense to stay indefinitely, leaving policy and forces exposed to whatever surprises political developments may throw up—even as the occupation becomes progressively less capable of shaping such developments.

Formal partition. Partition is the fallback position if the odds against creating integrated liberal societies within currently segregated ones are too low—and if we will not make the strenuous effort required to raise those odds. Phony multinational states are not harmless. They fool few and make no one happy but the lawyers, diplomats or foreign moralists who prefer a shameless fiction

[9]John Mueller, "The Banality of Ethnic War", *International Security* (Summer 2000).

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to an imperfect reality. Partition would make *de jure* political lines congruent with *de facto* social lines; political separation would reduce exaggerated expectations of day-to-day cooperation among the communities whose antagonism was the source of the wars of the 1990s.

Partition, however, is still a bad option.[10] To make states both ethnically homogeneous and territorially defensible (that is, geographically coherent rather than a checkerboard collection of noncontiguous or strategically vulnerable swatches of land) would require revised borders and forced population transfers. This would contravene international law and Western moral sensibilities to a degree that makes it a fanciful option. The kind of partition that might be salable diplomatically for Bosnia would likely be one etched along current lines. This would make for an awkwardly shaped Muslim Bosniac state lacking access to the sea and difficult to defend. It would require a Western military guarantee to that state, regardless of whether the Croat sections and the Republika Srpska joined Croatia and Serbia.

In one sense, partition of Kosovo would be easier, if only because ethnic cleansing was more extensive there. The 1999 war and its aftermath concentrated the province's majority and minority in relatively distinct zones, and more or less exchanged ethnic cleansing of Albanians by Serbs for the reverse. A partition deal would carve off a northern slice for Serbia and give independence to the remaining Albanian bulk of Kosovo. This would have to be engineered, however, in the context of an imbalance of power between independent Kosovo and Serbian Yugoslavia. It would also require the violation of the Western peace agreement with Belgrade and face the prospect that the Albanian Kosovars—who have already been mounting attacks into Serbia and Macedonia—would refuse to concede any territory. With both sides having good reason to fear revanchism by the other, anything but a craven retreat would require NATO to provide security guarantees of some sort to both sides—something much easier to do in theory than in practice.

Finally, partition of Bosnia and Kosovo would further undermine the shaky foundation of Macedonian statehood, and could energize a crack-up there as nasty as what happened elsewhere in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The rationale for propping up that multinational amalgam would be hard to sustain after giving up on the other two.

Hand over to the European Union. This—a modified bug-out—is also a bad solution, only less bad than the others. It would involve a plan for American withdrawal over the course of, say, six months, and a declaration that policing the periphery of Europe is a perfect mission for a European Union currently groping toward an independent "defense identity." This would be a rather shameful escape for the United States, which led the charge to the Dayton agreement and the Rambouillet ultimatum. In material terms, however, there is no reason that a Europe whose unity is worth anything, and whose collective resources exceed those of the United States, could not be expected to handle a neighborhood problem without us, just as we intervene in our neighborhood (Central America and the Caribbean) without them. Nonetheless, there are two problems with this option.

The first is that our European allies would scream bloody murder, and might well refuse to take the baton, instead evacuating when we do. This would leave the hope that the locals would see the wisdom of keeping the current peace, and forego new attempts to rectify old grievances by force. If optimists who prefer

[10]See Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Modern Library, 1999), p. 365.

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continued occupation are right to believe that it has been justified by progress toward stability, then there should be some chance of this. The plan for U.S. withdrawal over six months could include an accelerated schedule for doing whatever remains to be done in political transition. If, after all this time in Bosnia, we do not know what still needs to be done, we have no business being there. If we do know, the answer is just to *do* it. In Kosovo, if the European members of NATO refuse to continue the occupation on their own, the UN would have the ball in its court and could try multilateral trusteeship again. In any case, the U.S. withdrawal should include an offer of assistance in resettling Serbs who fear what Kosovo's Albanians will do to them without NATO protection.

Despite these possibilities of peace, the withdrawal leaves the distinct likelihood that the locals will go at it again. That would make the NATO efforts of the past six years—including the only war NATO ever fought—appear to have been a waste.

Should our European allies not be even more inclined to avoid such a waste? If proximity does not make their interest in pacifying the edge of Europe greater than ours, this will simply reflect the weakness of current commitments and the danger that, by standing pat with a minimal effort and no exit strategy, we will eventually be embroiled in a disaster as bad as what might follow withdrawal now. If the Europeans refuse to take the handoff, U.S. withdrawal would need to arm and supply the weaker of the local states to give them a chance of surviving.

The second problem is that the Bush administration is, to say the least, skittish about encouraging European military activism outside the NATO framework, and about reducing American leadership of the alliance. Too bad. We cannot have it both ways. On this the Europeans are right: If we want to run the show, we have to shoulder the burden. Bush and his foreign policy team have to face the choice in Europe between fortifying American primacy or moving toward a balance of power strategy. If they want the former, they should move toward more decisive intervention in the Balkans—the muscular nation-building version of recolonization—rather than backing away from the area altogether.

THE BALKANS are just one reminder of the uncertain function of U.S. primacy. There is only one global superpower, involved strategically everywhere in the world, but the variety of its involvements tends to limit the effort it can make in any one. The United States is one of a coalition of great powers in each region of importance outside North America. The post-Cold War world is thus unipolar globally, but multipolar regionally.[11] Or as Shin'ichi Ogawa has said, since the end of the Cold War the international economy has been globalized but security has been regionalized. Clintonites lurched prematurely toward the mirage of political globalization, conflating American leadership with multilateralism, committing the United States to humanitarian activism ambitious in aims but limited in action. Half-measures leave us bogged down in the Balkans. The Bush team risks promoting hollow primacy: a hefty affirmation of America as number one, ever ready to do deserts but not mountains—in a world where conflicts occur far more often in the latter.

Unless the projection of moral force is backed by material force that is decisive rather than hesitant, intervention risks ineffectiveness and embarrassment. The Clinton administration never fully faced this problem, and it certainly did not solve

[11]See my "Wealth, Power, and Instability", *International Security* (Winter 1993/94), p. 41.

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it. By the same token, American primacy is hard either to keep or to justify unless it is exercised when challenges to American preferences arise. Some on the Bush team have been reluctant to accept this. Even for those willing to intervene forcefully, however, the puzzle in the post-Cold War world has been how to decide the standard for selection. There are more disastrous political disorders around the world than can be dealt with decisively. The Clintonite answer to this was that just because we cannot do everything does not mean that we should do nothing. But then how to choose? If Bosnia, why not Burundi—or any number of other divided societies on the brink of violence?

A weak answer, but probably the only politically sustainable one, is that we should intervene where probable benefits exceed probable costs by a hefty margin. Estimating those probabilities in advance, of course, is hard. Keeping the costs low, in turn, may often require compromising moral principles and privileging peace over justice in the hierarchy of objectives. For example, interventions that separate antagonistic communities and allow them independence may face fewer obstacles to success than ones that try to impose Western standards of civic decency and re-integration of communities that have recently soaked each other in blood.

To reject humanitarian intervention altogether, even under this cautious standard, is unnecessarily callous. To demand more is to raise the question of how to marshal the international will and resources to make frequent and decisive intervention feasible—rather than guarantee spotty, limited and ineffective interventions that may harm all they touch. Those focused on material interests must deal with the former point, and those focused on moral interests must deal with the latter. Neither material nor moral interests alone can make a foreign policy that works, and that is truly American. □

Time to Stop Digging

"Balkan War Looms", say the headlines, as they have done intermittently for a century and a quarter. Nothing in this area is ever entirely new: just the manner in which it is done.

And it isn't simply the local contenders who exhibit the same old instincts. The Western powers (the Great Powers, as they would once have been called) are behaving in similar fashion as well—with one big difference: they are not, for once, fighting each other by proxy. Instead, they are bewildered, timid, reluctant, and have a terrible conviction that whatever they do will turn out to be wrong. In that, at least, they seem likely to be proved correct. . . .

Everyone knows that Kosovo is a mess that is going to get worse, and no one really wants to be there when it does. We should think of the conflict between the Republic of Macedonia and the Albanian extremists as the War of Clinton's Succession: as much a part of his approach to things as the pardons that he gave to sundry crooks and sleazeballs.

All the moral bombast that surrounded the idea of trying to settle a complicated, ugly little ethnic conflict by bombing Serbia from 15,000 ft. has fallen away now. We're left with the consequences. And we don't like them.

—John Simpson, World Affairs Editor of the BBC, *Sunday Telegraph*, March 18, 2001

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

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Different Drummers, Same Drum

Andrew J. Bacevich

WHEN, on February 16, George W. Bush ordered U.S. combat aircraft to attack targets in Iraq, White House staffers let it be known that the new President was putting Baghdad on notice: In Washington, the "adults" had once again grasped the reins of power. The bombing of a handful of Iraqi air defense facilities was indeed an important signal, but not because it marked any notable departure from past practice. On the contrary, taken in conjunction with other early indicators, the incident suggests that when it comes to foreign policy, the new Bush administration will hew more closely to precedents established during the Clinton era than either its supporters had hoped or its detractors are likely to acknowledge. The emerging story is one of continuity, not change. Understanding why is crucial to comprehending the essential nature of American foreign policy after the Cold War.

Throughout eight years during which Democrats controlled the White House, few things raised greater ire among Republicans than the fecklessness with which Bill Clinton employed U.S. military power. Attracting particular ridicule was Clinton's penchant for pinprick air attacks portrayed as demonstrations of toughness and resolve. The effort to contain Saddam Hussein displayed this tactic at its worst. As a symbol of allied vigilance, American (and British) pilots flying nearly daily combat patrols over the so-called no-fly zone have launched dozens of attacks against Iraqi military installations, in effect waging an open-ended war of attrition. Saddam's response has been to mount ever bolder acts of defiance. Determined to sustain the fiction that Saddam remains securely in his "box", but unwilling to risk a showdown, Bill Clinton relied on faux air power to camouflage the deteriorating situation in the Gulf. The impact on Saddam and his regime was demonstrably nil.

During the run-up to the 2000 election, Bush and his surrogates let it be known that, if elected, they would jettison this amateurish Clinton doctrine. When it came to using force, George W. Bush would exhibit the prudence and sound judgment that had characterized his father's administration. By implication, a second Bush presidency would revive some variant of the Powell Doctrine, using military power only when vital U.S. interests are at stake, and then doing so overwhelmingly and decisively. Bush's appointment of Colin Powell, the doctrine's namesake, as secretary of state seemingly affirmed this intention. When it came to Saddam, the Bush team

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promised to have done with the temporizing and vacillation. Two words sufficed to define the essence of a more assertive policy toward Iraq: "regime change."

But the adults have now had their chance, and the results show a remarkable resemblance to the lamentable practices of the Clinton era. In explaining his decision to bomb Iraq, President Bush took pains to emphasize that doing so had long since become simply "routine." Indeed, the media discovered that the February 16 bombing was by no means the "first" of Bush's presidency, that on several other occasions after January 20, U.S. warplanes had hit targets inside Iraq. Insisting that endless American air patrols form "part of a strategy", President Bush vowed that "we will continue to enforce the no-fly zone." Reporters present for these remarks politely refrained from pressing Bush to explain exactly what that strategy might be.

But within weeks the answer to that question became clear. During the course of Secretary Powell's first trip to the Persian Gulf in February, tough talk about removing Saddam from power was notable by its absence. Instead, Powell touted the administration's plans for "retooling" the sanctions regime established during the first Bush presidency and continued by Bill Clinton. Although Saddam over the past decade has evinced extraordinary skill in evading that regime, Secretary Powell promised that a new set of unspecified "smart sanctions" would deny Baghdad access to arms and militarily relevant technology, keeping Saddam from causing further mischief while easing the hardships of the long-suffering Iraqi people. Yet stripped of the flourishes intended to convey a sense of novelty, the smart sanctions policy amounts to little more than a promise to try harder.

Thus is the Bush team, in the apt judgment of a March 4 *Washington Post* editorial, well "on its way to adopting the same Iraq policy pursued in recent years by the Clinton administration—a policy President Bush and his top aides repeatedly and vociferously condemned." Why the apparent flip-flop?

SEVERAL plausible explanations exist. The first and most obvious is the different perspective that results from assuming the mantle of power. Advocacy when free of responsibility is one thing; action when one will be held to account for the consequences is, to put it mildly, something else. Employed as a basis for actual decisions, campaign rhetoric is as likely to produce disaster as sound policy. John F. Kennedy ran for the presidency vowing to get tough on Castro, a stance that landed him in the Bay of Pigs. Skeptics warn that attempting to overthrow Saddam Hussein could well produce a comparable debacle—a Bay of Goats. That George W. Bush, wary of such a prospect, might discover hitherto overlooked virtues in the Iraq policy of his predecessor is eminently understandable.

A realistic appraisal of the facts on the ground provides a second possible explanation for Bush's about-face on Iraq. Although viewed in Washington as an event of cosmic importance, the inauguration of a new president left those facts unchanged, chief among them the strength of the security apparatus sustaining Saddam's grip on power; the haplessness of the Iraqi opposition; the limited appetite of the American people for another large-scale Persian Gulf war; and the cost-benefit calculus persuading other nations that the time has come to cut a deal with Saddam. Just as candidate Clinton, after berating the elder Bush for coddling the "butchers of Beijing", discovered once in office the merits of "engaging" China, so too the younger Bush, who denounced Clinton for being soft on Saddam, is finding practical alter-

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natives to containing Iraq to be few and risky.

But there is a third explanation, one that looks beyond the particular problems posed by Iraq. To an extent that neither partisan supporters nor members of the chattering classes are willing to concede, Bush and his chief advisers conceive of America's proper role in a post-Cold War world in terms nearly identical to those used by Clinton and his advisers. They assume the same intimate connection between U.S. foreign policy and America's domestic well-being; they embrace the same myths about the past; they voice similar expectations for the future, ascribing the shape of that future to the same set of factors. To a remarkable extent, they agree on the basic aims that should inform U.S. policy and the principles that should guide its conduct. Even when it comes to overlooking or ignoring inconvenient facts, Bush and Clinton share the same blind spots.

Thus, it is not really surprising that when setting its foreign policy azimuth the Bush administration spent its first weeks tacking away from the positions taken during the campaign, back toward the course previously charted by the Clinton administration. This was true not simply with regard to Iraq but on a number of other issues. Would a Bush administration act promptly to return U.S. forces to their true vocation as warfighters and leave peacekeeping to others, as Condoleezza Rice, Bush's national security adviser, had hinted during the campaign? Not really: President Bush announced that he had no immediate plan to withdraw U.S. troops from the Balkans and assured NATO that any changes would occur only after thoroughgoing allied consultation—a signal for nervous Europeans to rest easy. Would the new administration reverse the Clinton policy of showering North Korea with blandishments whenever Pyongyang hints darkly about acquiring nuclear weapons? Not according to Secretary Powell, who announced in early March that the new team would "pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off."[1] Would Bush act quickly to fix the gaping problems with military readiness that had excited Republicans during the campaign? No again: for now, the final defense budget submitted by President Clinton will serve quite nicely, thank you. Is Colombia another Democratic quagmire in the making, with Clinton's $1.3 billion program of military aid the first step toward plunging the United States into an intractable civil war? Perhaps, but the Bush administration is not going to take the rap for "losing" Colombia or for neglecting the war on drugs. The commitment stays. And then there is China. Republicans had mocked Clinton for categorizing China as a "strategic partner." Candidate Bush had classified the regime as a "strategic competitor." When the "spy plane" incident in April offered Bush an opportunity to show just what that formulation means, his administration demonstrated a Clintonesque penchant for conciliation.

Put another way, Bush and Clinton each fit comfortably within the foreign policy consensus that prevails today in all quarters to the Left of the tattered remnant of hard-core isolationists and to the Right of those few beleaguered radicals still pining for the glory days of the 1960s—that is to say, across the entire

[1]The White House subsequently seemed to distance itself from Powell's position. But any differences in the Bush take on North Korea are ones of tone rather than substance. "All that has happened", one observer noted, "is that the public enthusiasm of President Clinton—which masked the private skepticism of everyone else—is gone, replaced by the public skepticism of President Bush." Anne Applebaum, "Ping Pyongyang", *Slate*, March 30, 2001.

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spectrum of opinion deemed respectable. That consensus defines the parameters within which the policy debate occurs and provides the language that shapes foreign policy discourse. It establishes priorities and defines options. It focuses, disciplines and excludes. As such, it transcends partisan affiliation and subsumes labels such as liberal and conservative. It renders moot old distinctions between realists and idealists, nationalists and internationalists. To be sure, not every adherent to that consensus agrees on every detail; but on those things that matter most, agreement is well nigh unanimous.

THIS CONSENSUS constitutes the substructure of present-day U.S. foreign policy, superseding an earlier consensus that prevailed from the mid-1940s through the 1980s (although for a time fractured by the Vietnam War). Yet the new consensus has not so much displaced the old as renewed and expanded it. So pervasive as to be all but taken for granted, so authoritative as to be virtually immune to challenge, the renewal of this consensus forms the true centerpiece of the foreign policy legacy left by Bill Clinton. It promises to be the most durable element of that legacy as well.

The consensus consists of five distinctive elements. Each figured prominently in the policies of the Clinton era. Each has now been embraced by the Bush camp.

First, *America as historical vanguard.* According to this notion, history has a discernible direction and destination. Uniquely among all the nations of the world, the United States comprehends and manifests history's purpose. That purpose is freedom, achieved through the spread of democratic capitalism, and embodied in the American Way of Life. As that way of life mutates so too does the meaning of freedom.

The conviction that America is, in Melville's phrase, "the Israel of our time", possesses a distinguished pedigree, but it is one to which the end of the Cold War, victory in the Persian Gulf War, and the prosperity of the 1990s imparted fresh life. During the Clinton era, that conviction gave rise to all manner of gaudy claims about America's indispensability and its providentially endowed mission. Clinton believed that, as the nation that defines what he called "the right side of history", the United States possesses an inescapable mandate to enlighten those who have thus far failed to decipher history's meaning. Thus, as president, Clinton publicly reproached the Chinese government for languishing on "the wrong side of history." On the eve of his 1998 trip to the People's Republic, he explained his personal obligation to the Chinese "to create for them a new and different historical reality." Revising China's view of the past, Clinton said, would enable the government in Beijing to "feel more confident in doing what I believe is the morally right thing to do."

Setting himself up as a source of instruction on the finer points of morality exemplifies the sort of effrontery that triggered paroxysms of disbelief among Clinton's many critics. But the conviction that the United States has indeed solved the riddle of history finds equal favor at the highest levels of the Bush administration. Speaking at the Reagan Library on November 19, 1999, then-Governor Bush was explicit on this point: "We firmly believe that our nation is on the right side of history." For Republicans, too, the point is not merely to claim an honorific; with it comes responsibilities. Condoleezza Rice wonders "if we are going to accept responsibility for being on the right side of history" and expresses concern about the willingness of Americans to step up to the task. Should they fail to do so, should they squander

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the opportunity to seal the triumph of democratic capitalism, she warns that future generations will be asking "why we were on the right side of history, and did not take care of this."[2]

Colin Powell entertains a similarly expansive conception of America's purpose. During his tenure as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell acquired a well-earned reputation as cautious and circumspect. Upon his appointment to be secretary of state, he shed his soldierly inhibitions to reveal his Wilsonian inner self. In his confirmation hearing testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for example, Powell waxed eloquent: "There is no country on earth that is not touched by America, for we have become the motive force for freedom and democracy in the world." As such, he said,

> We are attached by a thousand cords to the world at large, to its teeming cities, to its remotest regions, to its oldest civilizations, to its newest cries for freedom. This means that we have an interest in every place on this Earth, that we need to lead, to guide, to help in every country that has a desire to be free, open, and prosperous.

What might leading, guiding and helping entail? When it comes to China, Powell endorses a tutelary approach not unlike that pursued by Clinton. The key, he explained to the committee, lies in "exposing them to the powerful forces of a free enterprise system in democracy, so they can see that this is the proper direction in which to move."

SECOND, *the promise of openness and integration.* Previous U.S. efforts to lead, guide and help others toward the right side of history have achieved mixed results. Americans take pride in their contribution to democratizing Germany and Japan after World War II. Yet earnest and determined efforts during the decades before the war to teach Latin Americans to elect good men yielded resentment and reaction. A Herculean attempt after the war to graft liberal institutions onto South Vietnam failed spectacularly. Efforts closer to home in a much earlier time to lead, guide and help Native Americans produced a disaster of such magnitude that Americans are able to assimilate the outcome only by practicing a form of cognitive dissonance, acknowledging the facts as incontrovertible and then shrugging them off as irrelevant.

Given this spotty record, heeding present-day American calls to hop aboard the express train of history might strike some as an iffy proposition. Not so, according to members of the policy elite: climbing aboard has never been easier, nor has the prospective journey been more exhilarating. Thanks for that goes to that signal phenomenon of the post-Cold War era: globalization.

Combined with its fraternal twin the information revolution, globalization is accelerating the inexorable process of international integration. In so doing, it enhances the appeal of America's message, investing it with an allure that is well nigh irresistible. As President Clinton never tired of declaiming, globalization sweeps aside barriers impeding the movement of goods, capital, ideas and culture. It creates boundless new opportunities for the creation of wealth. But globalization also does much more: it imprints onto its beneficiaries the expectations and sensibilities of the nation acting as the project's chief sponsor, namely, the United States. A world opened up by the forces of globalization will not only be more affluent; it will also be freer, as Americans define

[2]Rice, "American Foreign Policy in the 21st Century", Speech at Los Angeles World Affairs Council, January 15, 1999.

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freedom. It will be more democratic, as we understand democracy. It will be more peaceful, as we ourselves are a peaceful people.

Clinton and his advisers frequently voiced these expectations; Bush and his advisers concur. Thus in December 2000, upon being introduced as the next secretary of state, Powell, with nary an acknowledging footnote, appropriated the clichés that Clinton himself had never tired of reiterating. According to Powell, the "information and technology revolutions . . . are reshaping the world as we know it, destroying political boundaries and all kinds of other boundaries as we are able to move information and capital data around the world at the speed of light." Removing boundaries fosters free trade, to which Bush, like his father before him and like Clinton, evinces a cult-like devotion. Like them, Bush also attributes to openness benefits that extend beyond mere commercial opportunity. "Free trade brings greater political and personal freedom", he told the Congress in February. Or, as he stated it more grandly in the November Reagan Library speech, his own approach to foreign policy derives from a "vision in which people and capital and information can move freely, creating bonds of progress, ties of culture and momentum toward democracy."

But the creation of an open world is not just about creating ties of culture. Globalization is not social work. The pursuit of openness is first of all about Americans doing well; that an open world might also enable them to do good qualifies at best as incidental. As Raymond Aron observed over a quarter century ago, "A world without frontiers is a situation in which the strongest capitalism prevails."[3] An open global order in which American enterprise enjoys free rein and in which American values and tastes enjoy pride of place is a world in which the United States remains pre-eminent. Clinton and his advisers knew this. So do their successors.

THIRD, *the duality of openness.* As senior members of the Clinton administration acknowledged, openness is a two-edged sword. The prospect of a world remade in America's image does not strike all with equanimity. Although post-ideological Washington cannot conceive of the future harboring any significant secret or surprise—have not all of the big questions been settled once and for all?—elsewhere History remains hotly contested.

So, even in the absence of any viable alternative to democratic capitalism or of any remotely comparable great power, America's enthusiastic promotion of openness incites resistance. Based on the record of the Clinton era, opponents fall into one of three distinct categories. In the first are those, such as adherents of radical Islam, who advance an altogether different view of history's purpose and their own distinctive claims to truth. Speaking on behalf of such groups, critics—some honest, some dishonest—assert that the values that America exports have less to do with authentic freedom than with a popular culture that they view as vulgar and meretricious, where not simply debased and dehumanizing. They are determined to prevent that culture from inundating their own.

The second category of opposition to openness includes those who reject universalism of any stripe and cling ferociously to their own particularistic vision. The perverse attempt by Kosovar guerrillas to carve out a Greater Albania offers only the most recent illustration of this phenomenon. Since the end of the Cold

[3]Aron, *The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945-1973* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1974), p. 176.

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War there have been countless others: bloody purges fueled by tribal hatred in Africa, violent separatist movements across Asia, and, most vividly, the intractable conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, who, we are told, have no choice but to live together but who regularly choose to do otherwise. Not for these groups the tolerant pluralism and easygoing multiculturalism that is the ultimate promise of an open world. They will not condone any blurring of the distinctions between "us" and "them." They persist in believing that identity is indelible, sacred and worth fighting for.

The final category of opposition includes various parties intent simply on grabbing their share of the loot. Although Americans take it as a given that the United States should benefit disproportionately from the spoils that globalization throws up in such profusion, to others the logic of this arrangement is not self-evident. Some opponents in this category are merely aggravating—like the industrious Asian entrepreneurs who pirate the latest CDs, videos and software and thereby siphon off profits rightfully belonging to Hollywood or Silicon Valley. Others—like the narcotraffickers of Latin America—pose a far more insidious threat.

The various elements forming this opposition differ in their capacity to act. They also differ in the means that they employ. But all are alike in rejecting the norms that the United States insists are necessary for globalization to work.[4]

Openness greatly complicates the task of suppressing these adversaries. Removing barriers to commercial activity likewise removes barriers that once protected everyday life within the borders of the United States. Openness exacerbates existing vulnerabilities and creates new ones. It facilitates the theft of technology, the transport of contraband, and the acquisition of weapons. It eases intelligence collection and infiltration. Thus, thanks to openness, and despite the absence of any single power capable of directly challenging the United States, Americans today ostensibly find themselves less secure than during the bad old days of the Cold War. At least one would think so as evidenced by the senior officials who issue stern warnings about fanatics releasing anthrax in downtown Washington or paint lurid scenarios in which hackers acting on a whim disable the nation's financial networks.

This depiction of the United States as besieged by "new threats" is very much the handiwork of the Clinton years. Yet the idea is one that the Bush administration has adopted without reservation. On the campaign trail in September, Bush depicted the twenty-first century as "an era of car bombers and plutonium merchants and cyber terrorists and drug cartels and unbalanced dictators." Once in office, the new President affirmed that the dangers facing the United States in this new era "are more widespread and less certain." Cribbing a term invented by the Clinton administration, Bush has cited the great danger posed by "rogue nations" intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the "rogue" label obviating any need actually to evaluate the capabilities of nations such as North Korea that fall into this category. When it comes to terror, Bush likewise endorses his predecessor's view, ignoring (as did Clinton)

[4]Some might see Europe as possessing the potential to oppose the United States. In terms of aggregate wealth and population, it does. In its resentment of perceived American highhandedness and arrogance—expressed most vigorously by France—it would seem to possess a motive of sorts. But Europe lacks political will. It talks, but actions seldom match words. The proposed European defense identity is a case in point. Who among the Europeans is willing to pay for it?

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data indicating that the incidence of international terrorism is actually on the wane. For Bush, as for Clinton, the utopia implicit in the vision of a globalized world will, it appears, be a precarious one.

FOURTH, *the necessity of military supremacy*. Even as openness exposes the United States to what Bush has called "all the unconventional and invisible threats of new technologies and old hatreds", it remains an abiding imperative. Once having decided that the protective barriers must go, there can be no retreat. To do so would be to jeopardize domestic prosperity, unsustainable absent ever expanding access to global markets. Furthermore, the most effective way to defend the open order (and to promote economic growth) is to continuously expand its perimeter.

Policing the perimeter and pushing it outward requires power, above all coercive power. As a result, the passing of the Cold War has accelerated the transformation of the U.S. military from an institution charged with providing for the common defense into an instrument of power projection and political influence. Begun haphazardly in 1898 when American soldiers set sail to liberate Cuba, that transformation reached a culminating point of sorts in the 1990s when the Pentagon promulgated its "strategy of engagement", formally charging U.S. forces with responsibility for "shaping" the international environment.

Formalized during the Clinton years, the notion of using the military to sustain the momentum toward openness and integration under the aegis of the United States is by no means the exclusive property of liberal Democrats. It commands bipartisan support. Consider the post-Cold War U.S. military presence and activities in Europe. A half century after World War II, with Europe prosperous, democratic, stable and easily able to defend itself, leaders of both parties take it for granted that the United States should maintain in perpetuity a European garrison of 100,000 soldiers. Similarly, leaders of both parties agree on the wisdom of expanding the "Europe" that the United States is committed to defend. A decade ago, the elder Bush first proposed the program of NATO enlargement. Clinton converted that idea into reality. But Clinton went even further: he also enlarged NATO's charter, exploiting the opportunities presented in Bosnia and Kosovo to convert a defensive alliance into a vehicle for policing Europe's periphery. The younger Bush—who supported the war for Kosovo—shows little sign of undoing the work that Clinton began.

This reorientation of purpose—not simply in Europe, but in Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Western Hemisphere and even, to a lesser extent, in Africa—has profound implications. In contrast to the soldier's traditional stance—awaiting the summons—engagement requires an activist posture. In contrast to the soldier's traditional expectations—responding to the occasional war or emergency—engagement entails continuous exertion. Thus engagement implies a continuing need for a large, highly capable and highly professional, even praetorian, military establishment, charged with shouldering a wider array of responsibilities.

On this score, too, the elite consensus is firm. Indeed, to judge by the most recent national elections, the proposition that the United States must remain militarily supreme attracts something close to universal assent. In mainstream American politics, there is nothing even remotely resembling an anti-military party. Nor does either national party contain an anti-military wing or faction. Indeed, in all of American public life there is hardly a single prominent figure who finds fault with the notion of the United States remaining

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the world's sole military superpower until the end of time.

If disagreement exists, it concerns not the ends of strategy but the means to achieve those ends. Critics have charged Clinton with having left the U.S. military in a parlous state. Stripped of its partisan underpinnings, that charge is difficult to sustain. By any conceivable measure, the United States ended the Clinton era as it began it—as easily the strongest military power on the planet while far and away outspending allies and adversaries alike in its determination to maintain that status.

Yet critics can quite justifiably fault Clinton's stewardship on another score: Throughout his two terms in office, efforts to transform the way that the American military thinks, organizes and operates have lagged well behind the actually ongoing transformation of what U.S. strategy calls upon the military to do. A combination of factors—lackluster civilian leadership, obstructionism on the part of hidebound senior officers, and the military's distracting involvement in the culture wars—has impeded efforts to restructure the services for their expanded role. In short, although Clinton succeeded in broadening the purposes that U.S. military power would serve, his efforts to adapt the armed services to those new purposes foundered.

The Bush administration has forcefully declared its intention to close this gap, if necessary bludgeoning the services into discarding the Cold War era structure to which they have clung. But in vowing to create, in Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz's words, "a future force that is at once more agile, more lethal and more rapidly deployable", the Bush national security team is reciting the very same litany of qualities that the Clinton administration had long since identified as essential for effective global interventionism. In other words, although on defense matters notable differences do exist between Bush and his predecessor, it is easy to make more of these differences than they deserve.

Ballistic missile defense—the signature initiative of the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld Pentagon—offers a case in point. The new administration's commitment to missile defense does not signify an abandonment of Clinton's paradigm regarding the proper role of American forces; if anything, it affirms that paradigm. The true purpose of missile defense after all is not to permit the United States to withdraw behind the ramparts of Fortress America. *It is not a step toward* isolationism. Rather, ballistic missile defense will facilitate the more effective application of U.S. military power abroad. By insulating the homeland from reprisal—albeit in a limited way—missile defense will underwrite the capacity and willingness of the United States to "shape" the environment elsewhere. As Lawrence F. Kaplan, writing in *The New Republic*, has correctly discerned, "Missile defense isn't really meant to protect America. It's a tool for global dominance."[5] Credit the Bush administration with having a better appreciation of what military tools dominance requires. But do not credit it with changing the larger purpose to which the tools will be put.

FIFTH, *the imperative of American "leadership."* The final element of the consensus to which leaders of the Clinton administration and of both Bush administrations have subscribed stipulates that there exists no alternative to global U.S. leadership. To be sure, during his first year in office, Clinton dallied briefly with "assertive multilateralism." But any fanciful notions that Washington would routinely work with or through the United Nations did not survive the debacle of Mogadishu in

[5]Cover text, *New Republic*, March 12, 2001.

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October 1993. Subsequent to that chastening experience, the Clinton administration acted unilaterally or at the head of a coalition, working in concert with international organizations only as it saw fit. In speech after speech and in crisis after crisis, members of Clinton's team and the President himself made it clear that the United States would defer to no one.

What the Clinton administration never could bring itself to acknowledge is that leadership is really a code word, one whose use honors the cherished tradition according to which the United States is not and cannot be an empire. Leadership has become a euphemism for hegemony.

In the public statements of senior officials, the word "hegemon" figures only by way of identifying threats that the United States must anticipate and deflect. For example, Condoleezza Rice has stated that the paramount aim of U.S. foreign policy should be to "make certain that the international system remains stable and secure . . . so that no hegemon can rise to threaten stability."[6] But what is the exercise of U.S. power to maintain global stability and security if not itself hegemony? There is today no region of strategic significance in which the United States is not pre-eminent. Thanks to NATO, the United States remains the leading power in Europe. With its permanent commitment of 100,000 troops in the Pacific, it is the leading power in East Asia. With its various bases and garrisons established subsequent to the Persian Gulf War, it is the guarantor of order and stability in that region as well. And that does not even count America's sway over the Western Hemisphere.

Back in the days when President Bush's father was in the White House, the Pentagon prepared a document suggesting (in so many words) that something approximating global hegemony offered a useful principle around which to organize U.S. strategy after the Cold War. The document leaked, the *New York Times* professed great shock, and Democrats pilloried its chief author, then Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Eight years later Wolfowitz is back in the Pentagon as deputy secretary of defense, and there is no evidence that he has modified his views. What has changed is the climate of informed opinion. Were Wolfowitz today to publish a new draft of the strategy he devised in 1992, it would produce nary a ripple. As a result of the Clinton era, hegemony—although few dare to call it by its rightful name—has gone mainstream.

The Theater of Continuity

IN THE aftermath of the Cold War, public discourse about U.S. foreign policy retains a strong element of theater. Especially when it comes to political campaigns, the parts are prescribed, the players know their roles, and everyone sticks to the script, sustaining the fiction that in the forthcoming balloting the differences separating the candidates are large and the stakes profound. Thus in the fall of 2000, during the second of the three debates between Bush and Gore, the moderator charged the two presidential candidates with identifying the "guiding principles" of U.S. foreign policy. Governor Bush, coached to play the role of hardheaded realist, explained that, "The first question is what's in the best interests of the United States." The vice president—ostentatiously donning the mantle of progressivism—demurred: "I see it as a question of values."

Thus do candidates pretend to differ. After the fact, partisans in both camps

[6]Interview by Haim Zaltzman with Rice, "The Future of Foreign Policy", *Hoover Digest* (Fall 1999), www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/digest/994/rice.html

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pretend that those differences actually matter. Journalists chime in with commentary pretending to spin out the weighty implications. In fact, comparing the actual views of Bush and Gore, or more generally comparing the views of Democratic foreign policy experts with those of their Republican counterparts, is akin to comparing the primetime programming of competing television networks.[7] Some differences exist—after all, people actually make a living contrasting the finer points of sitcoms—but enumerating those differences does not go very far toward identifying the true nature of the enterprise known as commercial television. Similarly, some people actually make a living parsing the differences between where Democrats and Republicans stand on foreign policy. But doing so does not get you very far toward understanding the essential nature of U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War.

In the period following World War II, the pivotal year for U.S. foreign policy was not 1947, the year of "Mr. X", the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Nor was it 1950, the year of NSC-68 and the Korean intervention. Rather, the defining moment occurred in 1953. In January of that year, Republicans, after a long and frustrating absence from power, reclaimed the White House. For years, they had been charging that on the paramount issue of the day—responding to the threat of communism—the Truman administration had been pusillanimous and inept. During the presidential campaign, Dwight D. Eisenhower had hinted at a new approach: his administration would seek ways to "roll back" communism. Privately, Eisenhower favored lowering the U.S. profile abroad, even toying with the idea of phasing American troops out of Europe. Once in office, he did neither more nor less. Instead, Eisenhower embraced the logic of the strategy that his predecessor had devised: containment. In doing so, Eisenhower paid his predecessor a very large if backhanded compliment. More important, he invested U.S. policy with a continuity that it would retain—with the exception of a brief period following the Vietnam War—until the end of the Cold War.

In a similar sense, 2001 may well prove to be the pivotal year in fixing the azimuth of U.S. policy in the emerging global era. Historians may well look back on the transfer of power from Clinton to Bush as the moment in which conservative Republicans, after a long and frustrating absence from power, after years of complaining about pusillanimity and ineptness, affirmed the course set by liberal Democrats—and in doing so made manifest the new consensus underlying U.S. strategy.

When President-elect Bush introduced Colin Powell as his nominee to be secretary of state, the retired four-star general let it be know that "the world marches to new drummers, drummers of democracy and the free enterprise system." In Washington a new set of drummers may have picked up the sticks, but, to a far greater extent than they are willing to acknowledge, the rhythms that they are tapping out do not differ appreciably from those favored by their predecessors. □

[7]Once the campaign ends, so does the posturing. Once safely elected, but even before his inauguration, Bush declared that, "American values always are at the center of our foreign policy."

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The Great War

Mystery or Error?

Michael Howard

IT IS ALMOST a century since the countdown to the First World War began, ominously enough, with a series of linked crises in the Balkans. Ten years hence publishers will start planning their first centennial histories. But apart from a gap in the 1940s and 1950s when the Second World War took priority, the flow of studies has barely ceased since 1918. Understandably: for Europeans, the war was uniquely horrifying both in its course and its consequences. In spite of the global title later bestowed on it, this was essentially a European war, and for two generations of Europeans it was simply the "Great War", *tout court*. Like earlier European wars it involved battles on and beyond the seas, but it was fought out on European territory and—apart from the brief but substantial American intervention in its final weeks—by European armies.

Above all it was for European peoples that the consequences were most devastating. Some thirteen million people died, nine million of them young men, most of them in conditions of almost unimaginable horror; the British in the mud of the Somme and Passchendaele, the French and Germans pounding each other to smithereens at Verdun, the Austrians and Hungarians freezing to death in the Carpathians, the Russians driven forward like cattle on the plains of Poland, the Italians slaughtered in their vain and repeated attacks on the rocky slopes of the Carso.

And for what? The victorious Allies exhausted themselves to no evident benefit, their sacrifices heartrendingly commemorated by monuments in every village throughout their lands. The empires that had kept Eastern and Central Europe in some kind of equilibrium for the previous two centuries—Hohenzollern, Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman—disintegrated, leaving in their place nationalist and aggressive successor states whose quarrels still provide the seedbeds of further wars. The liberal capitalism of the Enlightenment, which in 1914 seemed to be inexorably expanding its benefits throughout the world, collapsed, and with it all the moral certainties it had seemed to embody. Peoples turned in despair to the comforting promises held out by communism and fascism. What had all those people died for? What had been the point?

Two leading British historians who have recently published major works on the First World War have recoiled, baffled by the question. Sir John Keegan, the doyen of military historians, can

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only conclude that the war was "a mystery."[1] For Niall Ferguson, the most promising of a younger generation of historians, it was simply "the greatest *error* in modern history."[2] Such judgments are hardly adequate. The war may have been tragic and disastrous, but there was nothing mysterious or inexplicable about it. It was certainly the result of cumulative "errors", that is, of bad judgments, but there were too many of them—the German decision to support the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, the premature Russian order for general mobilization, above all the Schlieffen Plan, which extended the war willy-nilly to France and, through the invasion of Belgium, to Britain and the British Empire—to be considered a single "error." But for Ferguson the greatest "error" of all was the British decision to intervene in the war, rather than stand back and allow the Germans to win and establish a benevolent hegemony over Europe. It was this decision, he believes, that transformed a European war, which might well have been over within a year, into a prolonged confrontation that weakened where it did not destroy the whole fabric of European society.

Ferguson's revisionist judgment is provocative and interesting, and will be dealt with in a moment. It is certainly a refreshing variant on an otherwise sterile debate. In that debate there is, on the one hand, the traditional liberal thesis, popular between the wars both in Britain and the United States, and the German "war guilt" thesis, established by the victorious Allies at Versailles and revised by Fritz Fischer a generation later. The first maintained that the war was a ghastly "accident" resulting from the nature of capitalism, the prevalence of militarism, the "arms race", or the inflexibility of mobilization timetables (Barbara Tuchman's interpretation in *The Guns of August*, which, however mistaken, was to be of considerable value during the Cuban Missile Crisis). The second, however justifiable, was to have the disastrous consequence of outraging the entire German people and mobilizing them behind a revanchist policy in the interwar years.

NEITHER OF these theses is to be completely discounted, though historians, not least German historians, now give greater weight to the latter than to the former. But there is also a greater tendency to emphasize the European *mentalité* before 1914; a sense that a war was coming and that it would be no bad thing if it did. The roots of this sentiment can be traced to the general sense of insecurity resulting from the headlong social and economic transformation of Europe during the previous fifty years, from an agrarian economy that had changed little over five hundred years to one urbanized, industrial and global. This involved the growth of cities and a popular press, and the development of a hectic nationalism cultivated, at least in part, to combat the threat of socialist internationalism among the newly enfranchised working classes. War, when it came, was welcomed almost as a relief from tensions both internal and international. The relief was so ecstatic that not only did the English poet Rupert Brooke thank God for matching him with His hour, but the German minister for war, Erich von Falkenhayn, famously declared that, "Even if everything now goes smash, it will have been worth it." Certainly dread of hostile public reaction did not inhibit governmental decisions for war, as it did so disastrously in Britain and France in 1938 and 1939.

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[1]Keegan, *The First World War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).

[2]Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (New York: Basic Books, 1999). Italics in original.

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Hindenburg, Wilhelm II and Ludendorff

A creed that glorified military values above all others.

It may now appear "mysterious" that anyone should have welcomed war in 1914, but it would not have seemed so to anyone living before the twentieth century. Wars had always been taken very much for granted. In any event very few people—the professionals—had any idea what the war would be like. They had studied the American Civil War and, even more important, the Russo-Japanese War. They knew all about the defensive power provided by new weapons, even if they did not yet know how to overcome it. Most of them knew of Ivan Bloch's remarkable study, *La Guerre future*, even if they had not read it, but they did not need Bloch to tell them that no economy could stand a prolonged war involving, as General von Schlieffen himself warned in 1909, "millions of marks and millions of men." They knew, therefore, that the war would have to be short, because nobody (except the British, with their fortunate experience of maritime warfare) believed that it would be possible to win a long one.

The only way to keep a war short was to win it quickly; and that could be done only by taking the offensive, which all European armies planned to do. For the Germans it was particularly necessary to get their attack in first if they were not to be squeezed between the greater manpower of the French and the Russians and subjected to blockade by the Royal Navy. If the Schlieffen Plan had worked, and the Germans had successfully defeated first the French and then the Russian armies in the fine style of Frederick the Great, they would have won. But it did not work. Nor did the offensive plans of the French, the Russians or the Austrians. By the end of 1914 the war for which everyone had been preparing for the previous ten years was over, and nobody had won it.

The sensible thing to do at this point would have been to make peace. The original protagonists in the war, Russia and the Dual Monarchy, whose losses were already crippling, would have been only too glad to do so, but the blood of their allies was up. The British had barely begun to fight; the French had lost a fifth of their territory and were determined to regain it. As for the Germans, despite

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their inability to win quickly, their armies had been everywhere spectacularly victorious and were deep inside the territory of their enemies. There could be no question of accepting even the minimum terms that the Allies were likely to offer: a complete withdrawal of German forces from all occupied territories, especially Belgium, with an indemnity for the damage they had done, and the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France.

On the contrary: the Germans had already formulated their peace terms in Bethmann-Hollweg's "September Program", and these were not to vary until the very end of the war. They differed little from those that Hitler was to impose on Europe in 1940. In the west a protectorate would be imposed over Belgium; the French coast would be occupied to the mouth of the Somme, and the occupation of Lorraine would be extended to the adjacent ore fields around Briey. In the east, Poland and the territories reaching northeast to the Gulf of Riga would be occupied and "Germanized"; while *Mitteleuropa*—that is, effectively, the lands of Germany's Austrian ally—would become a domain of German economic hegemony. Finally, Germany's African colonies would be consolidated at the expense of Belgium and Portugal to give it a real "place in the sun." It was the refusal of the British even to consider such an outcome that Niall Ferguson regards as the greatest "error" of the war.

So if peace was impossible, the war had to go on, and it was Falkenhayn, now German chief of staff, who first formulated a strategy for its conduct. The experience of 1914–15, especially on the Eastern Front, proved that victories on the battlefield, however spectacular, could not in themselves prove decisive. What mattered now was not the skill of the rival generals or the courage of their armies, but the will and capacity of the enemy governments and peoples to continue the war. Their capitulation could be effected, not by "defeating" their armies, but by bleeding them to death, which could best be done by massive use of artillery. That, hopefully, would inflict heavy losses on enemy forces while being economical with one's own. Unfortunately, the Allies had come to very much the same conclusion. The result was two years of nightmare on the Western Front, when generals calculated advantage not in terms of ground held or gained, but of "body bags" counted in scores of thousands; while the industrial resources of the belligerents were mobilized to produce the millions of shells needed to bring about what was intended to be a decisive result.

BOTH KEEGAN and Ferguson wonder how it was that the troops stuck it out for as long as they did. But for that generation hardship and deprivation were commonplace; social deference re-inforced military discipline; and if romantic patriotism did not long survive the first experience of shell fire, it was replaced by the far more enduring bonds of "comradeship" that made the experience of war not only tolerable but, for some, almost rewarding. To understand what kept the British Army fighting we should read Guy Chapman and Robert Graves, rather than such highly strung witnesses as Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon; for the Germans, Ernst Jünger rather than Erich Maria Remarque. It is more difficult to understand what kept the civilian populations going as, under the combined pressures of military demand and enemy blockade, clothing and household goods disappeared from the shops, health deteriorated, and foodstuffs dwindled to famine proportions. Indeed, the greatest fear among pre-war soldiers and statesmen had been that prolonged war would shatter civilian morale, and sooner or later this would result in revolution. Sooner or later it certainly did; but it took

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three years even in a Russia barely recovered from one revolution, and over four in Germany and the Habsburg Empire. There is, as Adam Smith grimly remarked, a great deal of ruin in a nation.

But Falkenhayn, unfortunately, was probably right. It is true that by the last year of the war both sides had developed operational strategies that broke the deadlock of trench warfare, employing weapons and techniques that had not been available in 1914, and battlefield skills that could be learned only through the grueling experiences of the mid-war years. But it is doubtful whether those techniques would have been effective against armies that had not already been fatally weakened by the long years of trench warfare, and whose morale had not been eroded by the sufferings of their families at home. The military leadership on both sides squandered countless lives as they felt their way to an operational solution for their problems, but it has yet to be shown that there was any short cut that would have provided that solution any sooner. Even the much reviled British generals, brought up in a tradition that ignored Continental warfare, did little worse than their Continental colleagues in an environment that was equally strange for all of them.

The military cannot be absolved of all responsibility for the often unnecessary sufferings they imposed on their troops, but ultimate responsibility must lie with a political leadership that not only started the war in the first place, but failed to make peace when the full costs of the war had become clear; and the political leaders who both started and prolonged the war were the Germans.

AS WE HAVE seen, a whole accumulation of circumstances made war likely in 1914. It might have come sooner if any one of a series of crises during the previous decade had been less skillfully managed. Even if the crisis provoked by the Sarajevo assassinations had been successfully surmounted, the chances of Europe remaining at peace for much longer were very slight indeed. But the Germans should have known better than anyone what war would entail. As early as 1890 their great hero, the elder Helmuth von Moltke, had warned the Reichstag that the next European war might well last for thirty years: "Woe to the man who sets Europe ablaze", he declared, "who first throws a match into the powder barrel!" Von Moltke may indeed have realized that the man who would ultimately do so had just succeeded to the throne of the German Empire: Kaiser Wilhelm II.

This does not mean that Wilhelm II, although he personally embodied all of the least attractive characteristics of the German ruling classes, was, as Allied propaganda suggested, personally responsible for the outbreak of the war. But in his role as head of the German state and its highest war lord he bore ultimate responsibility for the decisions of his government. Nor did those decisions necessarily imply, as Fritz Fischer has argued, that the German government had deliberately planned aggressive war. The evidence is equally strong, as Ferguson rightly points out, that their immediate motivation was defensive. The High Command considered war to be inevitable once Russia had completed her massive French-financed mobilization program in three years' time, and they believed that Germany's only hope of survival lay in the kind of pre-emptive blow that Frederick the Great had so successfully struck at the gathering forces of his enemies at the beginning of the Seven Years' War.

What is incontestable is that the German political leadership took a series of gambles involving a high probability of war that did not come off. The first was the "blank check" issued to Austria-

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Hungary on July 5, 1914 encouraging them to go ahead with their ultimatum to Serbia and so to risk war with Russia. The second was a grand strategy that guaranteed that wherever and whatever the *casus belli*, the war would begin with a massive invasion of France. The third was an operational plan involving not only an infringement of Belgian neutrality, but a complete occupation of that country that guaranteed war with Britain—and an occupation whose brutality, however exaggerated it may have been by Allied propaganda, was sufficient to destroy such sympathy for the German cause as existed in neutral nations. A fourth, most fatal of all, was the decision for unrestricted submarine warfare two years later, which, predictably, guaranteed war with the United States.

In all these cases there was certainly an outside chance that the gamble would pay off; that Russia would be deterred from intervention, that France would be quickly crushed, that the British would abstain from Continental involvement, that the war would be won before the United States could intervene. One such gamble might be dismissed as injudicious; four look very much like madness.

A regime capable of making such decisions can at best be described as very peculiar indeed; certainly not one whose hegemony over Europe was likely to coexist peacefully for very long with such liberal democracies as Britain and the United States. The Napoleonic hegemony had been bad enough, but the doctrines on which it was based—the destruction of archaic privileges, the creation of legal and political structures based on the values of the Enlightenment—won it genuine support among the middle classes throughout Europe. But a German hegemony offered nothing except a rule based upon military power, exercised by a caste concerned only to preserve and extend its own dominance; and, in Eastern Europe at least, based on an explicit doctrine not only of territorial conquest but of racial superiority. This creed was to be labeled by Allied propagandists "Prussianism", which was in fact a libel on a country whose traditions of hard work and self-denial were in many ways admirable. But it remained a creed that despised the liberal democracy of the West, elevated service to the state as the highest virtue, and glorified military values above all others. Such sentiments could certainly be found elsewhere in Europe, not least in Britain, but nowhere else did they exist in so ferocious a concentration. There can be little doubt that military victory would have strengthened rather than eroded them.

That there were other and finer traditions in Germany than the militarism embraced by the ruling classes is beyond doubt. Indeed, as Ferguson rightly points out, German journalists and politicians were the first to identify "militarism" and were ferociously effective in their attacks on it. If the militarized upper classes and their imitators among the bourgeoisie welcomed the war, with all the opportunities it offered for the expansion of German power, the Social Democrats, the majority party in the Reichstag, only fell in line when Russia was maneuvered into taking the first step by ordering mobilization. The war could then be depicted to the Reichstag as being purely defensive. The September Program certainly embodied the aspirations of all the interest groups who wanted to increase German power, as well as those of the military who wanted permanently to guarantee German security, but a substantial minority in the Reichstag courageously continued to demand peace without annexations or indemnities.

ONCE THE war began, party differences were dissolved, as they were throughout Europe, in a common patriotism that embraced all classes. But after a year of apparently uninterrupted victories, it was hard to believe

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that German territory was any longer under threat. In the east the Russians had been driven out of Poland and Courland (Lithuania), back to their ethnic frontiers. In the west German armies were deep inside France, and their defensive lines had barely been dented. Civilians were already seriously short of food and clothing. So why no peace? The next year, 1916, was to see the terrible losses of Verdun and the Somme, and ever increasing hardship at home. The High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff took control of the Home Front, and imposed ever tighter controls over civilian consumption. The question was now more insistently being asked—why no peace?

It was largely the fear that the German people would not stand another year of war that precipitated, at the end of 1916, the fatal decision for unrestricted submarine warfare. But peace would have been available if their government had wanted it. The Allied terms were still not harsh—German withdrawal to her pre-war frontiers in the west; the abandonment of Alsace-Lorraine; indemnity for Belgium; the creation of an independent Poland; self-determination for the subject nationalities of the Habsburg Empire—even these might have been negotiable. But the German government would not budge from the demands of the September Program. The huge sacrifices of blood and treasure already made by the German people, they claimed, demanded the establishment of a Germany so strong, and with frontiers so inviolable, that she would never again be under threat from her enemies.

Eventually, in July 1917, a majority of the Reichstag passed a resolution demanding peace without annexations or indemnities. This only stiffened the resolve of the High Command, which organized a popular party of the Right, the Fatherland Party, to support their annexationist war aims. With the United States now committed to the war, the German leadership was fighting for objectives that could be obtained only by total victory, which, as was increasingly clear, they had no hope of achieving. But for the High Command the war was no longer simply against the Allies: it was against the *Reichsfeinde*, the internal enemies of the Reich, the socialists and the liberals. A victory by these elements would mean the end of all of the leadership's aspirations to *Weltmacht*, the end of its warrior culture, the end of everything that, in its eyes, Germany stood for in the world. For Ludendorff and those around him, the pre-war slogan, *Weltmacht oder Niedergang*, "World Power or Downfall", was no more than a statement of fact: there was no middle way. It was a self-fulfilling prophecy. When a year later Ludendorff's strategy did result in *Niedergang*, it was the *Reichsfeinde* who bore the blame and had to make the peace. It does not demand much effort of imagination to visualize what their fate would have been if that strategy had produced victory.

So if we are to count the cost of the Allied victory we also have to consider the possible consequences of defeat; the cost not only for Europe and indeed the world as a whole, but for Germany itself. The victories of 1866 and 1870 had not only united Germany, but militarized its culture. What would have been the effect of victory in 1918? How different would such a Germany have been from that which emerged twenty years later? And what likelihood is there that such a Germany could have long remained at peace with the British Empire? Those of the generation that won the war, at least in Britain, may have emerged weary and disillusioned, but they had no doubt that the war had to be fought, and that the victory was worthwhile. It is not for us to say that they were wrong. □

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Britain and the Intellectuals

In Thrall to the Bad Old Days

Ferdinand Mount

SOMETHING IS happening to Britain and the British. Or has happened. We are said to be passing through a transition, or a turning point, or even a transformation, nobody is quite sure which. Opinions in fact differ quite sharply as to what the "it" is that we are passing through.

Seasoned, even, dare I say, senior observers in the United States tend to identify what they see quite simply as decline. In the most obvious, palpable, undeniable sense, a decline in relative power must certainly play some part. This is not 1914, and Britain, though still one of the principal global trading powers and possessing the fourth- or fifth-largest economy in the world, is no longer Number 1. And it has to be admitted that a large part of what drew many foreign observers to this country was the thrill of reaching the center of affairs. For Norman Podhoretz, to visit or even to live in London was once to be in the modern Athens or Rome. Now, he tells us in a melancholy essay in *Commentary*—"The Last Time I Saw London" (January 2001)—that he no longer bothers to read British newspapers or keep up with the English literary world. To judge by the pop and rock stars and feminists whose images adorn the new wing of the National Portrait Gallery, he concludes, "the forces at work in the culture and politics of England in the second half of the 20th century had left a sorry—nay, tragic—wreckage behind."

Podhoretz summarizes the view of Britain held by Aleksa Djilas, a Belgrade commentator:

> The country's culture has declined; its sense of itself and its purpose have descended from the heights they formerly occupied; it has pulled down the curtain on the demonstration it once put on of what a tiny island could accomplish by adhering religiously to a moral code of duty, honor, work, and national responsibility; and it looks not with pride but with shame at the power it once had.

An accusation of cultural decline from the former Yugoslavia—things must really be bad.

Nor apparently does the UK look much better when viewed from outside the metropolis. In a recent "Letter from Wales" in this journal (Fall 2000), Owen Harries (Welsh by birth and upbringing, Australian and American by residence) declares that, "Until quite recently, it used to be the case that Britain was a decent, civilized country with very good public services but an absolutely lousy economy.

Ferdinand Mount is editor of the *Times Literary Supplement*. Parts of this essay were delivered as a lecture to the Harry Ransom Center at the University of Texas at Austin, and reprinted in the Center's series of Britannia lectures.

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Now it has changed to a country with a brilliant economy that is seriously and progressively sick in other respects." The country that was formerly a byword for lawfulness, civility and respect for property, he says, now leads the developed world in every crime except murder. Feckless habits have bred an underclass, the National Health Service is sadly decayed, the people are illiterate.

Such complaints are not limited to foreigners or expatriates. Homegrown laments, such as Peter Hitchens' *The Abolition of Britain: From Lady Chatterley's Lover to Tony Blair* (1999), and Roger Scruton's *England: An Elegy* (2000), also deplore the falling away in standards of civility, morality and manners. No longer do little old ladies cycle through the early morning mist to Holy Communion, as George Orwell (and following him John Major) had described when trying to catch the essence of England. These days, if little old ladies ventured forth at all, they would be scared stiff of being knocked off their bikes and assaulted by some drunken yobbo left over from the night before. And in any case, the church would probably have been closed down years ago.

Jeremiads of this sort come mostly from the Right. They differ from, and are a little difficult to reconcile with, the almost equally acerbic dismissal of Britain today that comes from another quarter—that of the leading generation of novelists now aged about fifty, notably Martin Amis, Ian McEwan and Salman Rushdie. As I argued in the *Times Literary Supplement* last year, this group, Leftish if anything, follows earlier British writers such as D.H. Lawrence and Lawrence Durrell in finding Britain unbearably stodgy and unexciting.[1] Peter Hitchens' brother Christopher, long resident in the United States, speaks for them in seeing "America as the great subject, the great canvass." Amis regards England as a backwater, "a little Switzerland"—though without its efficiency, if Owen Harries is to be believed.

NOW I SIMPLY find all these images of unrelieved decline to be unrecognizable. Leaving aside for a moment the revival of the British economy in the Blair-Thatcher years—which is quite a lot to leave aside—one still has to wonder why foreigners are flooding into Britain from all over Europe, Asia and Africa, why house prices are almost the highest in the world, why race relations are so much more relaxed than in America, why the arts—but I have no wish to engage in a counter-catalogue of things that are better done, or less badly done than elsewhere. There are, after all, plenty of genuine horror stories, and I have spent large parts of my life trying to draw attention to them. Marc Champion's picture in the *Wall Street Journal* of March 9 of decaying and understaffed British hospitals and schools is a perfectly accurate representation of what some of us have complained about for a quarter century and more.

But overall recent decline? No, I cannot see it, and I do not believe that any careful observer who set out to be objective would see it either. Let me simply quote here my old, much lamented friend, the satirist Auberon Waugh, not normally thought of as a Pollyanna, to put it mildly. Waugh introduced a 1994 collection of his columns, *The Way of the World*, with these words:

> There are many horrible things happening in the country, but by no means everything that happens is horrible. I would guess, in fact, that we are living in the happiest, most prosperous and carefree society in the history of Britain. Various conspiracies exist to pretend other-

[1] See my "Farewell to Pudding Island", *Times Literary Supplement*, April 28, 2000.

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wise, of which the most interesting comes from the displaced intelligentsia, ranting against the standards of the new mass entertainment culture in all its undeniable ugliness and nastiness, as it replaces the humane bourgeois liberal culture of the last 150 years.

What I find so bizarre is the claim that Britain is somehow a less interesting, less vivacious country than it used to be at some unspecified era in the twentieth century. On the contrary, when I travel today to Washington or New York, to Paris or Frankfurt or Rome, it is, to borrow Mrs. Patrick Campbell's phrase, like exchanging the hurly-burly of the *chaise longue* for the deep peace of the marriage bed. There is a sedateness, a formality, occasionally even a ponderousness which has all but disappeared from British life—also, in the United States at least, a religiosity that vanished over here after the Second World War, if not after the First. Well, so much the worse for Britain, you may say, though I have my doubts about non-believing conservatives who recommend religion as a civilizing medicine for other people while unwilling to swallow it themselves.

Podhoretz in his essay is kind about my own efforts and describes them as an "optimistic" sort of excursion. I do not exactly deny that, though I meant my conclusions perhaps to be more open-ended about the future, anti-declinist rather than dogmatically progressive.

To put it another way, I do not mean to be dogmatically cheerful about Britain's future, but I am dogmatic about Britain's past, by which I mean the thirty-odd years after the war. About that past I *am* pessimistic, if this is not too Irish or Yiddish a way of putting it (the primary dictionary definitions of both "optimist" and "pessimist" do not, in fact, refer specifically to the future but more generally to the view one takes of any set of circumstances). Perhaps there is an age element here. I guess I must be about ten years younger than Podhoretz and Harries, about ten years older than Martin Amis and the Hitchenses. For my age group, the years between 1945 and 1980 were the years that mattered—the years of our growing up and our twenties and thirties. And regardless of whether we were personally happy or not during that period, they are not years to look back on with much satisfaction, as far as our country goes. For our seniors, distanced perhaps by geography or other preoccupations, those years may have seemed much like a continuation of the Britain they had known and been fond of when young. They may have had no uncomfortable sensations of a nation sliding or hollowing out. Our juniors, for their part, grew up into a Britain that was already discontented with itself; they have known little but turmoil and reform. It was our generation, I think, that experienced the humiliations of going downhill most copiously and directly.

At the end of the Second World War, I was barely six years old. But curiously my recollections of those first years after the war seem to be exactly the same as those of adults of all classes and ages at the time: namely, an overwhelming sensation of exhaustion, poverty and restriction. Almost everyone seems to have felt like this, from the highest to the lowest. King George VI wrote to his brother, "I have been suffering from an awful reaction from the strain of the war, I suppose, and have felt very tired." Everyone was talking about shortages of everything—food, fuel, clothing. If you were in the government, you were talking about shortage of dollars. Our overseas investments had been snapped up by the Americans or dwindled into insignificance. We were bankrupt and we were down at heel. The then *Manchester Guardian* wrote in a survey of postwar London: "Shabbiness has descended deeply upon us."

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NOW, of course, these difficulties were trivial beside the suffering being endured on the Continent at the time. There, many cities were three-quarters in ruin, and there was a desperate shortage of basic commodities such as potatoes and flour. The atmosphere in Britain, if it could be remotely compared to anything in Germany, would be more like the genteel dispiritedness after the First World War described by Thomas Mann in *Disorder and Early Sorrow* than the more profound and threadbare exhaustion after the Second, chronicled so unforgettably by Heinrich Böll.

The ordeals of an exhausted victor do not make for a dramatic chronicle. Yet that exhaustion seeped in a quiet but remorseless way into our national spirit and was to continue to do damage to us for years to come. The nations of the Continent rebuilt their cities, their economies, their political institutions. They had to; there was no alternative.

We in Britain, by contrast, like the dispirited upper-class couple in Mann's novella, had a position to keep up. We had our war debts to repay, we had our overseas military responsibilities to discharge, our huge Empire first to administer and then bit by bit to dismantle. These tasks were formidable enough to demand all the energies of a vigorous and solvent nation. For a bankrupt and depleted people, they were a crushing burden.

So it was that my generation—Churchill's children—grew up knowing more about the intricacies of tribal disputes in Rhodesia or Nigeria than about the politics of Lancashire or Scotland. As for domestic reform—of the trade unions, of the City of London, of Parliament, of the all too hastily nationalized industries—it was the mark of the naive idealist or an encrusted reactionary to imagine that any such thing was possible. How serious in any case was the need to change? We had won the war, hadn't we? Those institutions we now lived under represented a kind of postwar settlement between the classes and the parties. We were not to tamper with them.

The travel restrictions of the postwar years also helped to conceal from us the dynamic process of rebuilding that was happening on the other side of the Channel. It was well into the 1950s before we woke up to the fact that, far from leading the economic recovery of the major European nations, we were beginning to wallow in their wake. Yet still nothing happened. We remained content to rest upon our now dusty laurels.

IN THE WINTER of 1962–63, by now in my mid-twenties, I was appointed assistant courier and general dogsbody to Selwyn Lloyd, until recently our Chancellor of the Exchequer. He had been sacked by Harold Macmillan in a desperate purge to regain popularity—the Night of the Long Knives, as it was called. To keep Selwyn quiet, he had been given, by way of consolation, the task of investigating the Conservative Party to find out what defects there might be in its political machine. Of course, the real defect at that time was the Prime Minister, but in politics party organization is always a convenient scapegoat.

For me the assignment was an unforgettable experience. We traveled the length and breadth of England and Wales. To a young man from the soft south of England who knew only the gentle undulations of Salisbury Plain and the antique serenity of Eton and Oxford, this odyssey was an education. In those narrow rain-swept valleys of Lancashire and Yorkshire, it seemed as though nothing much had happened since the first Industrial Revolution. We passed by miles of great sooty brick factories often with broken windows stuffed with rags, all

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apparently derelict. Yet you could sometimes still hear the hum of ancient machinery, and a dim light might be visible through the murky panes. The local Conservatives we met—Bradford wool merchants, Halifax fireworks manufacturers, South Wales steel men—seemed scarcely less antique, most of them well advanced into middle age, swathed in waistcoats and watch chains, robust and forthright, yet, I sensed, with an underlying feeling that the great days of their particular industries were over. As indeed, alas, in many cases they were. This odyssey was undertaken nearly twenty years after the war, but the sense of renewal was sadly absent.

Yet in the early 1960s the old businesses were at any rate mostly still in business, clinging onto their old markets, not yet wiped out by the new competition on the Continent, let alone in the Far East. By the time I undertook similar journeys in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the picture was far grimmer. The main railway line to the north now passed through great stretches of devastation—industrial wastelands with rows of roofless workshops (the roofs had been removed in order to avoid liability to local taxation). The strong pound sterling—a perverse consequence of the otherwise uncovenanted blessing of North Sea oil coming on stream at just about that time—was the immediate cause. But the long-term causes were the by now familiar ones: poor quality, late delivery, trade union restrictions, timid and defeatist management.

I emphasize here the physical sights, sounds and, indeed, smells of this decadence. The sensation of failure and national senility hung in the air. It was much the same as when one sees an elderly, much-loved relation, previously vigorous and sprightly, begin to lose it. At first one says, "Well, of course, at her age you must expect a little slowing down." You compliment her when she walks to the Post Office unaided, gently suggest that in fact she might take a little more regular exercise, progressively make greater allowances for her so that her decline becomes less painful, less perceptible to the outsider. You are reluctant to admit the truth to yourself. You are even more reluctant to admit it to outsiders.

AND SO it was with Britain and the outside world. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, our politicians made absurd efforts to minimize our decline and to exaggerate our present power and future potential. Harold Macmillan declared that Britain's role was now to play Greece to America's Rome. Harold Wilson asserted that Britain's frontier still lay on the Himalayas. Almost everyone who wanted Britain to join the Common Market prophesied that Britain's destiny was to "lead Europe." Those few observers who, often in the kindest possible way, attempted to nudge us toward some understanding of the realities were treated as mischievous troublemakers; Dean Acheson, for example, who was only stating the obvious when he argued that Britain had lost an empire and had not yet found a role, or Sir Nicholas Henderson, in his farewell dispatch as ambassador from Paris, which attempted to describe Britain as others saw her.

To most of us in our twenties, the pretensions of our leaders already seemed antiquated and fatuous. At the time, the productions of the young rebels—the plays of John Osborne, the novels of Kingsley Amis, the re-birth of British satire in print and on the screen—were more often analyzed as the rude intrusion of the "new classes" who had been emancipated from deference by state education. And so in part it was, but one scarcely needs to point out that many of the brightest sparks, from Amis to Peter

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Cook, were educated at leading public schools and Oxford or Cambridge. What they were also mocking was outmoded *national* pretension and the escapist rhetoric of the political elites. Take the most potent images of the time: the mockery of the Suez operation in Osborne's *The Entertainer*, or Peter Cook's immortal sketch of Harold Macmillan fumbling with a globe. The imperial game was up, and even those of us who called ourselves conservatives—and not very deep down many of the satirists were conservatives, if only with a small "c"—thought that our masters were living in a time warp.

What was clear—or is clear to me now, though it was not then—is that willingness to consider change is often considered as *ipso facto* defeatist. It was taken for granted that anyone who had real confidence in Britain ought to resist change stoutly. Take "going into Europe"—that extraordinary phrase, as though the British Isles had till then constituted a continent in itself. The proposal to join the European Economic Community was often presented, even by its supporters, as a second-best option, a *pis-aller*, made necessary by Britain's reduced standing in the world.

At first, of course, we had pretended that the project was a fanciful dream. For the crucial initial negotiations at Messina, Her Majesty's Government found itself able to spare only a not very high-ranking official from the Board of Trade, an undersecretary named Russell Bretherton, who sat and smoked his pipe, puffing indulgent clouds of smoke into the Sicilian air while those excitable foreigners spun their absurd fantasies of ever greater union. We might have come down in the world, but we had not come as far down as that. We were, in short, stuck with an imperial mindset, dating, I suppose, from the late nineteenth century, the days when Goschen, a British Chancellor of the Exchequer—who was, oddly enough, himself of German extraction—could speak fondly but quite unhistorically of our tradition of "glorious isolation."

Our earlier entanglements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries began to be quite forgotten. That legendary headline—*Fog in Channel, Continent cut off*—became increasingly close to reality. We knew a good deal about American life, literature and politics, just as we knew a good deal about Africa, but about what was going on in France, Germany and Italy, despite the supposed miracles of modern communications, we knew less than we had for centuries. Even in the Middle Ages, those few people who were educated knew more of French and German art, literature, scholarship, theology and politics. At best, the average Englishman could name three or four German footballers and several varieties of sausage.

In literature and the arts, this process intensified, rather than the reverse, after Britain joined the European Community in 1973. When I first came to live in London in the 1960s, some people still thought it their duty to keep up with what was going on in the Left Bank in Paris. Sartre and Camus, Moravia and Silone, Brecht and Mann were acknowledged leaders of a shared culture. Peter Daubeny's wonderful theater seasons at the Aldwych brought companies from almost every city in Europe—from Madrid to Moscow. I saw my first Lorca, I saw *Hamlet* in Russian, and a good deal of Schlegel Shakespeare. But this sense of a European culture opening out to us if anything faded rather than blossomed, and a nervous, tetchy insecurity took hold.

THUS, IT SEEMED to me, we began to get the worst of both worlds. We lacked the self-confidence to modernize our own institutions, and when we joined the Community, we were indeed damaged by the worst aspects of its regulation: a

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Common Agriculture Policy quite unsuited to our needs, excessive harmonization where what we needed was diversity, and finicky regulation when we had not yet got rid of all the burdensome regulations dating back to the controlled economy of the war years.

And even well into the 1970s and later, the tangible legacy of those war years was with us still. Our parks and squares were still enclosed with the brutalist wire netting that had replaced the elegant Regency and Victorian railings taken away to be melted down for the war effort. London streets still had gaping bomb sites, with ragwort and buddleia bushes turning them into strange mini-paradises of wildlife. A whole stretch of the capital along the river, from the Tower of London down to the Essex mudflats, remained derelict, the largest urban wasteland in Europe, perhaps in the world.

This sensation of unfinished business remaining from the Second World War was, I think, re-inforced for us by our continued commitment to European security. That such a great part of our forces was still part of the British Army of the Rhine froze our mindset. Indeed, it was possible to sit listening on a Sunday morning to the radio program *Family Favourites* broadcasting old-fashioned numbers sung, say, by Vera Lynn and dedicated by their loved ones to soldiers serving in Paderborn or Bremen, to feel that nothing much had changed in the world since the 1940s.

Certainly little or nothing seemed to have changed at home. Edward Heath repeated Harold Wilson's efforts to tackle the trade unions, with no more success. Another attempt was made to reform the House of Lords—removing the hereditary element in order to restore its authority as a revising chamber. Reformers, including quite a few hereditary peers, had been agitating for this since the end of the nineteenth century, but every time the project was blocked, this time by a not uncharacteristic alliance of the romantic republicans led by Michael Foot and the romantic reactionaries led by Enoch Powell.

It is not as if the House of Commons appeared capable of replenishing the deficiencies of the House of Lords. On the contrary, if anything its procedures were more ossified still. Perhaps the most absurd example was the virtual refusal of the Procedure Committee to adjust the working practices of the House to accommodate the timetable of European legislation, so that for nearly two decades MPs could only feebly bleat as they were shepherded through the lobbies to vote into law a succession of *faits accomplis*. Meanwhile, in Brussels we took up a negotiating position permanently composed in equal parts of incompetence, suspicion and sloth, regardless of whether there was a Labour or a Conservative government in London. It was by now painfully clear that those suspicions were the consequence of our lack of self-confidence in dealing with the modern world.

THEN came 1979. I do not hero-worship Margaret Thatcher. For one thing, as Montaigne first observed, no man and no woman too is a hero to his or her valet, and I was her political valet for a couple of years. She could be petty, vindictive, obtuse. Like almost all successful politicians, she never shrank from repeating herself. And she was a stranger to irony.

Yet far outweighing these minor weaknesses, she radiated a sense of possibility. She always believed that something could be done. And she was determined to see that it was done, if necessary—in fact, preferably—by herself alone if nobody else could be bothered to see it through to the end. Above all else, she possessed a glorious tenacity. And this can-do attitude, as the Americans call it, is

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perhaps her greatest legacy to us, a legacy that has lasted through the prime ministerships of her two successors and may have some life left in it yet.

It is not my purpose here to rehearse the social, political and economic changes in Britain over the past twenty years. But it does seem bizarre that so many of the intelligentsia should appear reluctant to take account of them. What can be the explanation—or perhaps explanations? I would hesitantly suggest here two lines of thought that may not have much to do with each other, except that, in a peculiar way, they both happen to apply to Britain.

The first is that, whatever they may say, intellectuals are no less vulnerable than "ordinary people" to the seductions of domination; perhaps they are more vulnerable. (I use "domination" rather than "power" in order to be more precise than I was at the beginning of this essay.) Intellectuals want to be the fleas on the top dog. Intermediate centers of power, however real and effective, are too boring to detain their attention. What intellectual has, for example, spent much time contemplating the splendors of English local government even in its heyday? (By intellectuals, I mean generally educated persons who like to take a stand in public affairs; I do not refer to professional historians or political scientists who may range quite impartially over any field, however dim and unglamorous.)

Thus Britain began to lose the attention of geo-intellectuals as soon as it began to shed its remaining pretensions to being one of the superpowers. Loss of Empire equals loss of interest, even for anti-imperialists. To be just out of the bronze medal position is to be an also ran—hence "another Switzerland."

That much may be obvious to the more thoughtful intellectuals, those who have some inkling of the herd instinct that drives their kind and of the miasma of power snobbery, a disease that moves through the air quicker than the foot-and-mouth virus. But perhaps they may be less aware of the potent conjunction of power and *shabbiness*. This may seem a peculiar quality to invoke. The simplest way to explain what I mean is to refer the puzzled reader to the works of Graham Greene and John le Carré, in which seedy surroundings and squalid behavior achieve a seductive resonance by being backed by power of a huge and sinister intensity. Behind the grimy façades of postwar London, beneath the lugubrious manners and fusty clothes of her inhabitants, there still lurked an imperial power—on the wane certainly, but still capable of acting in a heroic, underhand or brutal fashion to achieve its ends.

Now the buildings are more or less clean, the inhabitants wear designer clothes, and the country is a magnet for inward investment. But for Realpolitikers of the old school the glamour is departed. Of course, the National Health Service is short of money and the state schools are second-rate, but these services were far more dilapidated twenty or thirty years ago and foreign observers then took no notice, because declinism, whether directed toward one's own country or to other people's, is a notoriously erratic pastime (it would be absurd to call it a science). It was, after all, not so long ago that every wide awake publisher in the United States had a hot book on the stocks about how America was losing out to Japan on every technological frontier you could think of. Nor would it be smart to resort instead to a contrarian philosophy. You cannot rely even on futurologists to be wrong all the time.

I would only ask observers to report what they see rather than what fits their fancy. But then that is always a lot to ask. □

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Potemkin Democracy

Four Myths about Post-Soviet Georgia

Charles King

IT IS AN old culture squeezed into a tiny new state. That is the way visitors to post-Soviet Georgia often describe the place. Resting on the southern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains, hemmed in by the Black Sea, Turkey and its south Caucasus neighbors, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia became independent with the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the roots of Georgia's history wind back for millennia. As ancient Colchis, Georgia was the endpoint of Jason's epic quest for the golden fleece and the homeland of Medea. Its alphabet has been around since perhaps the fifth century A.D. As a country of mainly Orthodox Christians, Georgia has long been linked with the magnificent art and culture of eastern Christianity, from Byzantium to Moscow. Beyond that, the country's natural beauty, from the Black Sea coastline to the magnificent churches nestled in lush mountains, and the blend of European and Near Eastern influences in its music, cuisine and architecture have all made it an attractive spot for American and European expatriates.

Partly for these reasons, there are few countries in the former Soviet Union that get better press than Georgia. On a per capita basis, it is one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid in the world—since 1992 over $850 million for a population of five million. It is headed by an internationally acclaimed statesman, President Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet foreign minister who was a key player in the peaceful reunification of Germany. It has a cabinet and governing party, the Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG), peppered with urbane, thirtysomething, English-speaking politicians, several of whom hold degrees from Columbia, Georgetown and other prestigious American universities. In its 2000 Human Development report, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) praised Georgia's success:

> Of the former Soviet republics, Georgia has been one of the leading countries in providing its population with access to human rights. Georgia is to be given recognition for its achievements in the democratization process of the political, social, and economic aspects of its development. The country's commitment to a free press and respect of political rights have been remarkable in a region of the world not yet known for ensuring respect of such rights to their full extent.[1]

The picture on the ground, however, is sorely at odds with such assessments.

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[1] *Human Development Report: Georgia, 2000* (Tbilisi: UNDP, 2000), p. 4.

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Indeed, whether because of Georgia's importance to Western strategic interests in the south Caucasus or because of the Georgian government's talent in public relations, the United States and international organizations continue to cast the country's corrupt economy, its bloated state apparatus and its increasingly authoritarian politics in the best possible light.

During the 1999 parliamentary elections and the 2000 presidential election in which Shevardnadze won another five-year term as president, observers reported multiple irregularities. Recent reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have chronicled a host of abuses, including extrajudicial killing, police torture and state-condoned violence against religious minorities. All of this, moreover, seems to have increased since Georgia's admission to the Council of Europe in April 1999. The economy has continued to slide downward, and the government is unable even to ensure electricity and water supplies to the capital, Tbilisi, much less pay state pensions and salaries. Illegal commerce pouring through the many areas of the state outside Tbilisi's control—the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the autonomous republic of Achara—have deepened the culture of impunity that has placed Georgia among the world's most corrupt countries.

Georgia is not, of course, the worst of the lot in the former Soviet Union. For all its problems, it is not a raw autocracy. There is no cult of personality (although Shevardnadze does loom far larger in public life than presidents such as Vladimir Putin in Russia and Leonid Kuchma in Ukraine). Unlike President Heidar Aliev of neighboring Azerbaijan, Shevardnadze has not made his son heir-apparent to the presidency. Still, comparing Georgia favorably to the most authoritarian of its immediate neighbors obscures the extreme distance between the country and even the average, mostly illiberal democracies that have arisen across Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Whether consciously complicit in the misrepresentation of the realities of local politics or not, the international community is perpetuating four myths about Georgia—and, in the process, selling out its citizens to a government whose commitment to multiparty democracy, human rights and clean governance is, to put it mildly, highly questionable.

The Myth of Shevardnadze

WHEN Eduard Shevardnadze came to Georgia in the early 1990s, the country was in the middle of a separatist war, on the brink of another, and under the control of a military junta. The policies of the previous president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, had not only alienated the country's substantial ethnic minorities but had led to the virtual disintegration of the state. Abkhazia, the region in the northwest that had enjoyed autonomous status during the Soviet period, opposed Gamsakhurdia's reforms and refused to participate in elections for new central institutions. In the north-central part of the country, another dispute surrounded the status of South Ossetia. The Ossetians, an ethnic group split between Georgia and the Republic of North Ossetia inside Russia, had declared an independent state already in 1990. In the middle of all this, the Gamsakhurdia administration collapsed. Many Georgians had grown increasingly dissatisfied with Gamsakhurdia's authoritarian behavior and his inability to quell the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A coup, engineered by members of the Georgian military, overthrew him in January 1992.

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Into this failed state stepped Shevardnadze. Having served as Communist Party first secretary in Soviet Georgia through the 1970s and early 1980s, Shevardnadze already had a strong network among former party officials and administrative personnel, and he was respected in both Moscow and Western capitals for his sober hand in guiding Soviet foreign policy during the federation's collapse in 1990–91. He seemed the ideal candidate to haul his native republic, now an independent state, back from the abyss.

His early efforts, though, were an abysmal failure. Under his leadership, the Georgian army launched an assault on both South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the first half of 1992. With the assistance of Soviet, and later Russian, forces stationed in the separatist zones, the regional administrations managed to rout Shevardnadze's troops. In the process, over 250,000 ethnic Georgian refugees from Abkhazia—about half the region's total population—were driven across the Inguri River into Georgia proper, another 10,000 Georgians fled from South Ossetia, and some 80,000 Ossetians moved north to Russia. Throughout 1992 and 1993, "Zviadist" guerrillas loyal to former President Gamsakhurdia continued to attack military and police forces in western Georgia. So uncertain was Georgia's future that it was not until July 1992 that the country became the last Soviet successor state to join the United Nations.

These defeats sobered Shevardnadze and demonstrated the need for a solid political base on which to consolidate his rule. That came in the form of the Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG), formed in 1993. Like similar "presidential parties" in other parts of the former Soviet Union, the CUG was driven less by ties of ideology and class than by loyalty to Shevardnadze and a desire of local elites to secure their political and economic

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positions amid the turmoil of civil war and state collapse. Shevardnadze was able to rebuild the web of relationships among district-level administrative personnel, factory managers and former party bosses whom he had known before his departure for Moscow. The CUG also attracted a small group of younger, generally reform-minded leaders from the civic organizations that had sprung up in the waning days of Soviet power.

It is undeniable that Shevardnadze's return to Georgia helped save the country from even greater tragedy, perhaps even complete disintegration. The new president managed to corral many of the paramilitary groups that once roamed the country and eventually to defeat the major Zviadist formations. With the exception of a flare-up in violence in 1998, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been quiet, if for no other reason than that the separatists won their wars and have now turned to the task of building independent—but unrecognized—states. But the absence of open warfare has not produced the growth of a genuinely stable, multiparty and free state. Indeed, in recent years both Shevardnadze and the CUG have seemed less the bearers of democracy than brakes on further progress toward it.

Shevardnadze remains the single most important player in Georgian politics. Under the country's strongly presidential system, he is the ultimate decisionmaker both within the state and within the CUG; even the few political figures who have broken with the ruling party have remained staunchly loyal to the president. His leadership style, however, has been characterized by an effort to balance competing interests to ensure that no single group is able to challenge his authority as head of state, head of government and head of the ruling party. He has at times seemed a strong supporter of Zurab Zhvania, the young chairman of parliament and the most powerful genuine democrat on the Georgian scene. However, Shevardnadze has also cut deals with the country's least reformist figure, Aslan Abashidze, the potentate of the Autonomous Republic of Achara in the southwest. In exchange for Shevardnadze's recognizing his iron rule in Achara, Abashidze guaranteed a high voter turnout in his republic and aided Shevardnadze's victory in the first round of the 2000 presidential race.

Shevardnadze's party has become a mechanism for capturing the state rather than transforming it. The CUG's underlying structure is composed of a system of administrative cadres, factory bosses and security officials who ran Georgia under Shevardnadze in the 1970s. They have transformed themselves into a new class of entrepreneurs in Georgia's largely dysfunctional economy, benefiting from the opportunities to take over state enterprises under the country's Byzantine privatization program. There is little evidence that Shevardnadze has sought to transform the party he controls, precisely because he has created a state in which the ruling party and the administrative system are largely fused—a style of politics borrowed from the Soviet period. All of that may produce some semblance of stability in the short term, especially in a state still threatened by territorial separatism and a hot war in Chechnya on its northern border. But it hardly makes Shevardnadze a committed democratic leader.

The Myth of the "Young Reformers"

NO ANALYST of Georgian politics denies that the CUG is still in large part a tool of Soviet-era elites whose main interest is the protection of their own positions in the country's economy. But, it is often said, at least there is a reform-oriented

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wing within the CUG, a collection of younger parliamentarians and government ministers allied with the parliamentary chairman, Zhvania. Since these CUG members come from a very different background than their older colleagues—from pro-democracy civic groups—they stand a real chance of reforming the ruling party from within. And given the fact that Shevardnadze is now in his constitutionally-mandated final term as president, it is claimed that this "young reformer" wing will be the group to watch in Georgia's post-Shevardnadze era. The reality, however, is more complicated.

Talk of the young reformers goes back to the very beginnings of the CUG. The party leadership, and Shevardnadze in particular, were very astute about promoting younger party members to public positions, especially those offices best sited for contact with Western governments and international financial institutions. In the last year, several of these members have been placed in high-profile ministerial posts. By autumn 2000 the parliamentary speakership, the CUG faction leadership, the parliament's defense committee, and the ministries of justice, tax, finance, economics and agriculture had all come under the control of a younger, partially Western-educated elite.

These personnel changes are significant. Never before have so many members of the CUG's new generation held governmental portfolios. Still, they do not signal the sea change in Georgian politics that observers have been expecting for nearly a decade. As has often been the case in Georgia under Shevardnadze, there are several reasons for suspecting that the very idea of a "young reformer" circle is more the result of wishful thinking by the international community than a portent of clean and responsive governance.

In the first place, younger CUG activists, although in more visible positions than before, still control ministries that are largely irrelevant in the real world of Georgian politics. The ministries with genuine influence remain firmly in the hands of Soviet-era cadres, all in their late forties and fifties. Foreign Minister Irakli Menagharishvili was a former leader of the Georgian communist youth organization, chair of a district party committee, and minister of health in Soviet Georgia before becoming foreign minister in 1995. Minister of Internal Affairs Kakha Targamadze—arguably the most powerful person in Georgia after Shevardnadze—is likewise a product of the Soviet era who has refused to launch thoroughgoing reforms in his institution. The minister of state security spent his early career in the Soviet security services. The minister of state property served in the Soviet ministry of foreign trade, including at the Soviet trade mission in Iraq. A real sign of change would be to see a young reformer appointed to one of these positions. Until then, it is this older, Soviet-era elite that will control both the government and the internal machinery of the CUG.

Another reason for skepticism is that the young reformers are in no real sense a unified group. They are united by little more than age, and there are plenty of other young party activists whose reform credentials are uncertain at best. Their positions in government are likely to highlight their differences on key policy issues. Indeed, the only thing that seems to bind them at the moment is their loyalty to the CUG as the leading force in Georgian politics and the vehicle of their own political ascendancy. Unwavering loyalty to a party that has led the country deeper into corruption, and has been behind several flawed elections, hardly seems a sign of a clear reform orientation.

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The Myth of Progress

PROGRESS in democratization is notoriously difficult to measure, as is the impact that foreign assistance might have on the process. Those who design, administer and monitor democracy assistance programs rightly stress that a country's overall trajectory, not the short-term ups and downs of its reform effort, is the proper measure of how well it is performing. In these terms, Georgia has drifted backward in recent years, not inched forward, in the critical areas of democratization, human rights and administrative reform.

Since independence Georgia has had three parliamentary elections, three presidential races and one set of local elections—most of them during Shevardnadze's tenure. None, however, has fully met international standards, and the elections got worse throughout the 1990s. Parliamentary elections in 1995 and 1999 produced an assembly overwhelmingly controlled by the CUG, and presidential elections in 1995 and 2000 led to sweeping victories for Shevardnadze. In all of the elections, observers openly condemned CUG manipulations. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) primly noted in its report on the 1999 elections that they "failed to fully meet all commitments", especially since the "election law allowed the ruling party to enjoy a dominant position in the election administration at all levels." Non-governmental observers were less guarded. The International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), the country's highly respected local monitoring organization, reported widespread stuffing of ballot boxes, intimidation of voters by police and violence against independent observers.

Both local and international observers were unanimous in their assessment of Shevardnadze's 79.8 percent victory in the 2000 presidential race. As ISFED noted in its election report, "The biased interference of local officials and law enforcement representatives in the election process, as well as their criminal inaction, were outrageous. These facts demonstrate that the rights of presidential candidates and thousands of voters were severely violated." The victory even gave rise to a popular joke: Shevardnadze's chief adviser greets him the morning after the election with good news and bad news. "The good news is that you won the election", he reports. "The bad news is that no one voted for you."

In practical terms, Georgia's multiparty system remains to a great degree a notional one. Under the current electoral law, central and regional electoral commissions have most of their members appointed by state institutions—and are therefore guaranteed a majority of CUG supporters. Moreover, complaints about the conduct of the elections are processed not through the courts but by the electoral commission itself, an exemplary case of the fox guarding the hen house.

There are, of course, other parties represented in parliament. The most powerful of these is the Revival Union, a political formation that could not exist in its present strength without the willingness of the strongman of the Achara republic, Aslan Abashidze, to deliver votes in openly fraudulent elections in the districts he controls. There are opposition currents besides Revival, but these mostly exist within the ranks of the CUG rather than in the weak and poorly organized opposition parties. Machinations within the ruling party are far more significant to everyday politics than any potential challenges from outside, and representatives of foreign NGOs report that, especially in the countryside, there is little sense among CUG activists that a genuine multiparty system is even desirable. At the moment, Georgia

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does have a relatively stable political system, at least at the center, but that stability is based on a hardening of the CUG's corporatist authoritarianism. That may be better than the perpetual presidencies and quasi-monarchical rule of chief executives farther to the east, in Central Asia, but it is a far cry from the standards to which other post-communist states to Georgia's west are normally held.

A similar situation prevails with regard to human rights. Georgia joined the Council of Europe in April 1999, only the fourth country in the Commonwealth of Independent States to be admitted to Europe's human rights and democracy body. In the lead up to the Council's vote on accession, Georgia adopted a number of reforms designed to bring the country in line with European standards, particularly in the area of human rights and judicial procedure. Since then, however, not only has Georgia failed to comply with the Council's mandated reforms, but some of the legislation adopted before it became a member has been reversed or watered down.

Thus, in February 1998, for example, Shevardnadze signed a new criminal code that strengthened the power of the defense counsel, re-inforced the right of individuals to seek redress in cases of alleged abuse, and reduced the legal value of defendant confessions as a way of diminishing the opportunities for police torture. But in the summer of 1999, shortly after admission to the Council, amendments to the criminal code were adopted that virtually destroyed any progress that the original reforms might have made. Local and international human rights groups continue to report frequent police beatings (both inside and outside police stations), death threats to journalists coming from state officials, and the use of electric shock torture against detainees.[2]

Consider also local government reform, an area of particular interest to the Council of Europe. Pressured by Strasbourg, the Georgian parliament adopted a package of new laws in 1997. A system of local councils with directly elected members was established in each of the country's districts. So far, however, the ability of the councils to influence policy has been negligible. The real power in Georgia's regions rests with the district governors and prefects—both appointed by the president. The overhaul has had little real impact on local administration; if anything, it seems to have diminished it further, at least in the eyes of average Georgians. According to the UNDP's 1999 Human Development Report, in 1996, 42 percent of Georgians expressed high or moderate confidence in local government institutions; by 1998 the figure had fallen to 25 percent. The truth is that the country remains highly centralized in terms of both political authority and budgetary control, with the mass of the country's citizens having no power to effect change.

MANY FOREIGN governments, and especially the United States, are concerned to present a different picture. So eager have U.S. agencies been to give a positive spin to Georgian developments that inaccurate facts have been inflated into evidence of major progress. In May 2000, for example, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) launched a call for proposals to administer a $5.82 million program in the area of local government reform, a solicitation eventually won by the Washington-based

[2]Surveys of recent developments include *Georgia: Backtracking on Reform* (New York: Human Rights Watch, October 2000); *Amnesty International Report 2000* (London: Amnesty International, 2000); and *Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Europe and Central Asia Division* (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2000).

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Urban Institute. In the background information for prospective contractors, the agency asserted that the Georgian government had worked hard to reshape local government and that the country was entering a critical stage in which foreign expertise would be necessary to round off the reform effort. As the solicitation explained,

> USAID, in cooperation with the U.S. Treasury, has . . . supported the development of a package of eight draft laws related to fiscal decentralization (local budget, municipal finance, local audit, equalization formula for transfers, etc.). The newly elected Parliament will be debating these bills in 2000.[3]

Yet not only were the "eight draft laws" never debated in parliament in 2000, but it is questionable whether they really existed at all.[4]

The Georgian government has also been active in placing obstacles in the way of the few individuals who are genuinely committed to serious reform. In May 2000, when the Rustavi 2 television station broadcast a series of reports on abuses within the prosecutor's office, the prosecutor launched an investigation against the program's producer. A major anti-corruption commission, staffed by seven prominent government officials and intellectuals (and financed by the U.S. Department of Justice), was set up in September 2000. But since the commission reports directly to Shevardnadze, its draft recommendations were only made public after the international community began to put pressure on the president.

Notwithstanding its origins, there is a great deal of excitement about this new commission, with everyone from the U.S. government to George Soros getting behind the effort. Still, some of those intimately involved with the commission's work, both Georgians and Americans, are skeptical that anything but the most anodyne recommendations will ever be fully implemented.[5] In November 2000, when Mikheil Saakashvili, the new justice minister, suggested launching a full-scale crackdown within his ministry, Shevardnadze publicly rebuked him for the potential "negative consequences" of his zeal.

Of course, this is not to say that no progress has been made. After all, Georgia under Shevardnadze is not involved in a full-scale war, either internally or with its neighbors; there have been elections, although fraudulent ones; human rights are guaranteed by law, even though the police and chief prosecutor have been known to harass journalists and torture prisoners; and the government has admitted that corruption exists and should be rooted out. All of this may be progress of a sort, but not the kind that warrants the enthusiastic accolades Georgia typically receives.

The Myth of "Georgia"

LIKE ALL its neighbors from the south Balkans to the south Caucasus to Central Asia, Georgia is a chronically weak state. In a region of only minimally successful countries, however, the Georgian case is particularly dire, even compared to its immediate neighbors, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Indeed, it is worth asking whether a state called "Georgia" even exists today in any meaningful sense.

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[3]"Georgia: Local Governance Reform Initiative, Statement of Work" (Washington, DC: USAID, May 17, 2000), p. 2.

[4]Three confidential interviews by author with American NGO representatives, Tbilisi, October 24, 25 and 29, 2000.

[5]Confidential interviews by author with member of the anti-corruption commission and with senior U.S. government official, Tbilisi, October 11 and 24, 2000.

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Some 20 percent of the country's territory is either wholly outside the control of the recognized government or is only tenuously connected to it. After winning secessionist wars in the early 1990s, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are *de facto* independent states with their own armies, customs posts, flags, currencies (the Russian ruble) and school systems. Neither considers itself to be in the same time zone as the rest of Georgia; because of their strong political connections with Russia, locals set their clocks on Moscow time, an hour behind Tbilisi's. Travel between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital, is relatively easy, if one can push through the crowds of smugglers selling contraband petroleum products, wheat flour and cigarettes imported from the Russian Federation. Traveling in Abkhazia, however, is still dangerous, so much so that the U.S. government now forbids its two soldiers working with the United Nations mission in Georgia to go anywhere near the security zone separating Georgian and Abkhaz forces.

Achara, while still officially committed to existence inside a unified Georgia, has little real connection to the center. The region's population is linguistically Georgian, although many inhabitants are Muslim rather than Orthodox Christian. The region does send deputies to the parliament in Tbilisi but, in practical terms, Achara is controlled by one man, Abashidze. He and his extended family have enriched themselves by controlling the border trade with Turkey, where illegal commerce in hazelnuts, cigarettes, alcohol and women is rife. So profitable has Abashidze's fiefdom become that it even attracted the attention of Hillary Clinton's brothers, Hugh and Tony Rodham, who signed a hazelnut export deal with Abashidze in 1999, before being dissuaded from going through with it by the Clinton administration.

In Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Achara, state structures exist that are, more or less, independent of the Georgian center. But plenty of other regions of Georgia are only theoretically part of a single state. The country's main north-south artery, the Georgian Military Highway, is no more than a wagon trail for much of its length, becoming impassable in the winter snows and the spring thaw. For most Georgians outside Tbilisi and a few other urban centers, the only interaction with the Georgian state is through a corrupt traffic policeman, waving down cars loaded with produce to extort a few *lari* in "fines." So accustomed have average Georgians become to the predatory state that they either voluntarily pull over and drop a few bills in the police coffer or speed past the roadblock, hoping that the officers will think that only someone too important to be swindled would dare rush through without stopping. In Georgia, flouting the law has become a hedge against being cheated by it.

No observers deny that Georgia's economic and social situation is dire. One need only spend a night in Tbilisi—and venture anywhere outside the Sheraton hotel—to experience the frequent electricity cuts. Strangely, though, the progressive pauperization of Georgian society is usually seen as a phenomenon somehow outside the control of the government, as if the poverty, corruption and lawlessness that confront average Georgian citizens were separable from the policies pursued by the CUG government. But to local journalists and analysts, the links between Georgia's weak state and the interests of its rulers are readily apparent.

Under Shevardnadze, Georgia has seen a marked expansion in banditry, kidnapping and extortion, yet the police and security organs remain largely unreformed. Indeed, as average Georgians and Western expatriates alike report, state

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officials are themselves often complicit in the crimes they are meant to police. Stories are legion about police officers who mysteriously seem to know their way around an apartment when they are called to investigate a break-in. Meanwhile, the Interior Ministry has superseded the Defense Ministry as the real locus of organized violence. In budgetary terms, the army is largely an irrelevant institution; its allocations, which accounted for only 9 percent of the total state budget in 1997, stood at under 3 percent in 2000. The security services, however, have maintained their level of state support at 7–8 percent throughout this period, and remain under the control of a Soviet-era minister. Furthermore, the "other goods and services" line in the ministry's budget each year covers a host of administrative sins, including the purchase in 1998 of a fleet of expensive foreign cars bearing police license plates.[6]

There is also plenty of anecdotal evidence to suggest that state budget expenditures are only a fraction of the amount of money coming into government institutions and the pockets of their employees. Even during the Soviet years, for example, the highway police was essentially a tax farming organization. Its employees paid exorbitant bribes to secure positions—the better the post, such as on a road leading to a vacation spot where people were likely to carry money, the higher the cost—and then spent the rest of their careers paying off their investment by extorting money from travelers. The same system operates today, as a drive on any Georgian highway will confirm.

The tax inspectorate has provided a similar source of graft. When examinations were held for a new intake of inspectors, thousands applied. The government lauded this response as a sign of citizens' faith in the newly reformed inspectorate, but average applicants knew better—a tax inspector's job was a sure ticket to prosperity. If anything, opportunities for state-sponsored dishonesty have probably expanded under Shevardnadze. From 1995 to 1999, at a time when international financial institutions were pressuring Georgia to cut government employees (and therefore shrink opportunities for theft), the number of employees in central government institutions increased—compared to a precipitous drop in the number of education and health care professionals.

There is an even more insidious way in which the government has worked against effective governance: the roaring illegal trade between Georgians and their erstwhile enemies in the separatist republics. Cooperation between belligerents in civil wars is not uncommon, but in Georgia such cooperation has further weakened the state while enriching those who claim to be looking after its interests. South Ossetia has become a conduit through which millions of dollars in untaxed products flow from the Russian Federation, especially cigarettes, alcohol and petrol, which are then resold on the Georgian market. The situation benefits both sides. The South Ossetian government receives money from resale and haphazardly applied "transit taxes", while Georgian authorities, especially those in the Interior Ministry, are able to take a cut by exacting fines from truck drivers on the outskirts of Tbilisi.

The same formulas apply even in Abkhazia, where the animosity between the belligerent sides is far higher than in South Ossetia. Local government officials in Georgia and their counterparts in Abkhazia regularly trade in the same items as in South Ossetia; hazelnuts and scrap metal from Abkhazia's dysfunctional factories are also part of the transborder

[6] *Human Development Report: Georgia, 1999* (Tbilisi: UNDP, 1999), p. 39.

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commerce. The scrap metal business, in particular, has been terribly disruptive in both Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. Part of Georgia's problems with electricity supply have come from gangs stealing electrical cable for resale abroad—or even back to state authorities.

None of this commerce could exist without the complicity of government authorities. The weak state is not something that has somehow simply happened to Georgia; weakness is in the interests of those who now govern Georgian territory. It is no wonder, then, that average Georgians express skepticism about their own state institutions: According to the 2000 Georgian Lifestyle Survey, two-thirds report having no faith in parliament or the president, and some 80 percent have no faith in tax and customs officials.

"IT IS a magical place, Georgia", wrote John Steinbeck during a visit in the late 1940s, "and it becomes dream-like the moment you have left it." Something similar might be said today about the country's flirtation with democracy. Even by the imperfect standards of Eurasia's struggling democracies, Georgia is solidly in the laggard class. Other countries, such as Russia and Ukraine, have developed genuine multiparty systems. Some have managed to forge coalition governments. A good many—Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, not to mention the Baltic states—have changed their chief executives in a popular election. By contrast, Georgia under Shevardnadze has become a pluralist but not a democratic system within a state whose existence is precarious at best, and whose trajectory in democratization, government reform and observance of basic human rights has been largely negative.

As suggested above, however, all of that is at odds with the general picture of Georgia abroad. Whether out of a sense of obligation to Shevardnadze for his role in ending the Cold War or from a belief that American national interests are served by Georgia's pro-Western foreign policy, there is a focus on Georgia that is wildly disproportionate to its size and current level of democratic development. The scope of U.S. assistance is huge: in fiscal year 2001, a proposed $16 million to support the growth of private enterprise, $7.5 million for energy sector reform, $2 million for legal reform, $6.5 million for local government, $11 million for humanitarian assistance, and another $39 million for special programs carried out by the departments of Commerce, Treasury and Justice. On a per capita basis, U.S. involvement is even more striking. Last year, USAID spent $200 per person in Georgia—compared with $1.25 in Russia. Some local journalists even worry that the vast amounts of development aid available to Georgia may actually discourage real reform. With so much money to spend, Georgian officials have an incentive to launch new, allegedly reformist programs and projects, but little reason to make sure that their work has a genuinely transformative effect on local politics—for then the aid money would not be renewed.

Since the United States has earmarked a great deal of money for development and democracy-building programs—in per capita terms, more than is available to any other country in the former Soviet Union—there is also a substantial incentive for both government agencies and NGOs to oversell their work. The ratchet principle works all the way from Washington to the Georgian village: USAID overstates the success of democratization in Georgia to maintain federal appropriations levels; USAID-funded organizations overstate their successes to USAID; and local NGOs overstate their successes to their international NGO partners.

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Clearly, there is a logic to this process that has nothing to do with ill will or an active desire to pull the wool over the eyes of the international community. But the effect on the ground is a misrepresentation of the real problems of the Georgian state and its current leadership. Indeed, after almost a decade of serious engagement with Georgia under Shevardnadze, after the expenditure of many millions of dollars, marks and euros in assistance, it is difficult to see how Georgia is fundamentally more democratic—or more politically stable—than it was a few years ago. In many ways, it is less so.

There are Georgian NGOs, human rights activists, journalists, intellectuals and even some politicians genuinely committed to international standards of fair elections, human rights and clean governance. Notwithstanding the occasional campaigns against independent television stations and newspapers or even brutal harassment by police and security services, the reformers' voices are being heard. But what has been the most frustrating to them, and to anyone interested in Georgia's future, is the reticence of many international observers and self-described friends to call things as they see them. That has been the real tragedy of Georgian democracy. □

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The Long Goodbye

—*And Eric's Consoling Lies*

Neil McInnes

THE FUNERAL of communism will last for thirty years, prophesied François Furet in 1995. "The funeral procession will be accompanied by an immense crowd", he added, "and there will be much weeping. Even young people will join the cortege, trying here and there to give it the air of a rebirth." Hopes of a rebirth were vain, for the faith in communism was irretrievably tattered, but the funeral would last for years because "anti-communism remains more than ever a damnable heresy . . . more universally condemned in the West than in the great days of victorious anti-fascism."[1] Furet was not thinking only of France; he explained that in the United States the revisionist mourning party would prolong the funeral indecently, laboring as diligently as the Holocaust deniers but ever so much more respectably.

Jean-François Revel has lately demonstrated how prescient Furet was, in a polemical tract called *La Grande parade*, where *parade* is a fencing term for a parry, meaning in this case the desperate riposte of those who refuse to let communism go into what communists themselves used to call the dustbin of history.[2] After glancing at Revel's account of this French fencing, we shall see that the same parry and thrust are being deployed in English over communism's corpse, notably in the work of the veteran historian Eric Hobsbawm.

Revel says that, whereas in the early 1990s communism and anything like it was definitively proven to be a failure, a vast historical catastrophe, by 2000 we were confronted with a resurgence of excuses, attenuations, forgetfulness and plain misrepresentation, all in favor of a renewed belief in socialism. "The years 1980 to 1990 were the decade of the admitted collapse of communism, as well as the relative and acknowledged failure of democratic socialisms. The years 1990 to 2000 will have been the decade of largely successful efforts to obliterate the lessons of those historic experiences."

Nothing shows this better than the reception since 1997 of *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*,[3] a massive compilation by a team of French historians of the infamies committed by and in the name of communism over sev-

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[1]Furet, *Le Passe d'une illusion: Essai sur l'idée communiste au XXe siècle* (Paris: Laffont, 1995).

[2]Revel, *La Grande parade: Essai sur la survie de l'utopie socialiste* (Paris: Plon, 2000).

[3]Stéphane Courtois et al., *Le Livre noir du communisme: Crimes, Terreur, Repression* (Paris: Laffont, 1997). Trans. by Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

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enty years around the world. Clinically factual and amply documented, this work was denounced, in quarters from the Left-leaning *Le Monde* all the way to the far Left, as an apology for fascism, a maneuver in favor of the racist National Front, a diversion from the trial of the collaborator Maurice Papon, or simply (the pitiful resources of invective already beggared) a "fraud" and an "imposture." Several of the academics among the editors of the work came under intolerable pressure from their university superiors to recant in public.

The parry is much the same in the United States as in France or England, or anywhere else that Rupert Murdoch prints newspapers. To wit, any attempt at a balance sheet of decades of tyranny and genocide perpetrated in the name of utopia can only proceed from a nostalgia for the Cold War dressed up as an interest in history. That's all old stuff; why drag it up now? Are the hawks bitter at losing their stock in trade, anti-communist rhetoric, and are the eternal reactionaries still enraged by those who, in their thirst for social justice, admittedly made some generous errors but who meant well? Such views are common in the French media, whereas in the United States they are mostly confined to academe, where the professors who invented the notion "totalitarianism" now consider that it is a misleading term, never to be applied to pluralist regimes such as those of Stalin and Brezhnev, while they dismiss their elders—Malia, Ulam, Pipes and Conquest—as Cold War Sovietologists.

THERE IS resistance to this intellectual fencing even in France, as appeared lately in one of those squalid disagreements that Parisians like to call literary scandals. It concerned a massive tome by a British communist historian, which no one among French publishers wanted to bring out in a French translation, whereupon the author cried, "Censorship!" In Paris the superannuated courtesans of the communist cause, who had just discovered they had been innocent virgins all along, sprang to the author's defense behind their standard bearer, *Le Monde Diplomatique*. The book was Eric Hobsbawm's *The Age of Extremes*,[4] which was enjoying some success in Britain and the United States and in numerous translations elsewhere, but which Parisian publishers *en bloc* rejected as unsellable in a country abreacting from its long infatuation with Stalinism. Said Pierre Nora of Éditions Gallimard, France had been "the longest and most deeply Stalinized [Western] country" but it was now in "decompression", which entailed

> hostility to anything that could, from near or far, recall that former pro-Soviet, pro-communist age, including plain Marxism. Eric Hobsbawm cultivates this attachment to the revolutionary cause as a point of pride. . . . But in France at this moment, it goes down badly.

Less charitably, Revel dismissed the book as "pure propagandist hocus-pocus", a "pro-totalitarian manifesto" put out by "an old and incurable British Stalinist" and "an imperturbable negationist" of communism's crimes.

The mourners at the funeral were determined to prove Nora wrong. They wished to demonstrate that there was indeed a ready market in France for a book designed to console true believers for the demise of communism, to assure them that "real" socialism had not failed, and that liberal capitalism remained the demon to exorcise. They did what socialists always do when the market lets them down: They wangled a subsidy out of the

[4]Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991* (New York: Pantheon, 1994).

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Minister for Culture of the ruling socialist government and gave this taxpayers' money to an obscure Belgian publisher for bringing out Hobsbawm's book in French. Helped by the notoriety generated during this dispute, the translation is selling well. The story ends with everyone convinced they were proven right.

Actually, we need not rely on that book to show Hobsbawm as the very paragon of a mourner at communism's funeral, because he has recently produced another and up-to-the-minute exercise in apologetics, *On the Edge of the New Century*.[5] However, before we leave the subject of publishing works on the sudden death of communism, it is worth looking at the fortunes of a masterpiece in the genre, which has had a curious difficulty getting into English. Vladimir Bukovsky, who was rescued from twelve years in Soviet insane asylums and prisons by the Brezhnev-Pinochet prisoner exchange, wondered why there had been no equivalent of the Nuremberg trials when communism collapsed, why several thousand known criminals got off scot-free, and why anyone in the West who raised such questions was scorned as a sick cold warrior, nostalgic for the nuclear nightmare. So he wrote the sort of indictment that would be tabled at Moscow trials patterned on Nuremberg.

An engrossing side issue that Bukovsky took up was the exploitation by the internal Soviet propaganda machine of the sayings of Western sympathizers and fellow-travelers, whom Bukovsky was cruel enough to name. In translation, these passages would cause some embarrassment to people who today claim they bear no responsibility for Soviet crimes but whose words were bullets—no blood on their hands but blood all over their fountain pens, Revel would say. Given the mood Pierre Nora has described in France, this powerful Russian work found a ready French translation, but no reputable publisher could be found for an English version. It languished untranslated as long as Hobsbawm's book had, before it was taken up and mangled by a minor American publisher. The print run appears to have been paltry and the work shrank from 616 pages in French to 256 pages in English.[6] Communism's mourners are as active in getting consolatory books translated as they are in hampering the translation of disturbing ones.

SO SOON after it ended, histories of the twentieth century are plentiful. There are notable ones by Clive Ponting, J.M. Roberts, Agatha Ramm and Martin Gilbert. Special mention should be made of a 1998 work by Hobsbawm's successor as professor of history at Birkbeck College, London—Mark Mazower, an author free of the partisanship of his predecessor—entitled *The Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*. Hobsbawm beat the field by chronicling a "short" twentieth century, which ended in 1991, so that the first version of his history was out by 1994. He stopped in 1991 because that was when the Soviet communist party went down *corps et biens*, and the story as he told it had communism as the tragic hero of the century; when it fell, the tale was told.

Historians are of course entitled to frame their narrative as the answer to a particular question; there is nothing wrong with such selectivity. A philosopher even says, "History books, indeed, ought commonly to be more, not less, selective than they are; greater selectivity would be a step *towards* objectivity, not away from it."[7] There remains an obligation to ensure

[5]Hobsbawm, *On the Edge of the New Century* (New York: New Press, 2000).

[6]Bukovsky, *Reckoning with Moscow* (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1998).

[7]John Passmore, "The Objectivity of History", *Philosophy* 33:125 (1958), p. 85.

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that answers to one question do not contradict the answers to other equally valid questions. Each historian cannot do his own thing regardless of others in the field. For example, one cannot tell the story of the Soviet Union and the Cold War as though it were all about the effort to realize a communist ideal and had nothing to do with nationalism and ethnicity. Hobsbawm tries to do just that. In his history, as in his essays on nationalism, he is slave to the Marxist prejudice, as old as the *Communist Manifesto*, that "the workers have no fatherland", and so nationalism and ethnicity could never determine their actions whenever socialism was an option.

It makes nonsense of the history of the last century to accept the Marxist decree that "proletarian internationalism" would prevail and nationalism would vanish and leave nothing but a wrack of folk dancing behind. Hobsbawm was still arguing in 1990, when ethno-nationalism was about to rend the Soviet empire and the independent Balkans, that nations and nationalism were about to disappear. In what Daniel Patrick Moynihan called "a work of great learning that is equally a work of vast delusion", Hobsbawm was saying that "the great achievement of the communist regimes in multinational countries [was] to limit the disastrous effects of nationalism within them." Moynihan continues,

> The spell of Marxism, however, persisted to the moment of utter falsification and will no doubt continue on impervious to experience. . . . Hobsbawm's entire work seems directed at explaining away, or even denying, the plain fact that the vertical category of nationalism has proven far more powerful than the horizontal category of class consciousness.[8]

This stubborn error persisted not only through his *Age of Extremes* but into *On the Edge of the New Century*, where Hobsbawm says wistfully that "the reappearance of dramatic nationalist hostilities in these [ex-communist] countries is in some ways inexplicable, particularly because they seemed to have almost disappeared." Grudgingly admitting that they *did* re-appear, he still insists that this was not what blew the USSR or Yugoslavia apart. Multi-ethnic states, whether managed by Habsburgs, Ottomans, Romanovs or communists, come undone for reasons a good Marxist can acknowledge, such as war or economic failure, and it is only *then* that ethnic communities cast around for "new loyalties." So, in this telling, ethno-nationalism remains a secondary, derivative and artificial force, never a prime mover in history. This willful blindness to glaring fact is comforted by ending the "short twentieth century" in 1991, before the clamor of ethno-nationalism became deafening.

Another danger (besides missing nationalism) of making the ideological struggle between communism and the West the exclusive theme of the twentieth century is that, at the time, many things were subsumed into the Cold War that had little or nothing to do with it. Any outbreak of peripheral commotion was seized upon by one superpower as an occasion to incommode the other, who returned the compliment; and if the superpowers were slow to meddle, the petty states involved sought the opportunity to strut on the world stage as principled stakeholders in the universal drama. (The Non-Aligned Movement, led by ramshackle states like Yugoslavia and Indonesia, has no other explanation.) Says Zaki Laidi,

> Thus if we had misguidedly interpreted a minor ethnic convulsion in Africa as an exclu-

[8]Moynihan, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 125.

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> sively endogenous phenomenon, we would be pitied and called to order for not having grasped or appreciated the wider ramifications—whether symbolic (ideology) or material (arms consignments)—that linked these microconflicts to megahistory.[9]

The only trouble was that when the Cold War faded the "minor convulsion" persisted, misunderstood, indeed incomprehensible, and complicated by the fact that all involved were now armed to the teeth. Laidi did well to choose Africa as an example, as recent events have shown.

THESE ARE examples of the systemic bias that a communist view of universal history is liable to. What is harder—indeed fastidious to the point of tedium—is to pinpoint the numerous little falsehoods, half-truths and willful oversights to which a communist apologist must resort if he is to weave a single fabric. Whatever respect we may have for Hobsbawm's three volumes of nineteenth-century history,[10] we cannot take up his twentieth-century history without recalling that he has been a communist activist since 1936 and carried the card of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) almost to the day it was dissolved. Born in Alexandria, educated in Vienna and Berlin, a refugee in Cambridge, a teacher in London (in recent years in Princeton), he says he is one of those Central European Jews for whom communism seemed the only way to the future (they were fewer than he likes to think). He belonged to the Communist Historians Group after the Second World War, mainly consisting of friends and members of the CPGB, such as Christopher Hill, Maurice Dobb and E.P. Thompson. In 1997 he said, "Much of my life, probably most of my conscious life, was devoted to a hope which has been plainly disappointed, and to a cause which has plainly failed: the communism initiated by the October Revolution." But he is a man of tenacious loyalty, and he still venerates the cause of revolution. It takes a lot of little lies to shore up a position like that.

Here are some samples from *Age of Extremes*. Stalin was the champion of anti-Nazism (after 1934 at least) and it was the West's refusal to negotiate with him that drove him to his pact with Hitler. "What happened in Warsaw in 1944 was the penalty of premature city risings", so presumably it had nothing to do with Stalin's deliberate delay, which gave the Germans time to crush it. There is no mention of the slaughter by the Russians, on Stalin's order, of over 4,000 Polish officers at Katyn, near Smolensk. We must be grateful for this silence, for it is an advance on Hobsbawm's earlier denial of Russian guilt. What we ignorantly call the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe after 1945 Hobsbawm calls "the second great wave of global revolution", adding, "The world revolution had visibly advanced." Stalin's postwar intentions were peaceful and the USSR's "basic posture after the war was not aggressive but defensive. . . . In short, the 'communist camp' showed no sign of significant expansion between the Chinese revolution and the 1970s." So were there no wars in Korea and Vietnam? "The USSR accepted West Berlin as a Western enclave inside the German territory with reluctance but was not prepared to fight the issue." So there was no Berlin blockade either? No mention of it here, unless it is hidden in "reluctance." Such subterfuges do occur:

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[9] Laidi, *A World Without Meaning: The Crisis of Meaning in International Politics* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 18.

[10] *The Age of Revolution* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962), *The Age of Capital* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), and *The Age of Empire* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987).

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In 1950 North Korea was "spreading to the south", and a similar "spreading" occurred later in Vietnam, so spreading seems to include armed invasion.

Given this entire absence of provocation from the Soviet side, it follows that the Cold War was entirely the result of American paranoia—not Western, note, not European, but peculiarly American—for that country was in the grip of apocalyptic anti-communism and "public hysteria." The politicians who exploited these fears were cynical and hypocritical, except for those who were "clinically mad." The "mutual fear" thus generated explains such things as the Berlin Wall of 1961, although he does not show how the Western side of this mutual fear would lead the Potsdam authorities to lock up their own citizens. The Cold War ended when the USSR was wrecked and defeated by détente: Moscow made the fatal mistake of joining the world markets in grain, oil and loans, instead of retreating deeper into autarchy.

TO THINK that Parisian publishers shrank from putting out this farrago of lies and evasions makes one wonder about those who elsewhere had no compunction. But of course these are just the shifts and pretexts of one Western communist; another Stalinist would have his own collection of dodges and prevarications. What matters more is the standard gestures of the great parry, the eight lies about communism that console the mourners at the endless funeral. Hobsbawm is our infallible guide here, too, notably in *On the Edge of the New Century*. We shall list them.

Communism was not totalitarian. The point of this denial is to avoid having communism put on the same footing as Nazism and fascism, because once that is done, all sorts of embarrassing resemblances spring into view. People have been making this awkward identification at least since Franz Borkenau wrote *The Totalitarian Enemy* in 1940 and coined the term "brown bolshevism." Moreover, they have advanced sound arguments for putting all these enemies of liberal democracy into one basket, whereas the deniers are reduced to splitting hairs. Hobsbawm, for example, admits Stalin wanted to be, and tried to be, a totalitarian ruler, but says he failed because he never achieved "thought control" over the ruled. But nor, notoriously, did Mussolini, who nevertheless boasted he ran a totalitarian society. If you set the bar high enough no one ever installed totalitarian rule. If that makes the term useless, let us drop it and find another, but whatever it is, it will apply equally well to communism, Nazism and fascism in respect of their common enmity toward liberal democracy. That will head off the argument that communism belonged with democracy on one side of the barricades, and fascism on the other side; which leads to the refinement that communism was, or aspired to, a higher form of democracy—which is why, its sins confessed and its soul shriven, it deserves to be mourned.

Communism was an Enlightenment project. Curiously, this enormity is proffered not only by its mourners but by those of its opponents who nowadays say that this is just what was wrong with it, because the Enlightenment was nothing but an intellectually shallow rationalism, a conspiracy of dead white males to back up Western imperialism. The mourners make the claim because, as Hobsbawm still says, communism was devoted to the Enlightenment principles of reason, progress, science, education and popular government. That it periodically paid lip service to those ideals is true; and it even tried to cheat by passing off utterly bogus imitations of their realization (such as "the world's most democratic Constitution"). But communism was also, and preferen-

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tially, devoted to ideals incompatible with the Enlightenment project, such as monolithic authority, class-relative truth, central economic planning, and the religion of the party-state. Thus it engendered poverty, injustice and mass murder not by contingent chance but always and everywhere by its very own logic. Michael Oakeshott would have said that that logic contained as much bookish rationalism as the American Constitution, but so does any coherent policy for a modern state; that tells us nothing about its attachment to education, science, democracy and the other Enlightenment values.

True socialism was never tried, only distortions. You can choose your own distorter: Lenin, Stalin, Pol Pot, as you please. Hobsbawm chose Russian "circumstances" and maintained, in 1994, that "the failure of Soviet socialism does not reflect on the possibility of other kinds of socialism." There was nothing in "the socialist idea" to suggest a one-party state or the imposition of an orthodoxy, he says, ignoring the massive evidence that a central plan will always require both. Last year he was still arguing that

> communism wasn't Russia. It was a global cause . . . if you think that communism is something greater than the histories of the backward countries in which it happened that communists got to power, then that history is not reason enough to abandon the chosen cause.

At this rate, there can never be such a reason, since the "socialist cause" has become a metaphysical entity, forever proof against the mere facts of history. That sneer at "backward countries" suggests that the poor Russian people let communism down, the way Hitler said the German people let *him* down. History will always let deluded tyrants down—but unfortunately only in the long run, when so many of us are dead. Besides, as Revel asks, if local circumstances or individual villainy is distorting the socialist ideal, how does it happen that the identical formula for "really existing socialism" is transmitted from Stalin to Mao, to Kim Il Sung, to Ho Chi Minh, to Pol Pot, to Ceausescu, to Castro and to Mengistu? Were all these men suffering the betrayal of a pure ideal, or were they not rather all applying the same horrendous methods to reach the same impossible goal, the only methods and the only goal communism ever knew?

Please pity the former communists. There was a mawkish piece in *Les Temps Modernes* headed "The end of communism: the winter of our souls." It gave the tone for a requiem Mass in honor, not of the countless victims, but of their executioners' friends, whose generous hopes had been so cruelly disappointed. Hobsbawm too invites us to admire their "loyalty to a great cause and to all those who had sacrificed their lives for it"—that means party activists, not those they deceived and betrayed. He says he stayed on in the CPGB long after his faith was shaken by 1956 (he can never bring himself to say "the crushing of the Hungarian revolt", just "1956", so much more sterile) out of loyalty to the heroes who had stuck to the party line. "I didn't want to end up in the company of all those ex-communists who had become anti-communists", i.e., the men and women who had the decency to admit that their god had failed. There was no need to recant anything, for party activists in, for example, Britain "cannot be held responsible for what happened in other countries and certainly not in Russia." Lying about and apologizing for "what happened in other countries" was blameless because it was inspired by noble ideals. As Hobsbawm put it:

> Do I regret it? No, I don't think so. I know very well that the cause I embraced has proved not to work. Perhaps I shouldn't have chosen it. But, on the other hand, if people

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> don't have any ideal of a better world, then they have lost something. . . . I cannot help feeling that humanity couldn't function without great hopes and absolute passions, even when these experience defeat.

We are familiar with this mindless cult of commitment from Heidegger and Sartre, but here it is the merest hypocrisy. Imagine Hobsbawm turning up to a cell meeting in Berlin or Cambridge and saying, "I'm only here for my great hopes and absolute passions; it's their night out." He would have been told, "Either you are a sentimental idiot or you are here, like the rest of us, to promote Soviet interests, to deny the truth about Stalin's tyranny, to collaborate when instructed with Nazis, and to fight social democrats. Otherwise, *heraus*!" The bit about hope and passion comes later, as a lame excuse.

Communism provided the best resistance to Nazism. Since 1945, if not 1935, this has always been the strongest appeal of communism in the West, and explains the massive membership of the communist parties in countries like Italy and France, as well as the cohorts of fellow-travelers in the older democracies. For this appeal to have succeeded, however, some strenuous acts of forgetfulness were required. One must overlook the long history of collaboration between Moscow and Berlin, dating from well before the Hitler-Stalin pact, and including such services as facilitating military training and handing over foreign communists to the Gestapo. One must forget the campaign against the "social fascists", i.e., the democratic socialists, who as targets were long preferred to mere Nazis. Then and forever after the communists branded decided opponents "fascist", be they conservative, liberal or just the wrong ethnic type; this conceptual recklessness raises doubts about their true attitude to anti-democratic forces like Nazism. When the Comintern finally joined the anti-fascist coalition of the 1930s it was in order to manipulate it, starting with the decree: "You cannot be both anti-Nazi and anti-communist. You cannot criticize Hitler until you stop criticizing Stalin." Finally, one must pretend to overlook the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the brutal aggressions that it sanctioned, until a heroic people rose to save not communism, but the homeland, in what therefore had to be called, in a confession shameful for Marxists, the Great Patriotic War.

In any event, all this was so long ago, before 1945. What could resistance to Nazism have to do with the ravages of Stalin for the next eight years or the misrule of communist parties for a half century more? And yet, last year Hobsbawm was still milking this bull:

> If you look at the great causes in which people of my age have been involved, such as the war against Nazism, it is impossible to say that the price paid was higher than the results obtained. . . . Even with hindsight, it is impossible not to recognise that we [communists] did a great deal of bad, but also a great deal of good.

Communism was brutally effective. Communism never lacked tough-minded admirers who agreed that its methods were deplorable, but insisted that they worked. The USSR and the regimes it imposed elsewhere paid a high price for their industrialization but they got there, whereas Third World countries failed. This callous realism became less convincing when the Eastern bloc economies began slipping further behind the West; and it became quite implausible when the dilapidation of Soviet industry was laid bare.

Meanwhile, capitalism in newly industrialized Asia was demonstrating that impressive achievements were possible without resort to brutality. But it is an argument some mourners are unwilling to

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surrender. Hobsbawm, for example, always accompanies his denunciations of Stalin with a counterpoint of exculpation: "tough, but it worked." He says Stalin's reliance on terror was "rationally instrumental", i.e., it worked. Incidentally, it was a pure, high-minded terror, since Stalin was "quite indifferent to the material rewards that someone in his position could command." His role as "a secular Tsar" was based upon "a sound sense of public relations", i.e., it worked. His *Short History of the Party* was full of "lies and intellectual limitations" but it was "pedagogically a masterly text", i.e., *it worked, as propaganda.*

If the "tough, but it works" line is no longer applicable to Russian industry, one can always transfer the argument to China. Sure enough, Hobsbawm offers a tentative apology for the massacre in Tiananmen Square: The communist leadership was trying to manage a difficult transition and, courageously, "it did not abdicate its responsibilities." The result: ten years later China was prosperous, whereas weakly ruled Russia was in a mess. In other words, it worked.

Capitalism has failed as much as communism. This is a major gesture of the parry. In France it has produced a series of near-hysterical texts about *l'horreur économique*, the failure of liberalism and the crisis of capitalism. It is the main theme of all of Hobsbawm's recent work; he calls this the Age of Crisis, in which the "theology of the free market" has failed as miserably as communism. Capitalism (only the Pope has the courage to call it evil, says this non-believer) is lurching from one crisis to another, and its days are numbered. With it will collapse parliamentary democracy, whose elections are "contests in fiscal perjury" and whose cultural foundations have been mined by the new barbarism. He is relying on the sort of unease Schumpeter felt, that the affluence produced by successful capitalism undermines its own ethical foundations, plus a natural concern about the sort of moral decline that Francis Fukuyama has examined in *The Great Disruption*, and that James Kurth expressed in these pages in a previous essay on Hobsbawm.[11] But whereas Fukuyama set these cultural facts in a historical context, and even claimed to see signs of recovery, Hobsbawm puts on his "The End is Nigh" sandwich board. The way he seizes eagerly on every foreign exchange panic, every stock market slump, every riot about globalization as proof that the Big One has arrived reminds us that Marx and Engels went on this way for decades, *always sure capitalism was about to fall* over. These people are reluctant to admit what economic agents soon learn: that a free-market economy leads an adventurous life of frequent alarms and excursions; that (for reasons Keynes explained) it is not always self-correcting and needs clever managing; and, finally, that some of its excesses cannot be corrected by even the cleverest interventions but have to be worked through painfully. None of which has anything to do with the Last Trump. A line drawn through these ups and downs can be resolutely inclined upward, as it has been for the ten years since communism really *did* fall over.

Communism gave us the welfare state. One last reason to shed a tear for communism, we are told, is that it gave us the welfare state. Without a salutary fear of Bolshevik revolution at home, Western capitalists would never have conceded the social security measures that now temper the rigors of sickness, unemployment and poverty. So, says Hobsbawm, the October Revolution saved capitalism twice over, once in the war against Hitler and then "by providing it with the incentive, fear, to reform itself after the Second World War." But the Poor Laws date from

[11]Kurth, "'If Men Were Angels . . .': Reflections on the World of Eric Hobsbawm", *The National Interest* (Summer 1995).

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Elizabeth I, and it was not Lenin but Samuel Johnson who taught us that, "A decent provision for the poor is the true test of civilization." Thus social welfare is a story centuries old, its heroes include even the likes of Bismarck and Disraeli, and further progress lies ahead of it. The Western communists contributed nothing to it but rather diverted resources away from it by their industrial disruption and political subversion.

WE HAVE taken Eric Hobsbawm, as Jean-François Revel took a clutch of French writers, to illustrate a paradoxical stance that is not uncommon on the intellectual Left today. On the one hand, it is admitted that communism has failed utterly and irrevocably. On the other hand, it is not admitted that it deserved to fail and now merits nothing but a curt burial. There is, on the contrary, a hankering to save some hope from the catastrophe, some hope of revolution, an aspiration to the overthrow of the existing liberal capitalist system so that certain vast problems can at last be resolved. It is an incoherent position and therefore will probably never have any political consequences. It falls into disrepute by panicking at every hiccup in the economy, every social malaise, as though they were the last gasp of Western humanity. The rational and benevolent attitude to take to people seized of these fears (they are not all to be patronized as youngsters—Hobsbawm is 83) is to concede that there are indeed vast problems to be resolved, but it is wiser to put one's hope in economic expansion and democratic reform, rather than in the vast delusions that should be buried along with communism. One only hopes that it will take less than thirty years to seal the grave. □

Getting It Wrong Again

President Bush is such an obliging and compelling caricature of all things American. Homer Simpson elevated to the White House, he deals in unnuanced simplicities, tears up environment treaties, mixes up the death penalty with death duties and jokes about the alarming reports of arsenic in some U.S. drinking water. . . .

All this is comforting, not least because it allows Europeans to feel superior for no better reason than that they are not American. I hold no candle for George Bush. He wouldn't have been my choice if I had a vote in the U.S. election. But I do know, because I grew up politically in the Reagan years, that it is not a great idea to indulge too readily our instincts about what a nasty, brutish nincompoop is in the White House. Mr. Reagan had an unnerving way of getting what he wanted in the long run.

You don't have to like Mr. Bush, or want one of your own, to think it might be a good idea to understand what his aims and intentions might be. But this is not the fashion in day-to-day American studies in Britain right now. It's so much simpler to holler from the moral high ground across the ocean.

—Anne McElvoy, *The Independent* (London), April 5, 2001

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Power Houses

Kurt M. Campbell

IN THE YEARS following the end of the Cold War, security issues and defense establishments were supposed to retreat into the background of world affairs, but in some respects military organizations have taken on great prominence, or at least their buildings have. Indeed, one can tell a lot about military attitudes in a particular country by looking at the state of its defense ministry buildings. In the past few years, several countries, including Japan, Germany, China and Russia, have either reclaimed historically significant former headquarters or built lavish, sometimes ostentatious, new defense ministries. Even the venerable Pentagon, the five-sided gray monolith on the wrong side of the Potomac, is getting a multibillion-dollar facelift and addition.

Why this building boom in the defense sector? Part of the rationale is purely practical. Modern military institutions require facilities equipped with coaxial cable, fiber optics and computer wire, all the necessary tools for effective command and control. Also, as military officials take on more important diplomatic missions (particularly in the United States, China and Germany), they need furnishings and surroundings that suitably impress and compare favorably with the traditional elegance of foreign ministry offices. Yet each of these military monuments represents something more, a kind of heritage in stone, carefully conceived and constructed with one eye on history and the other squarely on the future.

It is not surprising that architectural historians and military strategists see different things when they look at these constructions of steel and stone. "I have always believed that architecture is intensely political and can serve as a vehicle for propaganda, and military architecture is certainly no exception in this", argues Michael Hays, professor of history and architectural theory at Harvard University's Graduate School of Design.

> The paradox here, however, is that overt symbolism of the state-sponsored variety reduces the depth and complexity of the architecture's meaning in favor of one overt message, and the history of architecture suggests that this kind of blatant symbolism often coincides with periods of political regression or hypernationalism.

Others see a mixture of anxiety and ambition behind these buildings. "These capital investments in new military headquarters reflect an underlying neuralgia and anxiety about the emerging security environment, an environment that is neither as sanguine nor as predictable as we

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had collectively hoped", reflects Richard Armitage, a Reagan-era Pentagon official and now deputy secretary of state in the Bush administration. "However, there is more to this than simple international angst. These buildings are concrete testaments to past and perhaps future military glory and they are physical manifestations of the continued relevance of militaries in the life of nations."

The most recent construction is the Japan Defense Agency headquarters in Ishigayia, a Tokyo suburb. (Japan's defense organization was downgraded to an "agency" from a "ministry" after World War II, as a purposeful bureaucratic reminder of the dangers of militarism.) Ultra-modern and bristling with antennas, it could easily be mistaken for the headquarters of one of Japan's commercial giants. However, the choice of location was anything but random. "Ishigayia has great significance in the martial history of Japan", according to Michael Green, an expert on the Japanese military at the Council on Foreign Relations. "Ishigayia is where the war crimes tribunal was held, the scene of the military's great shame. It is also the site of [noted Japanese author and nationalist] Yukio Mishima's 1970 call for a military coup and his subsequent ritual suicide after his appeal went unheeded." Indeed, there are frequent lines of Japanese visitors waiting patiently in front of the new building to visit the military-maintained shrine to Mishima inside. Still, Green sees Ishigayia as being "more about the future than the past. They had to bury a lot of rubble, literally, to create the foundation for that building."



Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo)

Japan Defense Agency headquarters, Tokyo

Building on top of the past, it turns out, is a common practice. "There is a long tradition of architecture being called upon to construct a new reality, one that superimposes upon and supersedes utterly a previous meaning", explains Scott Cohen, associate professor of architecture at Harvard's School of Design.

Much of Asia interprets the new Japanese military digs as another step along the road toward rehabilitating the self-defense forces. One Chinese military official reported that he was

> shocked by how unapologetic and proud the Japanese defense people were about this new building. I half expected that they would be somewhat sheepish about showing me around, but I was taken right in the front door—there was no sense of ambivalence.

But the construction has struck an ambivalent chord across the region and subtle questions have been asked about Japanese plans to play a larger security role in Asia. Several Asia hands speculated that the Chinese would have made a bigger stink about Ishigayia had they not opened their own new lavish Ministry of Defense virtually in the same month.

The Ishigayia building also seems to have touched a powerful chord in modern Japanese society. The old headquarters in fashionable Rompungi (nicknamed

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

Ullstein Bilderdienst (Berlin)

Bendlerblock, German Ministry of Defense, Berlin

Rompungi prison by the unfortunate military personnel who were stuck with exhausting tours of duty inside the dilapidated compound—a common military drinking song had the refrain "Monday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, Friday"), drew scarcely a glance from Japanese citizens. Ishigayia, in contrast, is attracting large crowds of Japanese visitors, including significant numbers of retired military.

THE GERMAN Ministry of Defense is in the process of relocating back to Berlin and the so-called Bendlerblock, an imposing stone structure dating back to the Wilhelmine era with towering German Gothic columns. The building's history mirrors the modern military history of the German state. As the navy headquarters at the turn of the century, it was where Admiral von Terpitz launched the program to build the Kaiser's dreadnoughts. Count Klaus von Stauffenberg plotted the assassination of Hitler here during the dark days of World War II, and it was in the Bendlerblock's courtyard that the co-conspirators were executed.

"Officials in the German Ministry of Defense are reacting to the move back to the Bendlerblock in immensely emotional and complex ways", according to Walter Slocombe, undersecretary of defense for policy at the Pentagon during the Clinton administration. "It is a reminder of a painful past but also a proud military tradition of brilliant innovation. The building is going through massive reconstruction now but, once complete, it will be a dominant presence in the new Berlin."

The new military presence in Berlin has not stoked a European neuralgia comparable to that which has accompanied the Japanese construction. Perhaps Germany has dealt more convincingly with its history than Japan, and, certainly, the institutionalization of security links in Europe is far more advanced than it is in Asia. Germany also has a much closer relationship with Russia than Japan does with China. Whatever the cause, the re-opening of the Bendlerblock to a new generation of German soldiers has not been met with levels of Russian or European angst that might have been expected even a few years ago.

In important respects, these buildings represent current national sentiments in both Germany and Japan to remove any remaining stigma associated with their respective militaries. By coincidence, last

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year the German army and the Japan self-defense forces fired shots in anger—in Kosovo and against encroaching North Korean fishing vessels, respectively—within days of each other, after over a half century of complete battlefield inaction.



Pentagon Renovation Program, Department of Defense

The Pentagon's New Geometry

CHINA's new Ministry of Defense is located just off Tiananmen Square on a large tract of prime Beijing real estate. Its yawning foyer is reached after a steep ascent of innumerable steps, passing stony faced red guards manning the entrance. The Ministry was completed and opened its doors to visitors last year, and former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott was the first foreign dignitary to be received there. A senior government official with him on the trip summed up the experience like this:

> After seeing the intricate oriental screens inside the Olympus-sized rooms I kept thinking of how L'Enfant was supposed to have designed Washington, DC to subtly impress visiting dignitaries. Well there is nothing subtle about this building. It was clearly designed to awe. The PLA may not yet have a modern military but you would never know it from the building. Their architects clearly were looking to impress—even intimidate—visiting barbarians to the Middle Kingdom.

The lack of upkeep and the deterioration of a relatively new national military facility—such as the recent plight of the Russian Ministry—also carries with it significant symbolism. The Russian military headquarters is a few years older than those of Japan and China, sitting just off the old Arbat section of Moscow. There are eight sides to the Pentagon's five. Its gleaming marble edifice can be glimpsed at a distance while strolling along the lamp-lit lane created by then Mayor Boris Yeltsin when *perestroika* was in vogue. The Russian tricolor flies proudly overhead and the occasional officer can be spotted wearing a traditional imperial military emblem replete with the two-headed eagle of the czars.

Up close, however, the building is showing signs of acute deferred maintenance. Inside, the ceiling-to-floor murals celebrate Stalingrad and other acts of World War II heroism, but much of the decor tends to bring to mind more the humiliation of Afghanistan and the current horrors in Chechnya. On a rainy day, there are buckets in some of the halls to collect drops from leaky ceilings, and the marble floors are already cracked and discolored. After several years of intense construction, the Ministry was completed during the waning days of the Soviet era, and the building was in some

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ways a tribute to the military's enduring influence along the Kremlin's corridors of power. Today, though, it is the scene of brutal infighting and plummeting morale, and the deterioration of the physical plant mirrors the overall crisis in spirit among the uniformed ranks in what was once a serious and respected fighting force.

THE PENTAGON's facelift, meanwhile, has less to do with vanity than a last-ditch effort to stave off the deterioration associated with the breakneck construction schedule and shoddy practices of the original architects and builders during World War II. The gentrified Pentagon will also have a massive new addition (thereby throwing off the geometry). This new annex will be a receiving center for incoming packages and deliveries, equipped with state of the art sensors designed to detect even minute traces of chemical and biological weapons or nuclear material.

In an important sense, the new addition is a kind of structural recognition that security challenges on the horizon are just as likely to be at home as abroad, and that the U.S. defense establishment must reorient its exclusively external focus toward domestic threats as well. The battleship-gray behemoth, nicknamed the five-sided puzzle palace by its occupants, has even been designated a national historical building, worthy of preservation for history's sake. It is almost impossible to recall now, but there was some speculation in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War that the military would be able to vacate the Pentagon for a much smaller headquarters, given that the missions and money would be drying up. Even as late as 1994, during his heyday as Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich talked about "turning the Pentagon into a triangle" in an attempt to streamline the military behemoth.

Each of these constructions is the result of a peculiar set of national policies associated with the role of the military inside societies and beyond national boundaries. Yet, taken together, they provide telling clues about the re-emergence of long-dormant militaries on the world stage (in Japan and Germany), the rise to prominence of a new national power on the international scene (China), the plight of a once great military (Russia), and the reorientation of another great power toward a new set of military challenges in the new millennium (the United States). Nothing like a new or refurbished building to remind people that you're back, you've changed, or you've never left. □

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Books

Communist Crowd Control

George Walden

Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, eds., *The Tiananmen Papers* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 510 pp., $30.

IN THE MIDST of the Cultural Revolution I once drafted a telegram from the British Mission in Peking, or what remained after the Red Guards burned it, suggesting that Deng Xiaoping was dead. It seemed a reasonable conjecture. The no-neck monster, as we diplomatic juveniles called him, had not been seen in public for some time, was portrayed in the wall posters we read as a leading capitalist-roader, and had begun featuring in caricatures at the wrong end of a rope. Plus we had procured a Red Guard newspaper containing a celebratory account of his actual death by hara-kiri. Getting hold of those newspapers was an operation in itself, so there was a tendency to overplay what was inside them. I suppose I was infected by a scoop mentality, and there were scarcely any pressmen left in Peking to confirm or contradict my words. Meeting Deng some years later, as principal assistant to British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, I inspected him for signs of simulation, but he seemed the genuine thing. No one else could smoke that much, or hawk and spit with such vigor.

Are *The Tiananmen Papers* genuine? With China, you never know. Even the endorsement of some of America's most respected sinologists is not conclusive. Van Meegeren's forgeries of Vermeer were accepted by the leading art historians of his day because they were designed to fill gaps in their knowledge, despite the fact that the women in them bore a curious resemblance to Marlene Dietrich.

Like those art historians, we *want* this material to be genuine, in our case for moral reasons. Moralism infects our behavior toward China more than toward the erstwhile Soviet Union, in Britain to compensate for our colonialist misdemeanors, in the United States because the history of American attitudes toward China is one of recurring evangelical hope followed by disillusion. This account of the Tiananmen massacre shows the hard men of Peking in a poor light, and when it is republished in Chinese and makes its way to the mainland, it could do much to strengthen the reformers' hands. That is why the anonymous leaker leaked it in excerpts designed

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to tell a story rather than as entire original documents. We must be especially wary of good intentions.

Enough caveats: if this is a forgery it is brilliantly done. To me, as to the editors, the voices in these extraordinary documents ring true. As I read the records of Chinese Politburo meetings and secret police reports, mentally I was comparing them with the documents now available from the Soviet period, notably in *The Road to Terror* (1999) covering the Moscow trials, but also later. For all the grim similarity of the Russian and Chinese official press, in private all communists do not speak alike. The Russian voice is a compound of ideology and gangster inflections, of Marxism-Leninism and mafia-speak, whereas the Chinese voice, while retaining a certain formality, is less intellectual, more pragmatic. If the subject were not the life or death of millions one might sometimes call it homespun. That is the timbre of some of the secret documents the Red Guards were fed by their Maoist mentors and reproduced in posters and leaflets, and in that sense, for me *The Tiananmen Papers* brought back old times.

Deng's voice is especially persuasive. At the start of the occupation of the square the position of this eighty-five year old indestructible was equivocal. At one point he insists, disarmingly, that he is not all that conservative for his age, and in Chinese terms it is true. The tough survivor of many a battle with Mao exhibits Hamlet-like qualities before resolving to do the deed. I know it is frowned upon to ascribe human attributes to Chinese leaders, but something of the enormity of turning the People's Liberation Army on the people seeps through these pages. If the army were a mere killing machine in the Party's hands, why did eight generals at first decline to follow orders? And why did Deng spend so much time rationalizing with himself? There are no reports of Stalin doing that.

In one of his soliloquies Deng tries to persuade himself of the necessity of repression in the interests of the world community. If he fails to keep order in China, the result could be civil war, with hundreds of millions of refugees flooding Asia and destabilizing the world. From a Chinese leader these are novel sentiments, a kind of communist internationalism, *style nouveau*. This philanthropic line was later to prove persuasive with many an Asian brother, not to speak of Western statesmen such as Sir Edward Heath.

My only doubt about the authenticity of Deng's voice arose fleetingly when he says something that summarizes his world-view so neatly that one wonders for a second whether it has been cooked up to tickle our palates: "Of course we want to build a socialist democracy, but we can't possibly do it in a hurry, and still less do we want that Western-style stuff. If our one billion people jumped into multiparty elections, we'd get chaos." And of course it is gratifying to hear him insist time and again that whatever happens there can be no return to the policy of isolating China from the world, which he rightly sees as the root of many of its problems.

LISTENING to these legendary figures talking is like seeing waxworks come to life. Sometimes their caricatural aspects are confirmed, sometimes not. Any reader who imagined that Chinese communist leaders are cloned in the cradle will be disabused. The range and interplay of characters—which is to say the human element—is greater than we might have thought. And doddery though some of them are, their antiquity is not always the problem. The youngish but widely disliked Politburo member Li Peng, an adopted son of Zhou Enlai, conforms satisfyingly to his reputation. A pernickety ideologue when it came to doing down Zhao Ziyang, the general

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secretary who wanted to compromise with the students, he plays on Deng's fears of disorder on the scale of the Cultural Revolution to nudge him toward a crackdown. And when, fearing they would all wake up under house arrest, Deng succumbs and orders martial law, Li Peng insists his every word is gospel.

Though the Party "Elders" all curse and revile the "tiny minority of counter-revolutionaries", Wang Zhen is the only one who is consistently vitriolic: "These people are really asking for it. . . . These kids don't know how good they've got it! When we were their age we lived in a forest of rifles and a rain of bullets. . . . No appreciation!" For all his malign intent, here at least this barnacled eighty-one year old, the old salt of the Party, is speaking no more than the truth. The students come across as moderate and sophisticated, but the effect of their actions is to make China's gerontocrats feel they have been backed into a corner. And when he complains of the soft life of youth, and their lack of gratitude, Wang Zhen, like any irascible father, is factually correct. By 1989 there was more freedom and prosperity in China than at any time since the 1949 revolution. And, naturally, the students and their supporters wanted more.

As the French Revolution, or for that matter the fall of Soviet communism, confirms, it is often when things are gradually improving that expectations grow exponentially and patience snaps. The logic is to dam up those expectations by curtailing freedom, and, despite their lip service to Deng's policies of reform and opening up, that is what Wang Chen and his fellow brutalists wanted to do.

Yang Shangkun, the president, a year older than Wang Zhen at eighty-two, emerges as a prudent figure. He is initially averse to force and balks at appointing Li Peng as Party chairman when Zhao Ziyang is on the way out for having failed to persuade the students to call off their demonstration. Zhao Ziyang himself, alas, appears to have been ineffectual, as well-intentioned people caught up in crises often are, and the tears he shed over the hunger-striking students inspired as much disgust in his more coarse-grained colleagues as they did surprise in the West. Yet despite his failure Zhao's analysis remains, as they say, correct. The hardliners insisted that reform (a highly relative term in their usage) could only proceed in an atmosphere of stability. Zhao insisted that without democratic reform there would be perpetual instability.

But Deng was convinced that instability would result from anything approaching democracy, Western-style. So the discussion in the Party turned and turned in a vicious circle; the only way out the leaders could see was to crush the students. The Greek tragedy aspect of the affair emerges with somber clarity. Given their fears that everything they had fought for all their lives (a powerful, proud, independent new China to them, a communist tyranny to us) was under threat, and given the tenacity of the students, for the old men of Peking there could be no halfway house. The same was true of the means of repression. For them, killing was the only way. For communist autocrats, crowd control has no meaning. Water cannon and riot police are democratic appurtenances, insofar as they assume that demonstrations that may get out of hand are allowed. Logically enough, China had neither. (It is interesting, however, that, when martial law was first declared, a last-minute attempt was made to equip the troops with batons, and at that stage they were ordered not to open fire on the students even if they came under attack, for example, from Molotov cocktails.)

Are we now in a more pacific stage of China's development? Some things have improved since 1989. Yet the very words used by the regime to dismiss this book—"Any attempt to . . . disrupt China by the

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despicable means of fabricating materials and distorting facts will be futile"—are so redolent of its catastrophic Maoist legacy that they suggest we have not come all that far since the government displayed the "counter-revolutionaries" it rounded up on television being browbeaten by soldiers for the delectation of the masses. It is high time things moved forward, and I would like to think that this will be a salutary book. Though the events are different in nature, my hunch is that these revelations could cause an intellectual ferment in China reminiscent of that which followed Khrushchev's 1956 Stalin speech.

THE PITY is that we are so often wrong on China, and confuse our hunches with our wishes. So we must allow for the opposite. As I read I tried to imagine how a middle-aged provincial Chinese—China does not consist entirely of Beijing students—might react. Far from being indignant and appalled, might he not sympathize with Deng's dilemma? Might he not admire him for giving Zhao Ziyang a chance and overlook the fact that, though Deng gave the order that "no one must die in the square", he and those about him knew what they were doing and were probably not unhappy at the prospect of a few deaths elsewhere, *pour encourager les autres*? And should our middle-aged Chinese be one of those who has profited from the new prosperity and relative freedom, might he not nod when he comes across Deng's warning about multiparty elections quoted above, and be wary of sowing *luan*—confusion—which is instinctively associated with the Cultural Revolution, even though that was the result of the Party making war on the people?

The answer, I suppose, could be that students and intellectuals might be stirred by the book, but not to the point of challenging the Party, if only for lack of popular support. More interesting is the possibility that its appearance might spark new thoughts of reform in high places. We are so in thrall to the myth that Reagan and Thatcher simply blew down the walls of the Soviet Union with a blast of their trumpets (if only we'd thought of it sooner!) that we forget the ferment among the more sophisticated senior party folk that antedated Reagan and eventually threw up Gorbachev. The fact that *The Tiananmen Papers* were compiled by a high-ranking Chinese official reminds us that the party whose general secretary was once Zhao Ziyang is capable of evolution, if only with the Burkean intention of self-preservation—though more likely with the aim of maximizing the country's wealth and power.

But this is divination, which this enthralling book inspires. Meanwhile, the regime's potential for viciousness is not in doubt, any more than the need for the West to keep up pressure for reform. If our policy is directed less at China than at our own gratification, we can cite the harsh side of *The Tiananmen Papers*—the paranoia about the West, the thuggish words about the students, the official murders and subsequent arrests—as conclusive evidence that the regime can behave in a repulsive fashion and ignore the rest. The trouble is, we knew that already. So what does this book change?

The Tiananmen Papers should help our China policy mature. The game of counterposing fearless democrats ready to "stand up to China" to sinocentric softies in the State Department or to the Foreign Office mandarins was fun in its time, but it has had its day. In Tiananmen, the crisis of a system, all that was unavailing. Nor is "standing up for democracy in China" a moral policy of itself, since true morality cannot be divorced from practicality. Indeed, it can be immoral if the grandstanders are more concerned with their own *bella figura* than with the fate of the Chinese people, or the results on the

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ground of the policy in question. I have no problem with a tough stance toward Beijing provided the fruits are clear, but China is a standing temptation for vainglorious politicians.

How far was the last governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, a notoriously self-regarding fellow, concerned with securing practical and lasting benefits for the Hong Kong people, and how far with re-launching his career after his rejection by the British electorate? And is President Bush responding to an increased threat, or playing macho politics? The competition he speaks of is implicit in the West's relations with China. How clever is it to force it to the surface, thereby inflaming nationalist sentiment among the Chinese people—a boon for Beijing's hardliners—not to speak of the risk of driving the Russians and the Chinese back together, and European and American policy apart?

Moralistic gesturing did nothing to help the students in Tiananmen Square and will help no one in the future. A truly ethical policy is incompatible with populist stances that dismiss anyone who knows anything about the country as kowtowing lackeys by definition. It means finding workable ways to advance Chinese democracy, alongside our legitimate interests, and staying the uphill, winding course. For all that they record a tragic setback, *The Tiananmen Papers*, a book whose very appearance gives hope, should encourage us to persist. God knows we are going to have enough trouble dealing with a more wealthy and powerful yet still aggrieved and resentful China without antagonizing it further, to no apparent purpose. □

George Walden's first-hand account of the Cultural Revolution is included in his memoir, *Lucky George* (Allen Lane, 1999).

Pushing Restraint

J. M. Roberts

G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 203 pp., $55.

TO JUDGE from the accolades of his peers quoted on the cover of his new book, G. John Ikenberry is a distinguished political scientist who has written a distinguished book. In it, he has sought to draw on the resources both of his own discipline and of history—though one hopes it was not his decision to use Delacroix's splendid picture of the entry of the Crusaders to Constantinople in 1204 for its cover, for it has nothing to do with his subject matter, even if someone in the publisher's design department thought it did. That disaster was hardly a sequel to a victory and was institutionally wholly negative. It inflicted a mortal wound on the eastern empire, the shield of Christendom and order in the Middle East, and embodied neither strategic restraint nor strategic common sense. But

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a blunder by a distinguished press[1] would hardly be worth comment did it not awake a vague misgiving about more than thoughtlessness on the production side. It may be, though, that there will be among his readers others who (like this reviewer) know little of the idiom of political science and do not understand easily and clearly just what Ikenberry is trying to combine, and how these elements should be related.

Ikenberry sets out his material clearly. The first three chapters are written in heavily theoretical language, though this hardly seems necessary.[2] They address the "Problem of [International] Order", some of the varieties in which order in that sphere emerges, and, finally, an "Institutional Theory of Order Formation." Four more chapters then consider the reordering of Europe after 1815, the peace settlement of 1919, stabilization after 1945, and, most recently, what has followed the end of the Cold War. These are presented as case studies not of the process of peacemaking but of priorities discerned in them. "The Vienna settlement of 1815 and the world war settlements of 1919 and 1945 are notable for the new use of binding institutions to limit and restrain the exercise of power", says Ikenberry. It is an unexceptionable statement, phrased with admirable caution. But does it say very much?

The central and articulating idea running through these examples takes us back to a political science emphasis and a generalized argument that "leading" states in these settlements—except in 1815, that means the United States—increasingly showed an awareness that it was beneficial not to throw their weight about even at such seemingly favorable junctures. They even voluntarily submitted to formal constraints by participating in new international institutions. Political primacy could best be sustained, it seems, by a moderate, consciously limited use of power. In particular, institutions, though restricting their power of independent action, actually strengthened the "hegemonic" position of the leading state through the growing stability that they provided. What is more, it is alleged, "democratic" states were especially apt and successful in taking this line.[3]

Necessary qualifications leap to the eye when the argument is thus boiled down (as Ikenberry himself acknowledges, "democracy" is an odd word to apply to Castlereagh's England), but here are interesting ideas worthy of discussion, even if not very startling ones.

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[1]And not the only one. Though the plentiful misprints that the publisher's editor should have picked up are not likely to mislead, they are unnerving. One is very bad: the footnote on page 26, which not only gives the wrong page reference and misspells the names both of one of the editors of the book and of its publisher, but also, by substituting the word "monetary" for "momentary", makes nonsense of what Eyre Crowe's famous memorandum actually said.

[2]At times, it leads to jargon. We read of "institu*tionalizing . . . voice opportunities*", for instance, rather than of giving someone a say in something, and of "epistemic communities", when all that is meant are experts.

[3]The summary but general benevolence of this book's judgments on the working of democratic foreign policy warrants more attention than there is space for here. But Tocqueville's reflections on the topic spring to mind, as does the frequent exasperation of nineteenth-century European statesmen at the powerlessness of parliamentary governments in England to commit their successors to binding agreements. Nor was the "policy viscosity" admired by our author much evident in Clinton's obsessive concern with the possibility of American casualties in the Balkans. As for Lloyd George's electoral victory of 1918, which is seen as a source of strength, it can also be seen as a trap or encumbrance—as was Clemenceau's.

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More pertinent, though, is whether they provide a horse for a course of this length. What Ikenberry has to say, I think, would better run either to a short essay, or be set out in a major piece of historical analysis that could specify all the doubts, qualifications and queries that it raises. The hundred and seventy or so pages, which is all he can give to discussion of four such major episodes, leaves us with only summary and somewhat conventional assessments of those aspects of them that emphasize their alleged "institutional" characteristics. But those settlements were about much more than any institutional imperative (to coin a somewhat pretentious phrase—perhaps the idiom of political science is infectious). They were notably shaped by more than just the wishes, institutional or not, of those who negotiated them. A more comprehensive historical focus might leave Ikenberry's thesis still valid with due qualification, but it would look much less portentous.

The impact of context on policy has to be weighed in all four of these examples. In 1919, after all, a huge demobilization dissolved the military power of the United States almost overnight, the discussion of peace treaties having hardly begun; this must shape our understanding of the "leading" state and its actual power. In 1945 the "hegemonic" (to use again that fashionable but vague adjective) position of the United States had no answer to the brute fact of the physical supremacy on the ground that the Red Army's fighting had given it in Eastern Europe. Once more, too, what the country could do had to be interpreted amid demands for demobilization and the scrapping of wartime economic controls. The United States was also deeply committed through wartime actions and attitudes not obviously in the country's interests once fighting ended in Europe. And U.S. policy was still being made by shifting influences in official circles, sometimes to the frustration of allied nations.

Perhaps my unease about context has something to do with a sense of the far from clear intellectual relationship of two ways of academic proceeding. Ever since Aristotle launched the profession of political science, its practitioners have been prone to chase the will-of-the-wisp of generalization. Ikenberry the political scientist seems to be searching in his chosen historical episodes for recurrences that sustained a system more productive of "order"—which seems to mean a greater degree of predictability in international affairs—than earlier efforts had been. If we are seeking to tease out by induction from the facts some sort of general rule, though, then history must be broadly conceived if it is to provide the information required. One does not gather from these pages what the shaping of the UN Charter before 1945 owed to the Soviet Union, or the cramping effect of strategic decisions taken by American soldiers and officials long before 1945 about colonialism or, say, China—a country that, incidentally, hardly figures in this book's account of the world's rearrangements after the Cold War, and is not mentioned in the index.

Further uneasiness arises from some of the historical terms employed. Though moved about the table with great confidence, they are fragile counters that do not easily survive close scrutiny. They often seem slippery and loose, feeble and sometimes positively misleading representations of reality. The notion of a "leading state" itself always requires particular and changing qualification. Leading when and what? And leading with questioned or unquestioned, challenged or unchallenged, authority? Strangely for someone who was thanked for his help with Robert Skidelsky's masterly study of Keynes' role in Anglo-American relations during the Second

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World War, Ikenberry also seems to have a remarkably simple, even innocent, view of what "power" means in practice. The "Power Rankings" he sets out in an appendix only scratch the surface of reality, because they ignore the commitments that give such abstractions meaning. And what happened to "power" with the emergence of the possibility of mutually assured destruction?

Another instance of an unacceptable shorthand can be found in the idea of a "Settlement", a complicated idea of which a simple word conveys very little. The years 1919–20 brought the St. Germain, Neuilly, Trianon and Sèvres treaties as well as that of Versailles, but none of them is mentioned here. "Institution" is another key term used very loosely. It blurs out from formal arrangements and bureaucratic regulation into patterns of behavior, conventional judgments and interiorized restraints, undergoing Protean change as agreements reshape their meaning in changing circumstances. Even when we are told—very reasonably—that institutions reduce the "return" on power (however defined), we are back with circumstance: sometimes they do so very effectively, but sometimes they don't. What is it that makes so crucial a difference?

Cross-cutting comparison over a century and a half might have been better avoided. History has moved too much, and with a too rapidly growing scale and speed to make it very revealing. In the world of Moore's law—which says that computer chips roughly double in power every two years—and a half century in which it has been claimed that the United States has created more real wealth than the rest of the world together in the whole of recorded history, historical entities cannot possibly be equated across even short periods except in the most formal sense. The currency of political language is formal, though, and can mislead. A "leading state" may have little in common with something to which we could apply the term at another time, even when we can agree on to what to apply it. One wants to know, too, why particular historical case studies are selected and others are disregarded. For all Gladstone's sentimentality and Bismarck's cynicism, the Concert of Europe managed the Eastern Question for a half century or so without major war; we should surely consider 1856 and 1878 as well as the chosen four case studies. After all, we are still hopelessly grappling with the problem of the Ottoman Succession, which the Congresses of Paris and Berlin contained for a long time.

Few of us can shake off our intellectual formation, and no doubt there are personal and subjective explanations for my reservations about the use of historical material in this book. But I recall a warning by one distinguished American scholar whose name crops up a lot in these pages, George Kennan. Writing nearly fifty years ago, he remarked that "the genuine image of the diplomatic process is hardly to be captured in historical narrative unless the lens through which it is viewed is a sharp one and the human texture of which it consists becomes vivid in considerable detail."[4] It is not one of his most incisive remarks, but he speaks with authority. The context of Ikenberry's emerging generalities remains a highly edited and selective version of historical reality.

After running on about ways in which this book disappointed someone who opened it sympathetically and optimistically, it is only fair to say that it made me think. It is also good to say that the impression it leaves of Ikenberry's aspirations for policy—for this is a prescriptive

[4]Kennan, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920, vol. 1, Russia Leaves the War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. vii.

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book—is thoroughly wholesome and welcome. Essentially, he is for American restraint, even if the basis of his counsel seems strangely abstract at times ("the most enduringly powerful states are those that work with and through institutions"). Whether or not that is true or easy to achieve in present circumstances, restraint must surely be sensible. If it has not avoided ten years of Anglo-American sterility and ineffectiveness in dealing with the problem of Iraq, there is no evidence that its abandonment would have achieved the end sought any better. This may suggest, too, that international relations are more complicated than any high-level, formulaic analysis allows. □

J.M. Roberts retired in 1994 from the wardenship of Merton College, Oxford. He is author of *Twentieth Century: The History of the World, 1901 to 2000* (Viking Press, 1999).

Poltergeist Economics

Anatol Lieven

Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinsky, *The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy* (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2001), 745 pp., $29.95.

Paul Klebnikov, *Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 2000), 400 pp., $28.

Stephen F. Cohen, *Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), 304 pp., $21.95.

THE RUSSIAN revolution of the 1990s was rather like a Hollywood poltergeist movie. Mysterious, hidden forces moved enormous quantities of property from place to place, spectacularly destroying much of it and the surrounding landscape in the process. Colossal industries and vast sums of money vanished into thin air. So too did millions of lives, but since these mostly belonged to unimportant extras—pensioners, children, workers, soldiers, Chechens—the Western audience could gasp with pleasurable horror while continuing to munch its popcorn.

There is even some sketchy appearance of the obligatory happy ending. What is left of the property has returned to earth and is firmly tied down by someone or other. The victims go on being quietly buried. The teenage poltergeists too have settled down. These "bold young reformers", as the more gullible or fanatical sections of the Western media never ceased to dub them, were evidently too young to exercise moral judgment, and must be left in undisturbed enjoyment of their stolen property. Innocent victims of forces beyond their control, they are being rehabilitated into the Western economic community with the help of distinguished American PR firms. And every Russian can take comfort in the fact that the

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biggest poltergeist of all now runs the Russian electricity system.

Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinsky's history of this catastrophic process is the richest and most detailed yet to appear, and is of timeless value as a record. Its conclusions are supported by Stephen Cohen's interesting, if one-sided, collection of essays on the same subject, and by Paul Klebnikov's more popular, well-written and brilliantly revealing biography of Boris Berezovsky.

It is a striking sign of just how deep Russia's catastrophe has been that Reddaway and Cohen should have found themselves in much the same camp. Cohen is a Marxist whose earlier books on Soviet history were written from the standpoint of support for the (relatively) moderate and humane strand of communism represented by Nikolai Bukharin, which was bloodily destroyed by Stalin. Despite his loathing of Stalinism and contempt for the rulers of the Brezhnev era, Cohen retained an evident sympathy for the basic Soviet project.

Peter Reddaway, by contrast, is an eminently conservative figure and a veteran and passionate critic of the Soviet system. In the 1970s and 1980s, he did more than any other person in Britain to expose Soviet crimes against dissidents and bring them to the attention of the British public. However, his hatred for communist rule as a profoundly immoral system was rooted in beliefs and principles that also explain his hatred of the post-Soviet order—or disorder—and of the Western role in its creation.

These principles include a deep concern for ordinary Russians and a profound understanding of the richness of the Russian intellectual and cultural tradition—as well as of the appalling and deliberate damage done to it by communism and now by post-communism. This is a welcome change from the common Western tendency to use "Soviet" and "Russian" as virtual synonyms and indulge in ignorant contempt for both. It also marks out Reddaway and Glinsky's work from the grotesque belief of too many Western reformers in the 1990s that post-Soviet Russia was a "blank slate" on which to scribble their experimental designs.

HOWEVER, this awareness does contribute to one flaw in Reddaway and Glinsky's book: It makes them a good deal too optimistic about the prospects of a truly democratic alternative to the Yeltsinite order, had it been given a chance. For this to have succeeded, an alliance would have had to develop between the more honorable and moderate elements of the old communist order on the one hand and the dissident tradition on the other—something that would have been exceptionally difficult to bring about.

As it was, the alternative to Yeltsin's rule by the autumn of 1993 appeared to be the forces that had taken over the Russian parliament—and these did not seem at the time to be a viable or positive alternative. It may well be true, as all three books convincingly argue, that Yeltsin and his staff deliberately helped the parliamentary radicals to gain the ascendancy and then maneuvered them into coming out onto the streets—the intention being to wreck a compromise plan for new elections being prepared by Russia's governors, and to give the regime a chance to crush the opposition by force. Given the amount of bigoted Western propaganda against anyone who questioned Yeltsin's "reforms", Reddaway and Glinsky are correct and courageous to point out that the parliamentary opposition contained individuals who were much more honest, patriotic and economically sensible (from the point of view of Russia, not that of their own pockets) than their equivalents in the regime.

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Nonetheless, when I visited the parliament repeatedly in the weeks and months leading up to the events of October 1993, I was left—and remain—profoundly skeptical about that institution's capacity to generate any kind of effective government. In the event of a parliamentary victory, it seemed at the time that there was a real risk of Russia going the way of Georgia in 1990–93, with bitter infighting between different would-be charismatic leaders, the collapse of central authority, the rule of nationalist fanatics and street thugs, ethnic revolt and civil war.

For the melancholy truth is that decent communists had by then been badly overtaken by the speed of change. Most of Russia's truly democratic intellectuals for their part lacked all administrative capacity and were fatally given to striking politically irresponsible moralizing poses—while the ex-communist intellectuals who joined Yeltsin either possessed no morals to start with (like the brutal and repulsive Gennady Burbulis, Yeltsin's then chief of staff) or soon lost whatever ones they had.

Yet to say this is certainly not to excuse the character and behavior of the Yeltsin regime. Yeltsin's own entourage was utterly corrupt, from the aides who in 1992 sold interviews with the president to the international media for $30,000 apiece, to the tariff-free import rights given to the "Sports Fund" headed by Yeltsin's friend and tennis coach, Shamil Tarpishchev—which led to the biggest vodka-smuggling operation in Russian history and contributed appreciably to the undermining of Russian health. Yeltsin's own family was closely implicated in the corruption, especially via Aeroflot, headed from 1997 by son-in-law Valery Okulov.

The entire privatization process was driven by a curious mixture of Western-endorsed ideological fanaticism and a manic greed that often destroyed industries with long-term value in the search for short-term loot—a very Bolshevik mixture, as Reddaway and Glinsky's title implies. This process reached its apogee in the autumn of 1995 with the "loans for shares" deal, brokered by Yeltsin aid Anatoly Chubais, in which Russia's principal oil and metal-extraction industries were distributed to Berezovsky and other crony capitalists for a tiny fraction of their true value. In return, these pledged their (illegal) financial support to Yeltsin's re-election campaign—a support that they would have had to give anyway, on the assumption that they did not wish the communists to return to power.

WHAT OF THE role of the Clinton administration in all this, which all three authors strongly condemn? Clinton, Gore, Strobe Talbott and others certainly wittingly or unwittingly turned a blind eye to Yeltsin's appalling domestic record, including both kleptocracy and the catastrophic decision to launch the first invasion of Chechnya in December 1994. For a long time most of the Western media parroted the official Western line that "in the end, Yeltsin has always done the right thing."

However, as Reddaway and Glinsky emphasize, the well-being of the Russian people was only part of what American support of Yeltsin was all about. The other part was advancing the U.S. national interest in a compliant Russian external policy. They and Cohen argue that this policy utterly failed, and that, by attaching the reputation of the United States to such a discredited regime, Washington helped create the anti-American backlash that now characterizes so much of Russian policy and public attitudes. This is certainly true, and sad to see in the wake of the deep respect for the West held by most of the Russian intelligentsia and much of the population in the early 1990s.

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On the other hand, paying bribes to foreign rulers to gain some kind of cooperation or compliance is an ancient and legitimate diplomatic tactic. It seemed to pay off in the case of the Kosovo war, where the Russian government helped dig NATO out of the hole into which it had wantonly jumped. If Moscow had backed a diehard Serbian resistance and forced NATO to launch a ground war, it would have stood an excellent chance of destroying NATO from within. That this path was not taken must owe something to the assiduous cultivation of Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin by Clinton and company.

In that sense, at least, the Clintonites may have been "realists" despite themselves. It is true that they were unable to see the difference between U.S. interests and Russian ones and thus deluded themselves into thinking that Yeltsin was good for both. Unlike some of their self-styled realist critics, however, they recognized that it was not possible to gain Russian subservience to U.S. policies without having to pay for it.

There has also been an ugly aspect to some of the endless complaints about the theft of U.S. aid to Russia. This aid was small not only in comparison to the financial gain to the United States from the end of the Cold War, but also to the flight of stolen capital from Russia in the Yeltsin years. And where, pray, did this stolen money go? Pluto? Alpha Centauri? As Paul Klebnikov brings out, the looting of the Russian economy would not have been possible without the enthusiastic collaboration of Western banks and trading houses, and the money went to fuel Western stock market and real estate booms from which the West in general has benefited. If the Yeltsinite elite had the morals of whores, then the West certainly provided their pimps.

INSTEAD of conducting what is in the end a sterile party debate on U.S. policy in the 1990s, Americans would do better to concentrate on some deeper lessons of the Russian debacle. Chief among these is the proof that markets are not "self-regulating." The creation of a "civilized" free-market state requires not only strong institutions but also ethical traditions that go beyond the search for personal gain and are credibly embodied in at least some public figures and other symbols. From this point of view, the analysts who seek comforting parallels for Russian developments in nineteenth-century America could hardly be more mistaken: Abraham Lincoln was not an idle drunkard whose family became obscenely rich at the expense of the state; Andrew Carnegie did not steal existing state industries at gunpoint and then consistently fail to invest in them, while moving most of the profits into foreign bank accounts and spending the rest on luxuries and sex.

This is where Clinton's pardon of Marc Rich is so damaging. As Klebnikov demonstrates, Rich's crimes against the American taxpayer are dwarfed by his role in the criminal plundering of Russia. The pardon is being portrayed in Russia as additional evidence that U.S. moralizing advice is deliberate hypocrisy. But that is far from being the worst of it. In Yeltsin's Russia, ordinary people saw their savings and living standards destroyed even as their rulers openly looted the country. As a result, for Russian leaders to ask ordinary people not to steal or take bribes is not just fatuous, it is downright immoral. A disastrous cycle of omnipresent corruption has been created with no evident way out. □

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Letters

Mugabe:

R.W. Johnson's piece in the Spring 2001 issue is timely indeed ("Mugabe, Mbeki, and Mandela's Shadow"). All those who hope to see a new South Africa survive should heed his message.

What is it that drives African presidents to support one another, no matter how far apart their public policies may be? The new South African Constitution upholds freedom of expression, free press, independent judiciary and freehold property rights. Mugabe locks up editors, destroys independent media, makes political appointments to the bench and allows farms to be illegally occupied. Yet South Africa's Thabo Mbeki does not condemn his Marxist counterpart in Zimbabwe. Unfortunately, such a reaction represents the rule rather than the exception in this continent. What did African presidents do about Mugabe's tyrannical predecessors—Idi Amin, Mobutu Sese Seko, Sani Abacha, Laurent Kabila? Very much the same.

Two vital things—democracy and intensive farming—have not transplanted very successfully into African soil. Traditionally, Africa honored the power of the Chief, the man who distributed the land, who held the Big Stick. Centralized power, particularly one-party power, appeals so much because it is the easiest way to wield that stick. Why give it up to someone who might use it against me? And if I am carrying the Big Stick, or the fly whisk or the AK-47, why do I need to respect my opposition? Consider Robert Mugabe and his current actions. On the one hand, he rejects the concept of legitimate opposition, is not concerned about accountability in government and resents any criticism of his abuse of power. On the other hand, and perhaps equally important, he does not understand the productive force of an open society or the modern farm.

The land, which all used to belong to the chief and which used to be distributed only to loyal citizens by chiefs or by kings, is still the object of local wars. To pass beyond this warlike stage, some type of agreement is necessary and an open acceptance of freehold property rights is a good start. Mandela certainly recognized this, and ensured that the principle became entrenched in South Africa's new constitution.

Next, we need the skills and the energy, the consistent husbandry that farming requires; and in a broader economic sense the management know-how to harvest, load, transport and distribute our product, package it and market it. Management in its turn needs some stability and security, the rule of law, in order to function effectively. Managers need to be encouraged and skills to be nurtured. But what does President Mugabe do? He sends "war veterans" to occupy working land at home, and he sends 12,000 troops into the Congo to protect his own interests there. The presidents of Angola and Namibia join him in this cynical enterprise in central Africa.

Mandela has denounced liberation leaders who "despise the people who put them in power and want to stay in power forever. They want to die in power because they have committed crimes." Archbishop Tutu says that Mugabe "seems to be wanting to make a cartoon of himself." Tragically, it is the cartoons that threaten to

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become the reality in today's Southern Africa.

ANTHONY FLEISCHER
Cape Town, South Africa

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R.W. Johnson's article on South African policy toward Zimbabwe paints a distorted picture of President Mbeki's policies.

Mbeki's goal is to keep Zimbabwe moving toward the March 2002 elections so voters can choose a president in a free, fair, and constitutional process. His goal is also that if Robert Mugabe and Zanu-PF lose the election, they will accept the election result.

This is the best possible outcome for the current crisis. It respects and reinforces the rule of law, assures a successor assumes office with full legitimacy, and consolidates democracy.

Johnson's proposal implies that South Africa should impose economic sanctions to cause enough turmoil and suffering to "topple" (his term) President Mugabe before the elections. This would require considerable violence and bloodshed, although Johnson sees this of little consequence. Any successor regime assuming office under such circumstances would necessarily be tainted with illegitimacy, coming to power outside a constitutional process and—worst of all—would set a precedent for future regime changes in Zimbabwe.

There is no guarantee Johnson's proposals will work. Faced with heavy-handed South African efforts to topple him, Mugabe might well declare a national state of emergency, assume the power to rule by decree, and postpone elections indefinitely. Instead of solving this problem in the next few months, Johnson's proposal may prolong the crisis.

Johnson misunderstands South African politics when he claims there is a major gap between Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki on Zimbabwe, or any other issue.

Mandela is now a private citizen and can voice opinions that Mbeki, constrained by office, cannot. Neither criticizes Mugabe directly, although both make comments about unnamed African leaders that can be viewed as criticizing Mugabe. The relationship between the two men is so close and ANC party discipline so strong that it makes better sense to interpret their comments as a whole with Mbeki's official comments augmented by Mandela's private comments to give a complete picture of ANC and South African government policy.

Thabo Mbeki has a record of extraordinary success in negotiating democratic outcomes in Southern Africa. Some call the 1994 election in South Africa a "miracle." Given his record of success, his critics' record of failure, the risks of the policies Johnson advocates, and the fact the election is scheduled in just a few months, the soundest policy is to support Mbeki's efforts.

PHILIP L. CHRISTENSON
Former senior professional staff member of the Senate and House subcommittees on Africa

Johnson replies:

Philip Christenson criticizes me for proposals I never actually made—though he is right to imply that I believe not only that President Mbeki should openly dissociate himself from Mugabe's state terrorist regime, but that he should use the same economic leverage on him that proved so successful when President John Vorster used it to make Ian Smith give up a unilateral declaration of independence twenty years ago.

Pace Christenson, there is no Mbeki "record of extraordinary success in negotiating democratic outcomes in Southern Africa." Thus far the record is of Nujoma overturning the constitution to secure a third presidential term in Namibia, the abortive South African invasion of Lesotho in 1998 and endless and quite fruitless politicking over the Congo. In addition, as my article showed, Mbeki forced through a "free and fair" verdict on the Zimbabwean June 2000 elections which were manifestly not free or fair. In prospect now is the likelihood that Mbeki will again try to fasten a "free and fair" label on the 2002 Zimbabwean presidential election and thus allow Mugabe, already in power for 22 years, a further five-year

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term. Already a wide range of international bodies—most recently the International Bar Association—have denounced Mugabe's abandonment of the rule of law, his use of torture, mass beatings and murder against political opponents and his attacks on the press and judiciary. The idea that the 2002 election can be free or fair is, under such circumstances, already preposterous. Indeed, President Mugabe routinely declares that the Movement for Democratic Change opposition "will never, ever be allowed to rule Zimbabwe"—apparently regardless of any election result.

President Mbeki's abandonment of President Mandela's human rights commitment is simply a sad fact which no amount of flannel and PR can disguise. Apart from keeping Mugabe in power, the sole result of Mbeki's policy is to ensure that other international actors—the United States, the EU and the Commonwealth—will have to bypass Mbeki if they are to fashion a policy to save democracy in Zimbabwe. He is now simply part of the problem, not part of the solution.

Sovereignty:

In Senator Helms' imperious article, "American Sovereignty and the UN" (Winter 2000/01), "the American people" are implicitly referred to as a collective body of homogenous thinkers. Would any, never mind all, Americans agree that our leaders have the self-ascribed right to disregard other nations' sovereignty, simply based upon those leaders' judgments of other countries' actions? If so, it is no surprise that we are referred to as a "hyperpower" by some nations. Senator Helms convincingly says that leaders such as Saddam Hussein, Fidel Castro and Slobodan Milosevic derive their sovereignty from the consent of their people, and if they are oppressing, or killing their citizens, they do not have the right to have their sovereignty respected. With that, not many would argue. However, was it the public in the former Yugoslavia that invited NATO to wage a bombing campaign? While Senator Helms speaks of leaders who oppress their people, let us remember the Iraqis (the children, in particular), who continue to pointlessly suffer under the sanctions that have lasted almost ten years. Let us also remember the people of Baghdad who have been repeatedly bombed because of their leader's stubborn refusal to allow weapons inspections.

Senator Helms says that the UN does not have the right to impose its utopian vision of international law on Americans. He says that America's actions are inherently legitimate and do not require the consent of the UN or any other country. These vainglorious proclamations that assert America's role in the world as a hegemon could come back to haunt the United States. It is true, the United States emerged victorious from the Cold War. However, does that mean we have the right to assert our interests over the rest of the world? How long will other countries sit idly by as the United States undermines the very international law which seeks to protect them? The arrogant actions of the United States ultimately may lead to terrorism, the loss of allies, or worse. As the omnipotent Senator Helms speaks on behalf of Americans, defining what we want, it is difficult not to notice that his speaking on our behalf represents a microcosm of America imposing its values on the rest of the world.

KELLY TOBIN
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Islamism:

Ray Takeyh's "Islamism: R.I.P." (Spring 2001) argues, rightly, that Islamism (or fundamentalist Islam) must fail because of its inherent weaknesses. But he errs in thinking that moment is upon us.

Takeyh skews his analysis by choosing three countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iran) and almost randomly declaring them the "bookends" of the Muslim world, then showing how Islamism is in retreat in all three. Had he chosen three other, no less important countries—say, Morocco,

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Pakistan and Indonesia—and called them "bookends", he could have made a convincing case for the continued rise of Islamism.

More broadly, the author (in the footsteps of Olivier Roy's 1992 study, *L'Echec de l'Islam politique*, which he surprisingly does not mention as his intellectual precursor) ignores the fact that Islamism remains on the ascendant from Afghanistan to Atlanta. Whether one's measure be lives lost or political assertiveness, far from having failed, the Islamist movement is more vibrant and bellicose than ever before.

Do I need to remind Takeyh how the Morocco Islamist movement has challenged the government's legitimacy? That Nigeria is going through an acute national crisis because of the sudden decision of some states to apply Shari'a law? That Islamists have prosecuted a religious war in Sudan that has caused the most horrific humanitarian crisis in the world today? That a Muslim vigilante group in Cape Town, South Africa, has set off about one bomb per month over the past three years? That the explosion of the U.S.S. *Cole* in Aden reflects the surge of Islamism in Yemen? That Hamas is steadily gaining strength *vis-à-vis* the Palestine Liberation Organization? That the main opposition to the already fervently Islamic Saudi regime is a Taliban-like movement? That the growth of *jihad* movements in Pakistan has led to a wave of terrorism around the world? That Islamists in the Philippines are engaged in an active attempt to break up the country? That their counterparts in Indonesia have created violent crises in such regions as Timor, Aceh and the Moluccas? That France in late 2000 witnessed the largest wave of anti-Semitic violence since World War II, all carried out by Islamists? That virtually every American Muslim organization invited to the White House to celebrate the Islamic holidays is Islamist?

The list goes on and on. Only a selective vision and willful disregard of the facts can lead an analyst to look around today and declare that "the failure of political Islam" is upon us. This failure will come in good time, as Takeyh suggests, but it has not yet happened.

DANIEL PIPES
Middle East Quarterly

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Writing on Islamism in Algeria, Egypt and Iran, Ray Takeyh claims that, with the defeat of Islamic fundamentalists, the onward march of political Islam has reached a cul-de-sac. And the Islamists, instead of flogging the ideological dead horse, should concentrate on political liberalization and economic modernization.

While Takeyh's conclusion may be valid in regions where Islam holds sway, in the non-Muslim world the Islamists' struggle for supremacy continues unabated, and is still far from over. Islamic movements in these regions (India and Russia), although not dissimilar to those in the Middle East, have two distinct features. First, they are directed not against fellow Muslims but against non-Muslims. Second, they are driven not just by the call to return to pristine Islam, but also by the engine of Islamic triumphalism. In fact, they are in many respects akin to religious wars, supported not just by many local Muslims, but also by Muslim *umma* (universal community of believers) throughout the world.

Armed insurgencies in India (Kashmir) and Russia (Chechnya) started in the early nineties, but today Islamists control both of these. Their declared aim, especially in Kashmir, is to create a Caliphate state that would stretch from Kashmir through Pakistan to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

The defeat of Islamists in Algeria, Egypt and Iran is undoubtedly a serious setback to political Islam, but it is not a fatal blow. Political Islam is an ideology, and Islamists are engaged in violent campaigns to impose that ideology. A single defeat or victory, as the Cold War repeatedly demonstrated, seldom decides the final outcome of ideological conflicts. Only economic collapse, like the one brewing in Islamic Afghanistan, would put an end to the growth of political Islam.

RANDHIR SINGH BAINS
Essex, UK

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Recent events show that Ray Takeyh's eulogy of fundamentalist Islam could not have been more off base. This is especially true in the three countries he cites: Egypt, Algeria and Iran.

Takeyh is correct in that Egypt's Islamist population has "sensibly rejected the notion that the violent overthrow of the state would magically solve all its problems." But that does not mean the movement has lost popularity, or that it would not support militancy again. A closer look shows that the Islamist movement in Egypt is as strong as ever. Even the government-censored media freely admits that repeated clampdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) have not undermined the outlawed organization's popularity.

In February, despite repeated efforts by the Egyptian military to turn away voters in heavy Islamist districts, MB candidates running for seats in the People's Assembly succeeded in taking seventeen, more than any other opposition party. Further, in the recent Egyptian Bar Association elections, MB-supported candidates won twenty seats—a clear majority. Takeyh must surely be aware of the fact that professional associations in Egypt are the true gauges of the popularity of Islamism. Egypt is far from finished with its ongoing fight against fundamentalist Islam.

Takeyh's assessment that "after nearly a decade of civil war, the Algerian military has effectively defeated the Islamist insurgency" could not be further from the truth. Recent reports show that Algeria's battle with Islamism has intensified, not waned. About 450 people have been killed so far this year in attacks carried out by the extremist Armed Islamic Group (GIA). These attacks have been reported across the country; targets have included both civilians and military personnel alike. Clearly, the amnesty deal offered to Islamist militants in early 2000 has fallen short of its goals. The Islamist movement continues to wreak havoc in Algeria.

Finally, Takeyh erroneously asserts that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's radical Islamic Republic "died with him" in 1989. Since President Muhammad Khatemi's 1997 landslide election, it appeared that Iran's reform movement was gaining ground, using the constitution, legislature and democratic building blocks already in place. In recent months, however, Iran's mullahs have regained strength while weakening Khatemi's power base as the re-election registration deadline rapidly approaches. Khomeini's protégé, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who served as president from 1989 to 1997, is also rumored to be making a political comeback. This is an ominous sign for Iranian liberalization. Rafsanjani is thought to be behind state-sponsored killings of dissidents, and is a long time supporter of the Hizballah terrorist organization in Lebanon.

Pace Takeyh's assessment, a simple survey of the media clearly shows that fundamentalist Islam, particularly in Egypt, Algeria and Iran, is alive and well.

JONATHAN J. SCHANZER
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Takeyh replies:

All the three respondents have one thing in common, namely, they have failed to account for the fact that after decades of activism, with the exception of Iran, militant Islamists have failed to assume control of regional governments. Even in Iran, the Islamists are struggling to redefine their failed revolutionary dogma in order to appeal to a relentless and disillusioned constituency. Obviously in a region where religion permeates the political culture, Islam will influence the parameters of public discourse. However, such influence does not suggest that radical Islamists are on the threshold of appropriating state power. Although they will always tempt those befuddled by the relentless march of modernity, Islamists have thoroughly failed to provide a viable alternative to the normative order—however defective that order may be.

In a curious manner, all three respondents concur with my assessment of Islamism's ideological shortcomings, but then defend its alleged resilience. Pipes begins by noting that Islamism "must fail because of its inherent weaknesses," and then proceeds to

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note its ascendance "from Afghanistan to Atlanta." Does Pipes really believe that there are forces and movements seeking to emulate the Taliban, or that the Islamists are poised to assume control of the Atlanta city council and use its august powers to subvert Christendom? Pipes enumerates an impressive list of Islamists attacks, failing to appreciate the difference between random and desperate acts of terror with mass movements capable of overthrowing secular states. For his part, Schanzer defies both popular literature and scholarly treatises by continuing to note that "Algeria's battle with Islamism has intensified, not waned." Schanzer would be well advised to note that the debate on Algeria has shifted since 1993 and the current quandary is how to compel the military oligarchs to fully rehabilitate the political institutions.

After reading the critical responses, I am even more assured in my judgment that the moment of militant Islam has now passed.

China:

I like to think that I am still too young to be, as Charles Horner implies ("China and the Historians", Spring 2001), a non-Chinese China specialist relic about to be pushed over the evolutionary precipice by a new generation of Chinese China specialists, but I am otherwise gratified to learn that minds like his are observing what is happening in China history writing.

Too often, commentators use China's imperial history as a rhinestone crutch for the conceit of modern Chinese leaders as "emperors" and China's political culture as "traditionally" authoritarian, paranoid or inhumane. In fact, as Horner suggests, and as I would argue openly, the important thing about modern Chinese history is that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is *not* an empire—but tries with monotonous failure to reconcile the geographical, economic and cultural disparities of the Qing empire with the political culture of a republic. It is, in fact, the only successor state of an early modern empire to attempt such a thing. And so, put in the framework of the past two or three hundred years and the histories of the other great land empires of early modern Eurasia, the Qing-to-PRC narrative appears very immediate, without the bright threshold between traditional and modern that we are often conditioned to see.

And was the Qing imperial ideology "really" like I say it was? It was really written like I say it was written by the empire itself. No historian can prove that the way things were written was the way they were. We can only say how it was written, and guess why it was written that way.

Many thanks for a terrifically insightful essay.

PAMELA KYLE CROSSLEY
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Southeast Asia:

Peter Hartcher's article, "From Miracle to Malaise: Southeast Asia Goes South" (Spring 2001) errs on one datum: there were not 36 but 48 parties in the free Indonesian elections of 1999. On everything else, Hartcher's proportions are splendidly judged: economic catastrophe, democratic fission, and fragmentation of ASEAN as a regional entity.

To amplify his already broad historical perspective: The NATO powers and the Washington sisters, IMF and World Bank, took the region for granted when it opposed the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and while it built up economic momentum. Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines stood for suffocation of communism and unregulated free enterprise. Now we are a dozen years beyond the first achievement, and into reanalysis of the second.

Dinner recently with a director of a mutual fund specializing in Asia reminded me of decades long preoccupation by such vehicles with cheap resources, cheap labor, authoritarian governments and their armies. Recent

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shocks have opened him to understanding more about parasitic regimes, oppressive militaries and reckless conglomerates.

We need not ask only for whom the Southeast Asian bells toll, but should listen for tintinnabular feedback in our own systems. Where does investment opacity and arrogance exceed that of Long Term Capital Management, the elegant, over-leveraged hedge fund of Greenwich, CT, and offshore? Did one wildly errant group deserve a federal bailout (in 1998) equal to one-fifth of the IMF package for Thailand?

Why was so little notice taken (because of the notorious pardons of Americans?) of the conviction of James Riady for fraud regarding illegal campaign contributions of the Indonesian conglomerate, Lippo, to candidate and President Clinton during 1990–94? Nine days before going out of office President Clinton's government announced Riady's plea bargain: a fine of $8.6 million, for conspiring to defraud the United States by reimbursing campaign donors with foreign corporate funds.

To mad speculation and systemic corruption, not just "they" over there need to wake up, but we over here. □

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Come, give us a taste of your quality.
—Hamlet, Act II, Scene II.

The decision by the evaluation committee of Gauteng education department to drop Nadine Gordimer's *July's People* on the grounds that it was "racist" has created a predictable media storm over misplaced political correctness. . . .

Far more revealing were the same committee's decisions to drop *Hamlet* as "not optimistic or uplifting" and Orwell's *Animal Farm* because it had "an element of subversive rebellion against the state." In contemporary South Africa few dilemmas could be as contemporary as Hamlet's realisation that what is conventionally accepted as reality is far from the political truth, while the last scene of *Animal Farm*, in which it is impossible to distinguish the revolutionary pigs from the human masters they have overthrown, is painfully redolent of the way in which the new black elite has come to resemble the white rulers it succeeded. *Hamlet* and *Animal Farm* are books for any century in a way that *July's People* is not.

—R.W. Johnson, *Sunday Times* (London), April 22, 2001

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